Counterterrorism policies prove to be quite perplexing to draft due to the fact that there are many aspects to consider when making them. Cronin’s article, Why Drones Fail, and Jordan’s article, When Heads Roll, argue that state responses to terrorism have shown to be ineffective in many aspects. Jordan’s article explicitly argues that killing leaders of terrorist groups will not always lead to the demise of the groups especially if they are religious based and decentralized. Cronin argues that misusing drones in an attempt to kill members of terrorist groups may have the long term consequence of further aggravating security issues for the United States . Thus both articles show the need for heavy caution and counter analysis when creating counter terrorism policies. Jordan’s article challenges the counter terrorism implications that decapitation will lead to a demise of a terrorist group . First of all, the most notorious terrorist groups that exist in the world are highly decentralized, thus killing the leader will not affect them because each decentralized cell has its own leader . Furthermore, religious based organizations will not suffer from the death of their leader . The main reason is if a charismatic religious leader gets killed, they will replace him with another charismatic religious leader . Also, religious groups tend to be decentralized as well . To continue, decapitation proved to be ineffective in dispersing older terrorist groups . Older
Byman’s tone in this article can be described as defensive. In his argument, Byman attempts to refute the arguments of many Americans that maintain that drones should be eliminated. This is demonstrated in Byman’s response to public criticism that using drones creates more terrorists. He states, “critics...
Drones already carry a negative, political connotation. The breaches in sovereignty are a major political issue for involved countries. Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are examples of the United States’ willingness to conduct military strikes without the consent of the governing body within the country. Furthermore, targeted killings are essentially a means for assassinations, which were prohibited under the Reagan administration. However, this fact is abated, as the killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki (US Citizen) demonstrated. Given all this information, would the usage of US drones in Iraq only perpetuate more violence, or bring stability to the region? This report will seek to answer this question. Utilizing an interview with an Associate Professor of Homeland Security at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU), Professor Bonner, as a primary source of research, along with secondary sources from accredited cites, this report will explore the dynamics of the drone program as it pertains to the current situation in Iraq.
During Clinton’s presidency the CIA borrowed “a gangly, insect-like airplane called the RQ-1 Predator” from the Air Force which allows Clinton to view what is known as a “live drone feed” (Mazzetti 61). Some were impressed by the “insect-like” drone but felt like it would be a waste of time to sit and watch the feed. Those opposed felt that it had no use to it, but only to realize later on how great of an impact it would have for the government (Mazzetti 61). Drones would be the key weapon for a “secret war” since “it was a tool that killed quietly,” and would allow strikes in restricted areas where publicist couldn’t go (Mazzetti 99-100). This weapon created a whole new meaning behind wars and assassinations as some view them as inhuman others view it as success. Many believe citizens should have trust in the government and adhere that drones are being used to “”find, fix, and finish” terrorists” (Mazzetti 77). The CIA use of the drones makes them
In recent years, the number of terrorist attacks have increased since the use of drones. One terrorist attempted to blow up an American airliner in 2009, and another tried to blow up Times Square with a car bomb in 2010 (Source K). Both had stated that drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia motivated them to do this (Source K). A picture drawn by Paresh shows a drone dropping a bomb near a civilian; the next day, the victim rises from the grave, bringing with them radicalism and anti-americanism (Source E).
The target audience of this paper is decision makers who are concerned with the topic of counterterrorism. These include the members of the legislature as well as officials in various government agencies dealing with counterterrorism. The current state of counterterrorism entails the use of violence and military action, such as a drone in combating the activities of terrorists. Other alternatives to the use of violence include policies focusing on the patriot act and the collaboration of various government agencies who are concerned with counterterrorism. The advantages, as well as the disadvantages, of each policy options, are discussed. Moreover, a comparison of the various policy options is discussed. The implications of each policy option politically, socially and economically are also discussed. The recommended policy option is a policy that focuses on the United States Patriot Act aimed at preventing terrorists before attacks actually happen, through the interception of communication. This saves on resources that could have been used in responding to a terror attack. The implementation of the recommended policy on counterterrorism entails the making of changes to the Patriot Act so as to make it more effective and constitutional.
In President Obama’s speech on drone policy, given on May 23, 2013 in Washington D.C., he asserts, “dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield... Simply put, those [drone} strikes have saved lives.” Many American’s support this view. According to a July 18, 2013 Pew Research survey, 61% of Americans supported drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia (Drake). However, this belief that drone strikes make the United States safer by decimating terrorist networks around the world is widely contested. An opposing viewpoint is that these strikes create more terrorist than they kill. There is a common misperception that drones are precise, killing only the target and entourage. According to a meta-study of drone strikes, between 8 to 17% of all people killed are civilians (Sing). People who see their loved ones injured or killed in drone
Furthermore, the study revealed that civilian casualties ranged between 18 and 26 per cent of the deaths in Pakistan (Boyle, 2013). Additionally, “President Obama launched more than six times as many drone strikes as President Bush did throughout his eight years in office” (Boyle, 2013, p. 2). As President Obama stated in his speech on May 2013, drones strikes are lethal, accurate, and extremely successful against Al-Qaeda’s High-Value Targets (HVTs). As the statistics show, numerous HVTs like Sheikh Fateh al Masri, Mustafa Abu Yazid, Qari Mohammad Zafar, and Baitullah Mehsud were killed by the drones (Barnidge, 2011). Moreover, it has eliminated “more than half of the top twenty HVTs. It has done so without endangering US pilots” (Plaw & Fricker, 2012, p. 346).
