preview

Debt Vs Decedent

Decent Essays

“Debts due by the decedent” cannot constitute debts that have accrued after the decedent has passed away. First, this conclusion is reached by a textual, plain-meaning, reading of the bond. Indeed, at the time of the decedent’s death, the decedent ceases to exist, and all that remains is the decedent’s estate. As such, any debts that arise after the decedent’s death are not “debts due by the decedent,” but they are debts incurred by the decedent’s estate. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the State of Maryland is within the class of entities that that a nominal bond secures. Stated differently, although the nominal bond secures the decedent’s debts to the State, the bond does not secure debts to the state that accrewed after the decedent’s …show more content…

In support, the State will rely on the text of the bond which provides that the surety is “obligated to the State of Maryland.” Moreover, the State will note that in Williamson, two other debts—one for the decedent’s credit card, and another for unpaid hospital bills—were properly recoverable against the bond. Id. at 154. These distinctions are immaterial. The issue in this matter is not to whom particular debts are owed, but rather, when the debts accrued. Although Williamson, is mandatory authority for the resolution of this issue, the Court of Appeal’s holding in that case embodies a border concept of the workings of suretyship law that require this outcome.
3. Principles of Suretyship Require That Erie Cannot Be Liable for The State’s Claim.
Not only does Williamson, expressly provide that debts incurred after a decedent’s death cannot be secured by a nominal personal representative’s bond, but elementary principles of suretyship prohibit a principal obligor and a creditor from unilaterally increasing a surety’s exposure to liability on a bond. Indeed:
[A] change in the agreement by the principal and the obligee, without notice or consent by the surety, when it materially changes the risk, entitles the surety to discharge, acknowledging that, when it is applicable, there is ample authority to support it. See Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty (1995) § 41, which, as pertinent,

Get Access