Dualism Vs Monism

In his writings, “A Contemporary Defense of Dualism,” J.P. Moreland argues the point that the mind and brain are separate from each other. It seems as a quick thought that both are the same. However, the mind deals with ideas, thoughts and hopes. The brain is made up of the neural process. Throughout the entire argument, Moreland tries to prove the theory of physicalism, which is the idea that only things that exist are composed of matter. His explanation is that the soul doesn’t exist and the brain controls everything.

In this paper, I will examine the principal merits and challenges of René Descartes’ concept of dualism and then defend my preferred alternative among the options Paul M. Churchland discusses. After briefly defining Cartesian Dualism, I will show that its principal merits are that it is consistent with common sense and that it is able to explain phenomena that appear mental in nature. Next, I will show that its principal challenges are its failure to adequately explain how the mind and the body can causally interact, and its failure to respond to the observation that brain damage impairs the mind. Finally, I will explain why Functionalism is the best alternative to Cartesian Dualism.

Sure the brain has the actual chemical processes and functions, but the mind holds the reasoning behinds actions, and the complex feelings a person has. It is basically what makes a person who he is, and controls his actions as a person. The brain only tells the body to carry out these actions.

Thus, one may further conclude that the only difference between a "normal" individual and Dennett's hypothetical case is the great temporal gap that exists between the brain and the body in Dennett's case. A difference that one may believe does not have clear philosophical implications. Therefore, it can be suggested that Dennett, in setting up his scenario in this way, does not contribute much more insight into the ‘self'-phenomenon than many

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

I would like to begin this paper by addressing what question I hope to answer through the entirety of this paper: is the mind physical? As simple as this question may seem to be, there still, to this day, is not a definite answer. There are, mostly, two approaches to answering this problem, through dualism or physicalism. The dualist, for the purposes of this paper, simply believes that the mind and the body are not equal and therefore, they are not one in the same. The physicalist, however, would come back to say that there are no such things as non-physical objects and therefore, they would conclude that the body and the mind are both physical. After weighing on both sides of this argument, I am going to defend the physicalist ideas and

Dualism covers the issue that is concerned with the connection between the mind and the brain, and whether humans are composed of all physical matter or contain a mind along with a physical body. Dualism is the belief that humans have both a non-physical mind along with a physical body. There are two types of dualism, which include Substance Dualism and Property Dualism. Substance Dualism claims the mind exists independently from the body, and Property Dualism claims the brain causes the mind into existence. When compared to the other beliefs mentioned prior, Dualism provides strong arguments made by René Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz that help us understand and answer the questions previously mentioned. The main differences between Substance Dualism and Property Dualism are not far

One, such as Descartes, might argue that because the brain has a physical presence, it is solely an entity of the body; the mind consists only of the intangibles. My response to such a statement is that because the mind exists only in the synapses that comprise the brain, the mind and brain are inseparable and therefore a single entity. Moods and complex emotions are heavily influenced by physical properties of the brain, such as the levels of certain chemicals. The loss of certain components of the brain can lead to an alteration of the mind as well. For example, Alzheimer’s disease causes dementia, a severe alteration of the mind, by destroying certain neurons and synapses. No other organ or appendage of the human body possesses this quality. The removal of a spleen or loss of a limb cannot permanently alter the mind on a primary level.

exists except from matter so therefore the mind and the body (brain) work together and

Mind-body dualism is usually seen as the central issue in philosophy of the mind. The problem with mind-body dualism is that it is unknown whether the mind really is a separate entity from the human body as Descartes states in his argument, or whether the mind is the brain itself. Descartes believed that in a person existed two major components, the physical body and the nonphysical body which was called the mind or soul. As a scientist, Descartes believed in mechanical theories of matter, however, he was also very religious and did not believe people could merely be mechanical creatures that ran like “clockwork.” And so, it was Descartes who argued that the mind directed thoughts. To account for this, he split the world into two parts,

Many arguments in the philosophy of the mind have been made for and against, whether or not the mind and the brain are the same entity. The mind-brain identity theory is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states (Mandik 77). Therefore, we can identify sensations and other mental processes with physical brain processes (Blutner 4). I argue, that the mind is not identical to the brain, and the conceivable idea of zombies, as well as the multiple realizability argument, can disprove this theory.

If it is logically possible that my mind exist independent of my body, then my body and mind are distinct things.

The theory or doctrine of mind-brain identity, as its name implies, denies the claim of dualists that mind and brain (or consciousness and matter) are distinct substances. The tradition of dualism, whose clear-cut foundations laid by Rene Descartes (1596-1650) were built upon during succeeding centuries, sharply distinguishes between the stuff of consciousness and the stuff of matter.

The Representational Theory of Mind proposes that we, as both physiological and mental beings, are systems which operate based on symbols and interpretations of the meanings of such symbols rather than beings which operate just on physiological processes (chemical reactions and biological processes). It offers that humans and their Minds are computing machines, mental software (the Mind) which runs on physical hardware (the body). It suggests, too, that we are computing machines functioning as something other than a computing machine, just as every other machine does.

     One type of monism is neutral monism. Neutral monism concludes that neither mental nor physical properties are attributed to reality but rather a substance called neutral stuff (Encyclopedia of Philosophy-Monism). Traditional materialism in monism proposes all things are part of the physical and the mental, the body and the mind (Encyclopedia of Philosophy-Monism). This means that a person’s mind works with their body through a simultaneous connection.