Final Memo
LRW# Nathan Orlando
November 20, 2015 MEMORANDUM
TO: Brooke Hardy, Managing Partner
FROM: LRW # Nathan Orlando
DATE: November 20, 2015
RE: Mr. Jason Valdes- Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Question Presented
Under Kentucky State case law, which provides that a wrongdoer is liable under intentional infliction of emotional distress when their conduct is intentional or reckless, so outrageous that it is beyond the standards of morality and decency, and is causally connected to an individual suffering from emotional distress that can be classified as severe, can a pet owner collect damages for emotional distress when a veterinarian fails to inform a pet owner that she performed a surgery that
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Valdes will most likely not be able to recover under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under Kentucky State case law, a person who suffers from severe emotional distress that is intentionally or recklessly caused by the extreme or outrageous conduct of another has the right to recover for their distress. Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Ky. 1984). To recover the plaintiff must first show there are damages that can be monetarily relieved. Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 813 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). Monetary relief can easily be found in Mr. Valdes’s case because he has to take daily medication for his depression and panic attacks, and has not worked as much as he did before his cat’s death. However, to collect these damages under intentional infliction of emotional distress, the remaining four elements must be met: (1) the wrongdoer’s conduct must have been intentional or reckless, (2) so outrageous as to offend generally accepted standards of morality and decency, (3) there must have been a casual connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the distress suffered, and (4) that emotional stress suffered must have been severe. Craft, 671 S.W.2d at …show more content…
Mr. Valdes left his pet cat, who he loved like family, in the care of the veterinarian for her to perform a procedure on it’s ears. While the cat was sedated the veterinarian mistakenly performed a declawing procedure and kept that information from Mr. Valdes even after multiple medical problems arose. Like the defendant in Ammon, the veterinarian did not intentionally cause emotional distress. Even though she withheld the information about the mistaken surgery after more problems arose, her actions unlike the actions of the defendant in Wilson, were not done with the purpose of causing harm. The court will likely hold that since the veterinarian did not mean for her actions to cause Mr. Valdes emotional distress her conduct was not
I believe that the hospital should take the blame for the damages and suffering that Kelly Niles endured. This decision reflects the quality of care that Niles received while he was at the hospital and also correlates to his physical status. The neurosurgeons stated that his status would have been better if they got to him sooner and were able to treat him in time, but due to the negligence throughout his whole treatment he is left with the ability to only move his eyes and neck. The fact that there was doubt that Kelly would survive the next few days after his surgery supports my decision that what the court ruled was reasonable and appropriate. Kelly “remained in a coma for 46 days before gradually regaining consciousness.” Kelly is totally disabled and his condition can’t ever be improved with medical attention or surgical treatments which furthers my final decision (“Niles v. City of San Rafael,”
App. Ct. Mass. App. Ct. at 341, the court reasoned that the degree of emotional distress can be inferred from the actual conduct and the circumstances, no need for an expert witness. Caddys had headaches and stomachaches and could not concentrate on work because their home was taken away from them which is not something an ordinary person could endure. Id. Similarly, Taylor felt so unsafe that he and Mya quit their jobs, he withdrew his membership from the union, and they left Massachusetts altogether because Murray was threatening their lives. No reasonable person could carry on with their life when someone is threatening to take their life. Although, Murray may argue that Taylor’s weight loss, insomnia and nervousness are not severe enough physical ailments, according to a holding in Agis, 371 Mass. Mass. at 146, absence of physical damages should not thwart a claim. Thus, the court will likely rule that Taylor’s favor on this
City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U. S. 1116 (1997) (based on a comprehensive survey of circuit case law, the court concluded that "a plaintiff's testimony, standing alone, can support an award of compensatory damages for emotional distress"); Williams v. Trader Publishing Co., 218 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2000). Emotional harm may manifest itself, for example, as sleeplessness, anxiety, self-esteem, stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional stress, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Physical manifestations of emotional harm may consist of ulcers, gastrointestinal disorders, hair loss, or
Intentional infliction of emotional distress - the Court states that because Texas law places a duty on Briles and McCaw, the Plaintiff 's negligence claim will fill any gaps.
infliction of emotional distress from Ms. Lucas. The court’s decision in Harris v. Jones, 281 Md.
