Q1. What are the key differences between Sony's and Bacro's strategies as far as their product roll out is concerned prior to Aug 1989 in the projector market (that is, you need to compare and contrast the chronological order and the scan rate/prices/other features of the models that both players introduced in the market prior to Aug 1989)? Why is it that both players were playing such different strategies prior to Aug 1989?
Barco launched its first projector BV1 (scan rate of 16 kHz & priced at $11,250) in video segment in 1982. But soon Barco decided to enter the computer applications market and by the end of 1983 launched BD1 (scan rate of 16 to 18 kHz & priced at $13,500) in data segment. In 1984 Barco introduced two more projectors
…show more content…
Sony's marketing strategy was to make use of its worldwide network of captive commercial video distributors which in turn worked with more than 1,500 dealers across the globe. Also Sony's strategy was to make use of brand name recognition which had a reputation of reliability and low price among dealers. Sony also took advantage of the fact that Barco was purchasing tubes from Sony Components. In some cases Sony's strategy was to be better off than Barco in terms of latest developments related to tubes with in-house supplier. Internal efficiencies were created from Sony Components Sony projectors would know about new tubes before competitors and thus be able to design for new tubes immediately. This resulted in supply chain efficiencies of being more responsive to demand, and not carrying high inventories.
Q2. Consider a hypothetical case where Sony was to charge $9,000 for its new 1270 super data' projector (assuming that 1270's marginal cost is much lesser than $9000). Do you think that Sony can merge the data and the video segments (in other words, it will attract a good chunk of customers, typically >30-40% of the share, in each of the two segments) if it was to charge the $9,000 price for 1270? Give reasons for your answer. Next, consider the hypothetical case where Sony was to charge $15,000 for the 1270 projector. Do you think Sony would be able to merge the data and the graphics segments if it was to charge
* Identification of the strategic goals of both the SBU and the parent company, Sony, and reevaluating goals as the market or technologies shift, or as Sony adjusts its corporate strategies;
1. Describe the cost behavior in the wireless industry. What are the implications of this cost behavior for cost-volume-profit (CVP) relationships?
I decided to do my research on Sony due to the advancement in technology and the competition between companies such as Microsoft, Apple, and Sony. I have been around long enough to know about Sony’s products but the real reason that attracted me to them for this essay is because I actually believe that they are having a negative trend. I am starting to see less Sony items in stores and I haven’t really heard much about them. Whereas companies such as Apple are constantly being talked about and you often see people walking around with some type of apple product in their hands. Today we are going to research Sony through a horizontal analysis and through different ratio analyses. Let’s see what we find!
Being the leader in the high-end graphic projectors segment, holding 55 % of this nice of 4 % market share (see Table 2) Braco hadn't launched a new graphics projector since the BG400 in 1987.
At Costco, VIZIO relied extensively on consumers to purchase their product without any assistance from salesman whom would either influence or steer the consumer during the sales. Because of their low brand awareness, they strategically placed their products on conspicuous display, right at the entrance at the stores, to catch the customers’ attention, but more importantly because their shoppers fell into the market segment target by VIZIO, 35+ years, wealthy, and with disposable income.
One way to estimate the price for S1270 is by using the value map from the previous scenario. After adding the S1027 data projector on the value map (as shown below), we can see that Sony has to price the projector in the range of $17,000 - $18,000(Option 1)to be on the value equivalence line. Since Sony has a strong distributor presence in the US market, it can introduce S1027 at a price lesser than $17,000 to be at a value advantaged position depending on product margins. From Sony’s point of view, if it were to price 1270 at $15,000 (option 2) this might lower the value equivalence line and put BPS’s products at a value
(c) Even though Sony’s launch date and the price is not certain BPS should plan for the worst case scenario since Sony deliberately took them by surprise in Siggraph trade show and timed it to ensure that BPS never had enough reaction time to compete Sony in Infocomm show.
• SONY 1270 is more competitive, not only in product quality, but also in price and thus would erode sales of all BPS projectors in the long term.
2. What forces are driving changes in the movie rental industry? Are the combined impacts of these driving forces likely to be favorable or unfavorable in term of their effects on competitive intensity and future industry profitability?
Q1. What are the key differences between Sony's and Bacro's strategies as far as their product roll out is concerned prior to Aug 1989 in the projector market (that is, you need to compare and contrast the chronological order and the scan rate/prices/other features of the models that both players introduced in the market prior to Aug 1989)? Why is it that both players were playing such different strategies prior to Aug 1989?
2. What forces are driving changes in the movie rental industry? Are the combined impacts of these driving forces likely to be favorable or unfavorable in term of their effects on competitive intensity and future industry profitability?
My analysis will cover competition from substitutes and the change in buyer behavior and demographics. I will use the five forces model of competition and a SWOT analysis along with other sources of analysis. The information and recommendations that follow will provide you with the insight and building blocks to compete in the movie exhibition industry.
Back in 2002, Sony geared themselves toward a vertical strategy as reported by Rob Weisenthal, VP and CFO of Sony Corp. of America, “Under the USA umbrella, we undertook a number of vertical initiatives for each operating division. These have already produced significant operational streamlining and financial performance improvements.” As discussed in his release, Weisenthal talked about Sony Pictures Entertainment and their strategy to restructure television operations, where core programming competencies were focused on. Film and television digitalization efforts have been expanded and have engineered a significant reduction in their corporate overhead. In addition, he mentionted that Sony Music has made long
The plan is to market these 3D releases by debuting in the consumer home with select Sony 3D products. This launching would be during the high-traffic holiday retail season which will be featured nationwide in the United States.
Competition between theaters often comes down to distance from home, convenience of parking and proximity of restaurants. Innovations by one theater chain are quickly adopted by others. The differing approaches of the theater chain companies are reflected in their cost of fixed assets per screen.