Judgment The judge had found that there was a reasonable prospect of litigation in January 2002 report when Halcrow was appointed. However, the instructions from the reinsurers were not for the predominant purpose of anticipated litigation. Consequently, the litigation privilege would not be attached to Halcrow’s reports. The line divided between a reasonable prospect of litigation and a mere possibility was not clear and the judge thought that this might came close to a borderline case. However, the judge took it into account that the insurance cover was only available for the roads constructed according to the certain standards and this could be confirmed by conducting a survey within a reasonable period of time. After the survey had been …show more content…
The reason was that the roads were not constructed according to the standard in which the end results were the rejection of the claim from the reinsurers as well as that the litigation would inevitably …show more content…
In addition, he said that it was profoundly unsatisfactory as the reinsurers were claiming the privilege while retaining Halcrow as their expert in the litigation. If the reinsurers were to be entitled with the privilege that they had a right to it, this however seems that most of the material in dispute would have a disclosed anyway. Hence, it was considered to be wasteful and inefficient to spend time just to argue about the claim to the privilege in which the short period of time would be irrelevant. Commentary The claim for the litigation privilege was foundered because the civil engineers were instructed for dual purposes with equal importance in which only one of these purposes might have the lead to the denial of insurance cover and potential litigation. Based on the judge’s comments, he suggested that he might have reached a different conclusion if the instructions and the reports were to be separated into distinct parts in which one of them was in the quantum and the another one was on contentious issue of coverage. Besides that, the judge had clearly took a dim view of the reinsurers on claiming the privilege that would have to be disclosed anyway when Halcrow had provided their expert evidence to the court. The reinsurers might found
FACTS -- Subsequent to a failed attempt from the plaintiff to appeal and receive the right to a trial, Harold Caldwell filed a bill of review for a case that was decided with his absence due to a dearth of convenient notification. The contrasting party, Robert Barnes, declared that he hired private process server DeWayne Perdew, to deliver the summon to Caldwell and that the decision made by the lower courts is correct. The decision of lower courts was made during a pretrial hearing, denying Caldwell a trial.
The defendants wanted to apply reasonable principles in search of specific performance of the contract. The disposition of the immediate motion for partial summary judgment and objection was controlled. “The court found that although the doctrine of mutuality of remedies may be alive and well in Virginia in actions at law for damages, that was not the case where, regardless of a lack of support of remedy at the time the contract was created, complete performance may, if revealed, afford a party specific performance of the contract for the sale of land.”
The court ruled that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was correct for the promissory estoppels claim. The plaintiff’s breach of contract claim case was remanded back to the lower court for further determination.
The four D’s of negligence are duty, dereliction of duty, direct or proximate cause, and
In conclusion, this case could have been started for monetary reasons, but the initial decision appeared to be made based on the case being controversial in many areas beyond monetary considerations.
The counsel used the specific phrasing “potentially, but not probably”, which logically could be interpreted to fall into the “Reasonably possible” category as it does not seem remote. The reasonably possible criterion indicates that the chance of the future event or events occurring is more than remote but less than probable. If we are to interpret this case as reasonably possible but not probable or reasonably estimable, we can say that the losses in question meet the ASC 450-20-50-3 criteria, thus requiring disclosure. Also, given that the fallout from this litigation could have a potentially significant detrimental impact on investors and other stakeholders, it is necessary for disclosure to be made as it could considerably affect future net cash flows.
MDM Group Associates, Inc.v. CX Reinsurance Company Ltd. 165 P.3d 882 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) ch 35
Our firm consisted of experienced entities that looked over topics such as legal matters, statistics that provided all the necessary knowledge in analyzing the facts and issues of the case. Our findings include future recommendations and strategic considerations that will assist in precluding a similar situation from arising.
The main issue of this case is concerning whether documents a privileged. Richard Frederick is both an attorneys and an accountant which he provides both services for the Lenz family. Currently the Lenz family and their company is being investigated by the IRS. In this investigation the IRS has summoned for documents to be handed over. Most of the documents that were requested are connected to the tax returns of the Lenz family and their company. Frederick will not hand of the documents arguing attorney-client privilege. The IRS argues back that these documents are not privileged because they are documents that other accountants or CPA firms would use.
To follow-up on our conversation about Marty Anderson, he called me on Monday to advise us that he has been working on getting our firm on the Chubb liability approve list. He told me that Steve Bradley, the large loss adjuster on the Cutaia case that we have been handling, was very pleased with our handling of that high level matter, legal analysis and recommendation. I can tell you that the analysis was extensive, involving the law of three separate states. This involved a coverage question involving Mr. Cutaia’s property. Mr. Cutaia is a billionaire. One of his properties is located outside of Charlottesville. He had an underground bunker constructed. There were construction defects in the construction which led to the collapse
As the condition of reasonable reliance is unsatisfied, the Authority and the Council were under no duty of care as to the making of a representation that the plan was feasible. Even if the plaintiffs and the defendants erroneously believed that the plan was feasible, in the losses which they incurred by relying on the feasibility of the plan.
With Bill’s special disadvantage established the majority judges then examined Neil’s knowledge and exploitation of the disadvantage. Through cross examination listed in paragraph it was acknowledged that Neil was aware of Bill’s affection for him. It was also established that Neil was aware that the properties acquired in 1988 and those available under the option in the will were being received at good value for him.
In Deepa v Goodman Law, if Deepa was advised she would not have to give evidence regarding her affair, the trial could have been more favourable to her. The results of kendirjian v lepore was that immunity from suit did not extend to negligent advice which leads to a compromise of litigation by agreement between the parties. As the majority joint judgment explained, by the same reasoning it is difficult to envisage how the immunity could ever extend to advice not to settle a case.
The defendants were negotiating the sale of their company to the plaintiffs, on the 17th of March 1987 they “entered into an agreement whereby, provision of a comfort letter from the plaintiff’s bank (indicating that loan
Controversy surrounds the ground of the section 19MIA. Both the decisions of Blackburn v Vigors3 and the Blackburn v Haslam4 contribute to the codification of section 19 MIA. Phillips J in Deutsche Ruckversicherungs v Walbrook Insurance5 upheld the view that the duty of disclosure of the agent to insure finds ground on the imputation of the agent 's to insure knowledge to the assured. This viewpoint was one of the opinions explicitly put forward in the Vigor 's decision which contradicts the other viewpoint in the same case, whereas it was maintained that this duty is an independent one irrespective of the assured 's actual or constructive knowledge. The latter notion was later upheld in Sail v Farex6.