Case unfounded Cat-2 for medical neglect and neglect. Audrey takes Shyann to the doctor for her diabetes and her pediatric doctor. Audrey monitor’s Shyann’s diabetes more closely now. Shyann is able to verbal how to care for her diabetes.
2. The outcome of this issue is governed by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress. The elements of this cause of action are (1) the wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or reckless, that is, he intended his behavior when he knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely result; (2) the conduct was outrageous, that is, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.
In order to state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must allege “intentional or reckless” conduct. Lasater, 194 Md. App. at 448. “To meet the ‘intentional or reckless’ criterion of the first element, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant either desired to inflict severe emotional distress, knew that such distress was certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct, or acted recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow. Floor, 78 Md. App. at 175 (emphases in original); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (““Intentional” when used in this context means “the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (“If he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress must establish one of these four situations: “1) that the defendant had a contractual or fiduciary duty; 2) plaintiff suffered a physical impact; 3) plaintiff was in a “zone of danger” and at risk of an immediate physical injury; or 4) plaintiff had a contemporaneous perception of tortious injury to a close relative.” Doe v. Phila. Cmty. Health Alternatives AIDS Task Force, 754 A.2d 25, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). The first element does not apply to our client because there was no fiduciary or contractual duty relationship. Secondly, it could be argued that Nordlund suffered a physical impact because after Sumner’s accident, Nordlund could not eat, could not
Damage of Emotional distress not associated with physical trauma will be considered as income. But According to I.R.C. §104(a) (2) if this emotional distress is the consequence of bodily wound then awards for compensation will not be
The last element is damages. “Damages are proven when it is determined the injury was a result of the practitioner's actions. The intent of awarding damages is to make the plaintiff whole, meaning as if the negligence never occurred” (Walker, 2011, para. 15). Damages are usually paid in the form of money, but I do not think any amount of money will ever make this patient feel whole or that the negligence never occurred.
When you think you can get advantage from psychiatric therapy although do not have the funds to pay for medical treatment, or have the financial means the co-payments through your medical insurance, a personal injury attorney can direct you for treatment to a psychiatric therapist who will provide treatment you based on a lien. It implies that the psychotherapist will agree to hang around to get paid up to a time that your case gets resolved. Rather counseling meetings start following an incident, your claim will have more strength. When there is a long lasting gap among the time of the dog bite event and the time that therapy starts, in that case the dog owner’s insurance firm will disagree that when the emotional distress had been severe, then the plaintiff would have begun therapy treatment
Issue: Under Kentucky tort law, does intentional infliction of emotional distress occur when a person suffers severe insomnia and anxiety as a result of witnessing a friend¡¦s child being injured by a vehicle that is out of control due to being driven at a high rate
`In the past, I worked in such a research setting, where if a person was found to meet criteria for opiate dependence they received treatment, however if even slightly short of DSM-IV criteria for the disorder they would have to look elsewhere. This was a continual concern for me, as the person who met criteria was not always the person with the most distress, and alternative treatments were not easy for people to find. Largely from this experience, I find the current categorical approach to classifying persons with psychopathology to be an imperfect system at best, with the primary advantage of being convenience when communicating with other professionals. I question whether this convenience comes at a severe cost to accuracy, the
) First and foremost, in order for us to claim for the psychiatric damage that Adam has suffered under tort law, we will have to prove that Adam is either a primary victim or a secondary victim and Adam is suffered from a recognised psychiatric illness, anxiety and stress will generally not sufficient. Primary victims are those who directly involved in the event and secondary victims are those who are suffered a psychiatric illness when someone they know is killed or injured in an accident. A recognised psychiatric condition is defined as a genuine illness or injury, needed medical evidence and has a long term effect. Adam might claim as a primary victim in this case, because a primary victim has to suffer physical injury or at a risk of physical injury and psychiatric injuries. The liability of causing psychiatric injury depends on foreseeability of physical injury, for example, in the case of Page v Smith where Mr Page suffered no physical injury but a recurrence of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and became unable to work, Smith is liable as he could reasonably foresee that Mr Page suffer physical injury. Adam could claim as a primary victim if Adam is in the zone of physical danger, I firmly believe that Adam was in the zone of danger at that time because he was seated in the row of the seat immediately behind their children and the risk of physical injury of Adam was also foreseeable, therefore, Adam owed a duty of care in relation to psychiatric damage. Besides, the