Case Study: Illinois V. Rodriguez

Case Facts: Roy Caballes was stopped for speeding by an Illinois state trooper Daniel Gillette. During the traffic stop another state trooper Craig Graham of the Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Team, overheard the stop on the radio and showed up to the scene with a narcotics detection dog. While the first trooper was writing Roy Caballes a warning ticket for speeding the second trooper walked around Roy’s car with the narcotics detection dog. The dog alerted that it had detected narcotics at the rear end of the car which subsequently led to the state troopers searching the trunk of the car. Upon searching the trunk of the car the state troopers found a large quantity of marijuana which consequently led to the arrest of Roy Caballes. The entire incident lasted no longer than 10 minutes. Roy Caballes was convicted of a narcotics offence and was sentenced to 12 years in prison and ordered to pay a $256,136 fine.

The California Court of Appeal found the warrantless search was justified by Rojas’s written and verbal consent. The court agreed with the majority of the federal circuits, in that, this case was “indispensable to the decision in Randolph.” The decision was ultimately concluded that a tenant’s objection has no force if he or she is not physically present. Therefore held, the warrantless search was lawful because Rojas; a co-tenant, consented. Fernandez was denied review in the California Court of Appeal, however certiorari was granted.

The case Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health was heard by the Supreme Court in 1990. Originally the case was started when the Missouri Department of Health refused the request of Nancy Beth Cruzan's parents to take their daughter off of a Feeding and Hydration Tube that had been on their child for 3 years. Nancy Cruzan was driving one night and it was guessed her car hit a ice patch and spun out of control. Nancy was thrown 30 feet from her car (she was not wearing a seatbelt) and was found by a trooper who could not tell how long she had been face down in the snowy ditch. At the hospital the doctors noticed that she had been without oxygen in her brain for fourteen minutes. Any person who is without oxygen in their

In 1886 the US Supreme Court declared that states could not regulate commerce that went beyond their boundaries in the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific R.R. versus Illinois case. The decision provided the basis for the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. The Interstate Commerce Commission was a regulatory agency in the united states. Its purpose was to regulate railroads to ensure fair rates, to regulate rate discrimination and to regulate other aspects of common carriers, including interstate bus lines and telephone companies.

Another case that establishes the premise for determining the validity of the search includes United States v. Matlock. The question before the Court in Matlock was whether the third party's consent for the police to search the defendant's house was "legally sufficient" to render the evidence admissible at trial. Police officers arrested the defendant in his front yard, but did not request his permission to search the house. Instead, some of the police officers approached the house and requested permission to search from Mrs. Graff, who lived in the house with defendant. Mrs. Graff consented to the search and the officers found nearly $5,000 in cash in a closet. Both the district court and the court of appeals excluded the evidence from the trial, finding that Mrs. Graff did not have the authority to consent to the search. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle this evidentiary issue. Justice White, for the Court, espoused the

United States v. Lechuga, 925 F.2d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 1991). Upon entering the apartment they discovered that is was "completely unfurnished," the officers discovered an unlocked suitcase in a closet, which contained a bag with approximately 1,800 grams of a mixture including cocaine. Id. The Court ruled that Lechuga's consent to search the apartment extended to the suitcase in part because he had apparent authority over the entire apartment, including the closet where the suitcase was discovered. Id. In Melgar, the court held that when police are given consent from a third party in possession of the place being searched, that person’s consent to search includes containers in that place as long as the police have no reliable information that would cause them to believe that someone else owned it. United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). The court in Melgar relied in part on Jimeno, where the court held that consent to search a place, whether an automobile, apartment, or a house, generally includes the things within that place capable of hiding the object for which the search is being conducted. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) The court also held that any “superstructure” such as separate permission to search each container within a place is not supported by the Fourth Amendment. Id. In Snype, the apartment

Her attorney argued that she should never have been brought to trial because the material evidence resulted from an illegal, warrant less search. Because the search was unlawful, he maintained that the evidence was illegally obtained and must also be excluded. In its ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that ?a reasonable argument? could be made that the conviction should be reversed ?because the ?methods? employed to obtain the evidence?were such as to offend a sense of justice.? But the court also stated that the materials were admissible evidence. The Court explained its ruling by differentiating between evidence that was peacefully seized from an inanimate object, such as a trunk, rather than forcibly seized from an individual. Based on this decision, Mapp's appeal was denied and her conviction was upheld.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holds that when officers receive consent to search with no limitations, only spaces and containers that appear to “obviously” not belong to the consenter are excepted from their search. See, e.g., Synpe, 441 F.3d at 136-37. The Seventh Circuit holds similarly that if officers do not have “positive knowledge” that the consenter does not have authority over the space or container prior to the search, then the search is reasonable. See, e.g., Melgar, 227 F.3d at

