Candidate Branom Case Study

Candidate Davis delivered his 5 paragraph order covering most of the key points associated with the order. SNC’s orientation was confusing; SNC briefed that the current location was where the cache was located, then proceeded to state that the fire team needed to advance to the second set of grid points to complete the objective. This information is confusing and is proof that the fire team leader did not fully comprehend the order briefed to him. SNC stuttered consistently, displaying his uncertainty of the information that he was relaying. SNC improperly stated his TCM’s and informed his team they would utilize a column formation from the “assault to attack” and a column from the “attack to assault”. Upon reaching the objective, the fire

Candidate Jordan delivered an in depth five paragraph order. SNC posted security ensuring that the safety of the fire team was not put at risk. SNC had a good initial plan and proceeded to move the fire team towards the objective. SNC moved the fire team through the woods with minimal opposition; SNC maintained communication and good dispersion. Upon receiving enemy fire SNC suppressed the enemy by assaulting the enemy. SNC pushed through the objective to ensure that all enemy were killed. However, SNC forgot about the weapons cache and commenced to conduct a hasty 180, followed by a consolidated 360, and then an ACE report. SNC, in his haste to complete the problem, completely forgot that the mission was not only to subdue the enemy

Candidate McKillop was able to brief a five paragraph order that included most sub-paragraphs, except for an initial scheme of maneuver. During the delivery, SNC sounded nervous and often used filler words. His inability to brief confidently and lacking a scheme of maneuver caused him to have a delayed execution since he had to brief all of the mission details again. During the execution, SNC was able to take charge and display more confidence than he had displayed in the brief. SNC employed his fire team members appropriately based on their physical capabilities to tackle specific tasks and sent the lighter ones through the planks first. Candidate McKillop struggled the most with being able to make adjustments to his initial plan. Although

Candidate Martinez began the SULE I evaluation with a standard five paragraph order. Although it was a standard brief, SNC failed to give an adequate mission and execution paragraphs. The statements were disjointed and confusing and were briefed without confidence. SNC was briefed that the mission was to get the map found at the weapons cache and brought back to MA2A IOT have S2 Intel look at it. Candidate Martinez was given the map and reminded that it was part of the mission and not to forget it. SNC started the execution without the map, ultimately failing the mission. During execution Candidate had little regard for the tactical situation as demonstrated with little to no communication for formations at danger areas or dispersion.

Candidate Lamb posted security prior to the beginning of his brief. Candidates Lamb's brief was delivered confidently, naturally, and not rehearsed. SNC was very comfortable delivery the 5 paragraph order. During his brief, SNC oriented his fire team and provided references to aid in the understanding of his order. Prior to execution, SNC developed an initial plan that included all the elements necessary to complete the mission. During execution, SNC was able to make decisions at points of friction. SNC was able to develop a sensible and comprehensive plan by gathering intelligence and taking suggestions. However, SNC did not rely solely on the suggestions of others to make informed decisions. At points of friction, SNC checked on the

Candidate Hays' attempt to brief the initial five paragraph order and take charge of his fire team did not work in his favor. There were times when SNC reiterated certain briefing points which displayed a lack of confidence rather than a sense of clarity. Other than the Mission, SNC failed to brief all the key points of the order. SNC seemed unclear on the mission and what needed to get done although, SNC did verbally address an initial plan of how to attempt negotiation of the obstacle, prior to the actual execution. SNC made the vital mistake of not briefing nor posting security. Upon execution of the problem, SNC's initial plan did not appear to be well thought out and unsafe as he attempted to have his fire team along with himself

Candidate Blackmon successfully plotted the current location of the objective. SNC’s five paragraph order was delivered confidently, however he did not properly state the friendly situation. SNC stated that friendly units were northwest of the current location instead of friendly units being one mile north then west along Guadalcanal. Without this information SNC’s brief was inaccurate. Though SNC was confident during his brief, he did not have the attention of his squad as members who were focusing in different directions staring into the trees or cleaning their nails. The squad's lack of attention was ignored by the squad leader. After engaging the enemy SNC was informed that he sustained casualties and the bridge was covered by enemy fire

SNC gave a detailed brief that outlined a precise plan that was coherent and directed towards mission accomplishment. SNC contradicted a well thought out plan of action with a monotone voice and his use of filler words, such as, uh and um, coupled with a lack of passion. The lack of passion was seen in his sense of urgency as SNC spent 80% of his time briefing his 5 paragraph order that adversely affected his sense of urgency. SNC was able to secure the objective quickly, but loss situational awareness of his surroundings and enemy position that initially created confusion when engaged by the enemy. SNC was able to make clear and concise decisions in an appropriate amount of time that efficiently utilized his fellow candidates. This expedited

