Gibbons V. Ogden Case Study

Gibbons vs. Ogden (1824), the question asked was: Did the state of New York exercise authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the regulation of interstate commerce? A New York state law gave people the right to operate steamboats on waters within state jurisdiction. Thomas Gibbons, a steamboat owner, did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license and challenged the monopoly license granted by New York to Aaron Ogden. New York courts consistently upheld the state monopoly. The unanimous court ruled that the New Yorks licensing requirement for out of state operators was inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coastal trade. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the supremacy clause. Marshall developed a clear definition of the work commerce which included navigation on interstate waterways. Marshall gave meaning to the phrase “among several states” in the commerce clause, he concluded that the regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for the purpose of conducting was a power reserved to and exercised by

Since steamboats can be licensed the same as sailboats, the New York enjoinment that inhibits any vessel from using its waters conflicts with Congressional power and is unconstitutional.

The sixth and fourteenth amendment both protect rights having to do with due process and right to counsel.

The decision of the Supreme Court was unified. The court argued that Congress alone had the right to monitor coastal trade. The Court decided that communication is the actual trade of goods. The justices also decided that one or more states had a working hand in the commerce that was in conflict. The Court was dominate in the favor of Gibbons. The actual court decision read: "If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several states is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single

Throughout an 18-hour period on October 26, 1989, the appellant Marc Creighton, a companion Frank Caddedu and the deceased Kimberley Ann Martin consumed a large quantity of alcohol and cocaine. The afternoon of the following day on October 27, the three planned to share a quantity of cocaine at Ms. Martin’s apartment. The evidence and later testimony indicates that all of the members involved are experienced cocaine users. The appellant acquired 3.5 grams (“an eight-ball”) of cocaine; he did not try to determine the quality or potency of the cocaine before injecting it into himself and Frank Caddedu.

It is important because it brings a balance of power by allowing states to make their own laws and still keeping the national government as the supreme decider for situations when conflict arises. In Gibbons v. Ogden, New York tried to monopolize on steamboat operations. The federal government has the power to regulate any and all interstate activity under the Commerce clause and this is enforced through the Supremacy clause. New York exercised an authority that is reserved to the federal government through the Commerce clause. As a result of the Supremacy Clause, Congress is given power over the states. Any nature of interstate commerce fell under federal government jurisdiction. In the Gibbons v Ogden case, the Supreme Court upheld broad congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, stating that the New York Law was invalid by virtue of the supremacy clause. Marshall's was one of the earliest and most influential opinions concerning this important clause. He concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress. This case is an example of federalism were the Federal government is given a power that over the states and supersedes States’

The Tennessee vs. Garner case in 1985 reiterated the unlawful nature of deadly force when used by law enforcement officers. A few years later, the justification of excessive force transpired during the Graham vs. Connor case in 1989. In this case, the concept of "reasonableness" was explored when a police officer followed a man’s car because of personal suspicions. Berry Graham was handcuffed and questioned. In the midst of the arrest, Graham experienced discomfort due to his diabetic condition. He simultaneously acquired several cuts and bruises because of the excessive force being used on him. His pleas were ignored, and he proceeded to file a lawsuit claiming that the force that had been used on him violated his fourteenth amendment rights regarding unreasonable searches and seizures. The court justified the practicality of the case and declared that the officer’s force was appropriate regarding the circumstances of the situation. This decision emphasized the powers that law enforcement officers have regarding the amount of force they must use to execute their duties.

“Is the U.S. Constitution a living, breathing document?” Well, there could be lots of answers to this question. This helps our government define our rights and freedoms. The

In the court case Worcester v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1832 that the Cherokee Indians and Samuel Worcester created a nation holding distinct sovereign powers. This decision did not protect the Cherokees from being removed from their tribal birthplace in the Southeast.

The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” Despite its silence as to the effect of that affirmative power, federal courts have recognized the Framers’ wish to create a unified national market and have found a dormant congressional authority in it. Since the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), that dormant authority has limited state regulations that burden interstate commerce, even in the absence of congressional regulation. Congress has the power only to restrict the scope of permissible state regulation but it does not absolutely preclude states from affecting commerce. "[T]he states retain authority under their police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern', even though interstate commerce may be affected." A challenged statute is upheld if its effect on interstate commerce is merely incidental. On the other hand, a state regulation that is facially or practically discriminatory will be defeated unless it shows a legitimate local purpose that cannot be accomplished by any less discriminatory alternatives.

Even If This Court Was To Find That Ms. Brie’s Authority to Consent Was Ambiguous, This Court Must Still Find that the District Court Properly Denied the Defendant-Appellant’s Motion.

In America’s time there have been many great men who have spent their lives creating this great country. Men such as George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson fit these roles. They are deemed America’s “founding fathers” and laid the support for the most powerful country in history. However, one more man deserves his name to be etched into this list. His name was John Marshall, who decided case after case during his role as Chief Justice that has left an everlasting mark on today’s judiciary, and even society itself. Through Cases such as Marbury v. Madison (1803) and McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) he established the Judicial Branch as an independent power. One case in particular, named Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), displayed his

Gibbons v. Ogden was a landmark decision in which the United States Supreme Court held that power to regulate interstate commerce. It was given to congress by the commerce clause of the constitution. It was led by Chief Justice John Marshall. The debate in Gibbons concerned contending cases of adversary steamship establishments. The condition of New York gave Aaron Ogden a select permit to work steamboat ships between New Jersey and New York City on the Hudson River. Thomas Gibbons, another steamboat administrator, ran two ships along the same course. Ogden looked for an order against Gibbons in a New York state court, asserting that the state had issued him elite rights to work the course. Accordingly, Gibbons guaranteed he had the privilege to work on the course in accordance with a 1793 demonstration of Congress directing waterfront business. The New York court found for Ogden and requested Gibbons to stop working his steamships; on bid, the New York Supreme Court avowed the request. Gibbons spoke to the U.S. Preeminent Court, which surveyed the case in 1824. John Marshall ruled for Gibbons, holding that New York 's selective award to Ogden disregarded the government authorizing demonstration of 1793. In coming to its choice, the Court deciphered the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution surprisingly. The proviso peruses that "Congress should have energy to manage trade among the few States." According to the Court, "trade" included articles in

In the decision regarding Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall ruled that a state can't grant a monopoly when it is related to interstate commerce. This gave supremacy to the national government in issues regarding interstate commerce. Through his interpretation of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, John Marshall successfully increased the power of the national government.

Freedom of assembly defines the right to hold public meetings and form associations without interference by the government. In the case of “De Jonge v. Oregon,” the Court protected freedom of assembly from state actions and rather referred to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Dejonge v. Oregon - 1937”). Dirk De Jonge was a member of the Communist Party. De Jonge protested against “police brutality.” Oregon charged De Jonge as wanting to cause civil unrest. However, in the end, the case made it to the Supreme Court who stated the following, “No State . . . shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (“Dejonge v. Oregon - 1937”). “The Court said this means that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime” (“Dejonge v. Oregon - 1937”). Another freedom of assembly case, Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network involved pro-life protestors who surrounded abortion clinics. The Pro-Choice Network complained that pro-life protestors were hassling their clients outside their clinics (“Schenck v. Pro-choice Network (1996) - Bill of Rights Institute”). This case was about the assembly rights of citizens who wanted to protest abortion, which was their First Amendment right (“Schenck v. Pro-choice Network (1996) - Bill of Rights Institute”). The Supreme Court struck down the “floating buffer zone” due to safety concerns, yet upheld that pro-life protesters can still pass out leaflets and make statements from the approved buffer zone (“Schenck