Additionally, in the case of U.S. V. Davis one roommate was present for the search and consented to the search however, a gun was found in the duffle bag of the non present roommate. The ruling suggested the roommate present couldn’t give consent to the search of the duffel bag because they didn’t have joint access to the duffle bag. Since Alex was only present during the search and they found convincing evidence against Jes, Alex couldn’t allow for the search of Jes’s belonging because Alex didn’t have joint access over his personal items including the script Murder by Monoxide. According to the case People V. Harwood the defendant let the officer search the building and during the search the officer answered the phone. The person on the phone was eager to try to buy drugs. The ruling removed the evidence from the phone call because it was not permitted to answer the phone during the search. This case is similar to our case, Detective Green shouldn’t have been rummaging through the pool house even if it was open because no one

Is a person’s giving of consent to search an inculpatory or exculpatory statement? Should a person in custody be given Miranda warnings before being asked for consent to search? Why must police give elaborate warnings before custodial interrogation but no warnings

If the police officer precedes to search the resident’s house without obtaining a search warrant the evidence obtained can be deemed illegal under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine. “Under this rule, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, evidence that has been seized illegally is considered “tainted” and cannot be used against a suspect.” [6] The Exclusionary Rule could also be used as cited in the Mapp v. Ohio case. Anything obtained illegally could be deemed tainted or inadmissible in court. It is imperative that the police officers follow all procedures faithfully and as per the tenets that the courts have set up. Any mistakes can, and regularly do, permit a liable party to go free on a technicality.

(Nolo)” Several police officers tend to abuse their authority to attain evidence out of their reach. They often abuse their power because they know that the average citizen does not know their rights. Consent is a huge factor when it comes to determining if a search is lawful or not. The trial case of Arizona vs. Evans also determined that “the rule is not triggered when courthouse errors lead police officers to mistakenly believe that they have a valid search warrant, because excluding the evidence would not deter police officers from violating the law in the future. (Greenhalgh)”

I believe it would be granted due to law enforcement’s suspicions not being reasonable or articulable. In the case of State v. Braxton, 90 N.C. App. 204 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), the court found, "gestures which are not clearly furtive are insufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless search unless the officer has other specific knowledge relating to evidence of crime." In State v. Braxton the defendant was pulled over by law enforcement for speeding and was observed putting something under the seat. When the defendant exited the vehicle the law enforcement officer searched the defendant and refused to answer any questions which pertained to the object which was put under the seat. Law enforcement searched the vehicle and found illegal drugs which led to the arrest of the defendant. Law enforcement continued searching the vehicle and found more evidence of illegal contraband. It was found that the defendant’s suspicions movements and actions were not enough probable cause to find the defendant dangerous. However, if law enforcement uses the observation of the young woman handing the passenger an object and then walking away from the vehicle as probable cause it could be argued that law enforcement’s suspicions were reasonable and

With the use of proper search and seizure guidelines, schools are allowed to search students lockers without a warrant. Lockers and backpacks are subject to search with reasonable suspicion. To search a locker, a school staff member or police officer would have to have reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and student consent in some cases (Ehlenberger). For reasonable suspicion to occur, “ the search would be justified at its inception, meaning that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will reveal evidence that the student has violated or is violating the law or school rules, and the search is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the search, meaning that the measures used to conduct the search are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and that the search is not excessively intrusive in light of the student 's age and sex and the nature of the offense” (Ehlenberger). Probable cause to search is when” "known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband will be found" (Ornelas v. United States, 1996, at 696)”

The Supreme Court has established that some searches go too far, as displayed with Safford Unified School District v. Redding, 2009. An unidentified male student, claimed that Marissa Glines, had given him a prescription pill.  Marissa’s day planner and pockets were searched, which in addition to more pills, weapons were discovered. Marissa claimed that the day planner was Savana's and that Savana had supplied her with the pills. Savanah was searched, and this search not only included her backpack and pockets, it also her undergarments. Since she believed her privacy was invaded, she sued the school district and the Supreme Court ruled in her favor. The search was deemed unreasonable and invasive, as it was a