Marder's Argument Contract

-The Reasoning: the face that the appellant did not like the fee indicated does not preclude the finding of a binding contract. Appellant intended to negotiate, but never did so. Appellant

8) Chris promises Dina $40,000 if she graduates from Eagle College. Dina enrolls in Eagle, attends full-time for four years, and graduates. When Dina asks Chris for $40,000, Chris says, “I don’t remember promising you $40,000. But if there was a promise, it’s not enforceable, because we didn’t bargain for it. And even if there was a promise that would otherwise be enforceable, I revoke it now.” Can Dina enforce Chris’s “promise”? Why or why

In week four’s theory practice, we reviewed the case scenario of Big Time Toymaker vs Chou in regards to determining the validity of a contract.  As we’ve reviewed, an agreement or mutual assent is of course essential to a valid contract but the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts. If his words and acts, judged by a reasonable standard, manifest an intention to agree, it is immaterial what may be the real but unexpressed state of his mind (Melvin, 2010).

Mr. Slim Jim verbally submitted an offer to Mr. Potbelly who proceeded to accept Mr. Slim Jims’ offer unequivocally (pg. 122). The “Basic Requirements of a Contract” (pg. 107) were completed. In this bilateral contract (pg. 107), “Communication of Acceptance” (pg. 123) was evident as Mr. Potbelly responded “Sure I’ll take it” when Mr. Slim Jim submitted an offer for the pottery and enthusiastically replied “I’ll take it!” when Mr. Slim Jim gave him an offer of cash for his home. As a result of this, Mr. Slim Jim is suing for the “right to obtain specific performance” asking that the agreement be upheld. Also, according to “admissions” (one of the “exceptions to the statutes of frauds” (pg. 175) Mr. Potbelly’s agreement should be upheld.

Gregory, a comedy writer, entered into a contract with Wessel, a comedian. The contract provided that Gregory would provide Wessel with a 15 minute monologue for his upcoming appearance on the comedy Hour and that Wessel would pay Gregory $250. All Performers on the comedy Hour make $500 per appearance. As Gregory knows, the last time Wessel appeared on the Comedy Hour he was asked to make special guest appearances at three local comedy clubs using the same monologue. Wessel earned a total of $750 for the three performances. Shortly before Wessel was scheduled to appear on the comedy Hour, Gregory informed Wessel that he was unable to provide the monologue. As a result, Wessel was forced to cancel his appearance. Wessel sued for breach of contract and requested damages of $1,250. What will result? Issue, -

At this time, I also approached the possibility of settling this case pursuant to a compromise and release. As you know, the Stipulations with Request for Award we were ready to accept were for 24% PD paid at a rate of $160.00 per week. The stipulation was for the applicant’s lumbar spine and left knee only. The monetary value of this stipulation would be $15,280.00. I indicated to the applicant’s attorney that I had authority to settle the claim pursuant to a Compromise and Release for $24,000.00. After further discussions, the applicant’s attorney took the Stipulations and indicated he would discuss the Compromise and Release with the applicant.

Bickham v. Washington Bank & Trust Company is a case that involves a formal bilateral contract that was entered into by businessman Bruce Bickham and G. S. Adams, Jr., Vice President of the Washington Bank & Trust Company in 1976 (Cheeseman, 2013). According to Cheeseman (2013), the facts of the case indicate that Bickham would conduct his personal and corporate banking with Washington Bank & Trust and the bank would provide loans to Bickham at 7.5 percent interest rate with 10 years to repay the loans. The language of this bilateral contract translates to what is referred to as a “promise for a promise” whereby no act of performance is necessary to form this kind of contract… and it is an enforceable contract (Cheeseman, 2013). The findings of

The following case American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Kennedy & Crawford, 103 Va. 171 (Va.1904) it is expressed that; where the consideration for the promise of one party is the promise of the other party, there must be absolute mutuality of engagement, so that each party has the right to hold the other to a positive agreement. Both parties must be bound or neither is bound. A party making a promise is bound to nothing until a promisee, within a reasonable time, engages to do, or else do or begins to do, the thing which is the condition of the first promise. Until such engagement or such doing, the promisor may withdraw his promise, because there is no mutuality, and therefore no consideration for it.

In Kaye, this Court relied on comment a to § 295 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for the proposition that “[d]ischarge by release . . . has long been regarded as an executed transaction rather than an executory promise.” Kaye, 227 Md. App. at 682. Therefore, any right to maintain an action on the released obligation ceased at the time Lawrence Kaye gave the release. Likewise, in this case, “a lawsuit predicated on claims that have been [waived] cannot be actionable as a breach of contract, because a [waiver] is a unit of consideration that is tendered . . . immediately at the time of contracting.” Kaye, 227 Md. App. at 682.

I agree with court’s decision to dismiss Ms. Marder’s grievance against Paramount. Ms. Marder made a contract with Paramount and sold away the rights to her story. The contract between Ms.Marder and Paramount was legal and binding; the courts could not favor her. Paramount became the legal own of Ms. Marder’s story at the time of its purchase; the price they paid for her story, although quite small, was the amount she had agreed to.

The offer and acceptance model is flawed- only an agreement is necessary. In order to fully comprehend this statement, we must first establish what constitutes and offer and what constitutes acceptance. “An offer is a statement by one party of willingness to enter into a contract on stated terms, provided that these terms are, in turn, accepted by the party to whom the offer is addressed”. Acceptance is “…an unqualified expression of ascent to the terms proposed by the offeror”. The “Offer and acceptance model” is based on the court’s adopt the “mirror image” rule of contractual formation. Applying the definitions stated above, we can take this to mean that there must be a clear and unequivocal offer which must be matched by an equally

I agree with the court’s decision in favor of Mills. The case fall under the Statue of Fraud One year rule as it had been 107 months since the oral contract was created. The oral agreement was unenforceable after the time period as it violates the Statute of Fraud. Mrs. Sawyer did not have the agreement in writing; therefore it could not be enforced even though he had paid a little over 13 months in checks.

Besides BonJour's argument of illustrative examples, moderate rationalism is defended by two intimately related dialectical arguments. The argument is that the denial of a priori justification will lead to a severe skepticism, in which only the most direct experience could be justified. Stemming from this severe skepticism, comes the stronger argument that argumentation itself becomes impossible. This essay will describe the distinct segments of the argument and will demonstrate the relationship between the two arguments.

Contractual agreements are supposed to be consensual, and freely entered into by the parties involved. Therefore, ‘before a court enforces a relationship as a contract, the courts must have a reasonably certain basis in fact to justify binding the parties to each other.’ (St. John’s Law Scholarship Repository, no date). Resolution of whether a contract was intended to be legally binding is not determined by what the parties themselves thought or intended. Rather, a more objective stance is taken by the courts. This is known as the objective theory of contract, and essentially enables ‘the courts to look at external evidence (what the parties said and did at the time)’ (Poole, 2006, p. 34), as to objectively indicate the parties’ intentions

Before unilateral contracts come into place, contract law is about a promise for a promise. Cases such as Carlill v Carbonic Smoke Ball Co. have shown how the contract law has adapted to accommodate this form of contract. Judges seek to identify consideration and acceptance in unilateral contracts whilst managing to achieve a balance between protecting reasonable expectation of an honest man and retaining respect for the sanctity of contract.