Fodor's Functionalism
Fodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist theory, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of
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Functionalism also states that the output of the system is related to both the input and the internal status of the system at a given time.
Based on the definition of functionalism, the mental processes of a human are not distinct from the systemic processes of a machine. Mental processes are defined as an operation on symbols to yield certain results. Thus, if the same symbols yielded the same results in two separate systems, then the mental states can be seen as similar, or even identical. Along this vein, consider a computer programmed with the same reasoning process as a mind. When the input "B" is entered, the output depends both upon "B" and upon the state of the system resulting from the computation of "A." If the computer was programmed with the exact same reasoning process as a mind, then the result would be the same. Thus, the mental state of the mind would be indistinguishable from the systemic state of the computer. The computer metaphor upholds the theory of functionalism because the output is the result of interaction between the input and the current state of the system. The metaphor also demonstrates the insignificance of the physical state of the system when determining whether two mental states are alike. Thus, it shows that the processes, rather than the composition, of the system determine the mental state.
Searle disagrees with the view that the physical composition of the system does not influence the mental state of the
Functionalism is the dogma for creating something a thought; a desire, a belief, pain, or satisfaction by allowing its dependence only on the role it plays in the cognitive system. Another classic example demonstrated through the functionalist theory, is being in a mental state of pain that induces the notion that something is wrong with one’s body, where the individual wishes to be out of its mental state and as a result, possible behavioral outputs may include wincing, moaning, crying, or anxiety. In the functionalist theory, it states that any creature that is capable of a mental state and meets its conditions experiences pain (Levin). Humans have a process of neural activity, for instance C-fiber stimulation, which meets the conditions of functionalism. Therefore, humans can experience pain by C-fiber stimulation. The theory also allows other creatures with different physical makeups that have mental states can also experience pain. Functionalist became aware that creatures with different types of physical states could experience pain.
The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.
One of the most talked about concepts of philosophy is that of the mind-body problem. In short, the mind-body problem is the relationship between the mind and the body. Specifically, it’s the connection between our mental realm of thoughts, including beliefs, ideas, sensations, emotions, and our physical realm, the actual matter of which we are made up of the atoms, neurons. The problem comes when we put the emphasis on mind and body. Are the mind and body one physical thing, or two separate entities. Two arguments have stood amongst the rest, Interactionism and physicalism. Interactionism claims that mind and matter are two separate categories with a casual integration between the two. By contrast, physicalism draws from the idea that all aspects of the human body are under one physical being, there are no nonphysical connections that come into play. While both state a clear and arguable statement regarding mind-body problem, Interactionism gives a more plausible answer to the mind-body problem because although it may seem like we are tied as one, our minds have a subconscious that influence our thoughts, actions, ideas, and beliefs, which is completely independent from the realm of our physical matter.
In his paper “Mind and Body Problem”, Jerome Shaffer examines the much discussed view of the relation between mental and physical events. According to this view consideration is given to whether or not mental events can occur in the same place the corresponding physical events occur. In the course of his examination of this view, Shaffer considers one difficulty which arises in connection with it, and concludes that it is insurmountable. Unfortunately, his treatment of what he takes to be the central difficulty with the view in question is seriously defected and my purpose in this paper is to indicate wherein its defects lie.
In David Armstrong’s thought-provoking work titled, The Nature of Mind, he explains that the most convincing way to make sense of the mind-body problem is to approach it in a materialistic way. Specifically, Armstrong shows that the science of physico-chemical processes of the brain is the best way to explain the nature of our mind. He goes on to explain traditional and dispositional behaviorism, and states his own materialistic take on behaviorism. His arguments throughout his paper are very logical, and though there have been arguments against his explanations, he effectively justifies the materialistic view of the mind.
Functionalism is a macro system theory which sees society as a mega structure of linked social institutions such as school, family and the legal system. Each different institution is functional to ensure the whole of society is maintained. For example primary socialisation takes place within the home where children are taught basic life
As the tool of scientific investigation increase, the relationship between the mind and the brain has never been more intimate. Chemical changes in our brain could lead to heightened euphoria or it can lead to the most profound depression. Damages to the brain can lead to changes that can eliminate the some abilities of the brain, such as smell, vision, or even the ability to recognized faces. Therefore, this is at that vary lease a powerful correlation between the state of the mind and state of the brain. But this is not enough for the Identity theories, so they go above and beyond this to explain this profound view.
To quote Karl Popper, “Every solution to a problem, raises another unsolved problem” (Williams, 2003, p. 2). It has been a topic debated for centuries, still, a definitive solution is yet to be found that universally satisfies the problem of mind brain identity. The most logical answer comes in the form of monism. Therefore in this paper I will argue that the mind and the brain are identical, as the mind exists only as a property of the brain. David Lewis and D.M Armstrong give support for the causal relationship between mind and brain states in the form of the identity theory, and deal with the multiple realisability argument provided by Hillary Putman. Gottlob Frege provides his support for materialism by showing that mental states are determined by the function of the brain, while discounting Thomas Nagel’s argument which proposes the idea of Qualia. Both the functionalist theory and identity theory reach agreement on the materialistic view that the mind and brain are of the same substance.
Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.
Functionalism is a theory by Durkheim that conveys that all aspects of a society serve a function and are necessary for the survival of that society. In this way, society is like an organism. If all institutions work properly it contributes to the
Functionalism is a system of thinking based in the ideas of the Emile Durkheim that looks at society from a large-scale perspective. It examines the necessary structures that make up the society and how each part helped to keep the society stable. According to functionalism society is heading toward an equilibrium.
The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound
No. While the Turing machine is one model of computation, it is not the only one. The Turing machine is equivalent to other models of computation in the way that the same functions are quantifiable by Turing machines as by other models. However, it is not equivalent to other representations in the stronger sense that the computations operate the same way. Machine functionalism says that thinking is computation. However, I believe that machine functionalism could be strengthened by not committing to the idea that it is Turing machine computation. At this point one might ask, “Why should we call this machine functionalism?” And the answer to that question is that human’s beings, like Mac and PCs, are a type of computing machine.
Functionalism is a consensus perspective, whereby society is based on shared values and norms into which members are socialised. For functionalists, society is seen as a system of social institutions such as the economy, religion and the family all of which perform socialisation functions.
In the philosophy of mind, there are many theories that try to resolve the mind-body problem. That is, how does the mental or consciousness interact with our physical body? Do they interact at all? Are they two separate entities or one in the same? Many theories try to answer these types of questions, but the one I will be focusing on is role functionalism. When mentioning functionalism throughout, I will be referring to role functionalism. Functionalism is a theory that says mental states can be defined by their function. So, we can identify mental states with their functional states. We can come to know the function of a mental state through examining its inputs, outputs, and relation to other mental states. I will show how this theory is correct by comparing it to the identity theory. I will begin by clarifying a few important terms in relation to functionalism, lay out the theory, and then present an objection. Lastly, I will present a possible functionalist reply to the objection and conclude.