How Do Allied Forces Control Sea Lines Of The Gulf Oil?

Meanwhile, the British and the French were colonial powers which prior to the start of the Second World War, had empires which were large and expansive. They had colonies in the Carribean, in Africa, as well as in Asia. Whilst both countries came out of the war as victors, they had suffered embarrassing early defeats to Japan and Germany respectively, which was a knock to colonial prestige (Nairn, 2003, p.3). The post-war scenario was one in which colonies like Indochina and India rose up to demand independence and the right for self-determination from their previous rulers. It was clear to many in this time period that the traditional system of empire was finished, and with it the power of previous colonial rulers (Hyam, 2006, p.239). Britain and France, not surprisingly, were unwilling to let this happen. When Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, they saw this as a threat to their already diminishing empire, as not only would it lead ‘inevitably to the loss one by one of all our interests and assets in the Middle East’ (Hyam, 2006, p.227), it would also lead to an increase in distance between their

Since the US decided to support the Israeli military and make a post-war peace negotiation with Egypt and Israel, known as the Camp David Accords, the Arab members of OPEC imposed an embargo against the United States cutting off their oil supply. In Document C it says, “Because of that war, most of the Middle Eastern oil producers have reduced overall production and cut off their shipments of oil to the United States.” Showing that not everyone agreed with America when it came to supporting Israeli military and that the Middle East has more control over American than we would like. Another reason the OPEC oil embargo happened is because of the Camp David Accords. In Document D it depicts a newspaper with the headline, “Egypt and Israel Sign Formal Treaty, Ending a State of War After 30 Years,” which shows that America wanted to gain allies in the Middle East and not everyone in the Middle East was happy about

First of all, France and Britain hoped to regain Western power over Africa using the concept of alliances during the Suez

History has provided us a lesson about great power involvement in the Middle East. It is that, when superpowers drift away, peace, progress, moderation and stability do not necessarily follow in their position. While the result pattern of Great power intervention is familiar, we never fail to be shocked by the

forces became a potential threat to Allied supply routes in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

The Allied Powers, during World War II, recognized the only way to achieve a decisive victory was to work in conjunction, and utilize one another’s strengths and assets. However, Great Britain and the United States had differing views on the proper strategy. The United States believed concentrating its power at the earliest possible moment to attack an enemy’s critical center of gravity was the appropriate course of action (Greenfield, 1963, p. 25). The United States desired to conduct a cross channel amphibious assault and securing the French coastline from German forces. Great Britain viewed American strategy, operations, and tactics as reckless and inexperienced (Greenfield, 1963, p. 43). Winston Churchill preferred his forces to concentrate their efforts in the Mediterranean and North Africa, through more cautious engagements, to preserve economic stability in the region, while allowing the Russians to fight Germany directly and weaken German resolve. Successful unified operations in the Mediterranean were necessary, prior to conducting the cross channel invasion, in order to provide the Allies with increased strategic advantages, as well as increased faith in the commitment to combined war efforts. First, the United States needed to prove to Britain that its military forces were able to plan and execute disciplined combined operational

The United States has engaged in numerous international interventions in the Middle East. The two major events that have shaped the politics of U.S. foreign policy, Israel, and the Arab states are the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Six Day War of 1967. President Eisenhower and President Johnson each took different approaches while confronting these crises. The personalities, motives and predispositions of the Presidents and their circle of closest advisors explain how they shaped their policies and how they responded to the events. The decisions these Presidents made have had a long-lasting effect on the region. Over the course of this paper, I will compare Eisenhower’s policies in the 1956 Suez Crisis and Johnson’s policies in the 1967 Six

After the Axis’s power defeat in the North African Campaign the Allies decide to attack Italy hoping that it would stop some of the fascist regime from the war.1 The purpose of the attack was to stop air and sea potential from the Axis’s hold on the island and gain access to Mediterranean sea as well as defeat the Italian

to maintain a primary economic tie to the Middle East region’s foremost commodity, oil. The U.S. should remain at least a nominal consumer of Middle Eastern oil, while maintaining the capacity to be energy independent in times of crisis, in order to retain economic influence in the Middle East region.

This book consisted of five large chapters. Each chapter was about a small group of people who played a significant role in the victory of World War 2. The names of the chapters are: How To Get Convoys Safely Across The Atlantic, How To Win Command Of The Air, How To Stop A Blitzkrieg, How To Seize An Enemy-Held Shore, and How To Defeat The “Tyranny Of Distance.” Most of the events that are described in this book occurred between the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 and July 1944.

Background: In the midst of the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict, conflict arose over Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. This was of particular concern due to Nasser’s increased connection with the Soviet Union, through the Czech Arms agreement and the Aswan Dam. Following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, Great Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt. In facing this crisis, the U.S. had to consider Cold War politics with the Soviet Union, relations with Arab and Israeli nations, and relations with the invading powers

Conflict over energy resources—and the wealth and power they create—has become an increasingly prominent feature for geopolitics particularly in the Middle East . The discovery of oil in the late nineteenth century added a dimension to the region as major outside states powers employed military force to protect their newly acquired interests in the Middle East. The U.S.’s efforts to secure the flow of oil have led to ever increasing involvement in the Middle East region’s political affairs and ongoing power struggles. By the end of the twentieth century, safeguarding the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf had become one of the most important functions of the U.S. military establishment. The close relationship between the United States and the Saudi royal family was formed in the final months of World War II, when U.S. leaders sought to ensure preferential access to Saudi petroleum. The U.S. link with Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region has demonstrated to be greatly beneficial to both parties, yet it has also led to ever deepening U.S. involvement in regional politics.

During this period, Iran's objectives were to end the war by having both sides withdraw to the common border as it had existed prior to the invasion. Baghdad wanted Teheran’s consent to the revision of a 1975 treaty that had defined their common border as the middle channel of the Shatt al Arab (which Iranians call the Arvand Rud).

The ambition of the often autocratic leaders to acquire more land, which may bring them access to oil, water or arable land. The problem according to Sørli et. al is “scarcity” and “abundance” (147). Water is scarce, and oil is in abundance, but the access to both is limited. According to our text, the new “water wars” have emerged as a major source of conflict, in addition to the “oil wars” (Anderson et. al, 226). Water is scarce in the Middle East, and will continue to dwindle as the population rises. Not every country has the same access to the water sources, which will naturally cause problems. For example, Israel has control of the Golan, and Egypt of the Nile, and Kuwait of the Persian Gulf. Oil is in abundance, but only to a limited number of countries in the Middle East causing great economic disparity between those who have, and those who do not. Kuwait, having access to the Persian Gulf, produces a large supply of oil to international players. Given its high value internationally, and its worth, oil is much sought after.

Since the end of the Cold War, water has assumed a more prominent place in the diplomatic relations between Israel, Jordan, and the other Middle Eastern states. Beginning