Candidate Rabideau while briefing his order stumbled a few instances but was able to regain composure after moments of difficulty. However, he did brief most portions necessary to execute the mission and his plan reflected coherent thoughts. Prior to the execution phase, SNC posted security. SNC oriented security in the correct direction, assigned sectors of fire, and ensured he was not stagnant. SNC did not look at the obstacle prior to his initial plan. As a result, over two minutes passed after the brief; the fire team stood around, did not progress towards mission accomplishment, and waited for orders. Nonetheless, once the fire team focused on their mission, Candidate Rabideau constantly ordered them to remain focused and reminded

Candidate Huff did not brief the admin/logistics and command/signal paragraphs of his order. The rest of his order was briefed with shaky confidence involving heavy use of "ums." SNC did not establish security during his brief or during execution. SNC demonstrated inefficient use of his time by spending nearly sixty seconds re-slinging the teams rifles in the beginning of execution. Due to a lack of an initial plan following the brief, the team had to begin execution whileconducting reconnaissance and orienting to the problem. Once oriented, SNC was hesitant in deciding how to engage the problem. Once a scheme of maneuver was developed, he was able to communicate his guidance to the team members and begin driving his team toward mission

SNC did not calculate the correct distance to the objective. SNC tasked fire team members to set up the terrain model, but failed to verify and correct the mistakes they had made. SNC made eye contact with his squad members during the brief. SNC had poor vocal control, stumbling over his words and using filler words such as “uh” and “um” throughout the brief. SNC also briefed information in the wrong order and repeated information that he had already mentioned. During the execution, SNC had excellent control over his squad, making decisions quickly, giving commands clearly, and moving his subordinates with a sense of urgency. After the squad neutralized the enemy, SNC had the casualties brought to the objective location. When SNC attempted

Overall, Candidate Friederick's lack of confidence hindered both her operations order and her execution of her assigned mission. Her delivery lacked enthusiasm and interest. While her lack of confidence indicated unfamiliarity with the five paragraph order, SNC did brief a detailed mission statement with a task and purpose. SNC also briefed some details of her scheme of maneuver and some tasks to her subordinates, but the lack of detail and her confidence ultimately failed to inspire the other candidates in her fire team. As her fire team moved from order to execution, SNC appeared lethargic with little to no awareness of her surroundings as the team approached the objective. SNC both heard and saw the enemy combatant and demonstrated

Candidate Cameron appeared confident in his brief. He was poised and well-spoken. In executing his plan, his initial communication was sufficient however, it lessened throughout the mission. SNC positioned himself poorly for the obstacle. He was positioned in the center of the fire team where he was more concerned about not tripping the explosive while keeping his balance, He wasn’t able to do that and give orders simultaneously. As a result, his team members were unsure what their roles were and they were standing around, he lacked command and control. His fire team had difficulty following him. Candidate Cameron didn’t manage his time effectively. He could not keep his team moving forward to accomplish the mission, adversely affecting the

Candidate Sirks began by completing a leader’s reconnaissance of the problem and immediately addressed security before briefing the fire team. His voice sounded confident, but his body language did not portray the same confidence as he shuffled around and did not make eye contact with his fire team. He thoroughly briefed his order with detailed tasks and coordinating instructions. Immediately after the order was complete, his fire team began to execute with minimal direction showing they understood the tasks assigned to them. SNC employed all of his fire team members adequately and directed them to carefully handle the POW, demonstrating he understood the tactical situation. SNC was able to adjust his plan without losing bearing and took time

There was TF 11, TF Dagger, TAF K-bar, TF Blue, TF Red and TF Rakkasan, just to name a few; these were units headquartered in different geographic areas, answering to different commanders and overall commands, made up of conventional infantry forces, aviation forces, allied foreign forces, indigenous forces, white special operations forces and black special operations forces. Though many of the officers had served with each other in various capacities (especially within the 75th Ranger Regiment) there was still friction between many of the Task Forces. With this many variabilities in commands and organization important resources and pieces of intelligence were bound to slip through the cracks; and they did. One important instance being the failure of communication between CFLCC and CAOC regarding what Army forces were expecting in terms of close air support (CAS). In the words of one pilot “Those guys are having rock drills at Bagram, we, the guys who are going to fly the missions in support of it, aren’t part of it. What the fuck? Over.”3 Additionally no one from the SOF units attended final rehearsals by the conventional rehearsals or visa versa. This lack of communication led to a lack of unity of effort between the two groups; neither group fully understood what the other expected from them. Later in the battle, during the handoff between TF-11 forces and TF Blue forces, there was a severe lapse in communication. TF Blue forces were communicating almost solely on their own communication net, leaving out nearly all other forces from their planning and execution process. This resulted in the plan to helicopter a team to establish an OP directly on the summit of Takur Ghar, a plan unbeknownst to the TF-11 headquarters, who knew of enemy