Strikes conducted by remotely piloted aircraft may undermine counterterrorism efforts or enhance them depending on the nature of the violence, the precision with which it is applied, or the intentionality attributed to it. (Kalyvas, 2006; Downes, 2007; Kocher et al., 2011) . Existing research has studied the effects of coercive airpower, (Pape, 1996; Horowitz and Reiter, 2001) , targeted killings (Jaeger, 2009; Jordan, 2009; Johnston, 2012; Price, 2012) and civilian victimization (Kalyvas, 2006; Lyall, 2009; Condra and Shapiro, 2012), but social scientists have conducted little empirical analysis of the effects of drone strikes.
Following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 President Bush inspired the term War on Terror that expressed the fight against terrorist groups. Subsequently, the use of armed aerial drones has become the United States signature attack for counter terrorism. After the attack the Bush administration began the target killing of suspects involved in terrorist attacks (Rowman& Littlefield 2016 p.13). A variation of target killing is signature strikes in which suspected militants and anyone considered a “possible” suspect is targeted based on their behavioral characteristics. In the case of a signature strike the target is unknown. Although drones are not new, the emergence of armed drones remains the topic of many debates. The application
Today’s new military technologies are often developed in covert labs, with the public only learning of them after they have fulfilled their violent purpose, which too often is questionably unethical. To demonstrate why this covert development is dangerous, and to show how almost all involved find a way to deny responsibility, this paper will focus on the Predator drone. An investigation of this topic will be shown best through a chronological investigation of what led to the Predator becoming an unmoderated weapon. This investigation will establish just how many people are involved in making a drone, and help to inform an opinion on the moral foundations of unmanned warfare. It may also help to clarify which people are responsible for the unintended deaths in many drone strike. The military industrial establishment in the United States is often driven by a regard for money, and is slowly turning what should be considered dangerous weapons, into merchandise with more marketing budgets than some fortune 500 companies. Friedrich Nietzsche’s thoughts on how humans develop their moral code from our surroundings gives shows the society is generally fine with the kind of distanced killing drones allow, as few people are vehemently against the use of Unmanned Drones in warfare. The Predator drone has effectively put great distances between the pilot and death, this new form of killing has been taken advantage of by our own mind, with the Id gaining greater releases of violent
In today’s day and age, the fear of terrorism is not only a common sentiment, but is also a rising subject of debate. In order to keep troops out of harm’s way, the United States has looked for alternate means of combatting terrorist organizations. Since September 11, 2001 the United States has relied heavily on its men and women in uniform to prevent terrorism abroad. Technology of today and the use of intelligence offer the United States alternate means of addressing terrorism. For instance, drone strikes were called by former US CIA director Leon Panetta, “the only game in town in term of confronting or trying to disrupt the Al Qaeda leadership” (ODLE, 2013). With the use of typology, socioeconomic assistance, drones, diplomatic engagement and enhanced airline security services, the use of military force is not the only way to prevent terrorism.
But terrorists organizations are similar to a Hydra. If one head is cut off, another can take its place. For example, Osama Bin-Laden’s death may have been an integral piece in the demise of Al-Qaeda, but it did not stop terrorism in the region. In a matter of five years, “the emergence of the Islamic State has in many ways filled the… void,” left by Al-Qaeda (Jenkins 2016). The effort by the United States solved a short term problem, but failed to make the world safer due to the imminent resurgence of terrorism in the region following his death. Rand Corporation Scholar, Brian Michael Jenkins (2016) claims that “the elimination of terrorist leaders affected neither the rate of terrorist attacks nor the likelihood of organizational collapse.” Thus, traditional counterterrorism tactics may need to be reevaluated moving
Indeed, in the last years, few States have adopted politics on targeted killings even in the territories of other States. This trend constitutes one of the major issues to be addressed at international level. Such policies have been justified as legitimate response to face the unlawful way of fighting of terrorist groups. However, new technologies – and especially drones – changed the old practice of killing, making it easier for the ones possessing them. The outcome of this situation has been “the displacement of clear legal standards with a vaguely defined license to kill, and the creation of a major accountability vacuum.” The aim of this paper is to analyze the legality of States ' new practice of targeted killings, providing it with a legal framework and estimating the impact of such policies in the new warfare system.
As Dwight D. Eisenhower said, “We are going to have peace even if we have to fight for it” (Likable Heroes 26). It is essential to fight to end terrorism and the effective means used to wage this battle is to use drones. Like all wars, the War on Terror is fraught with actions that in hindsight may be clearly justified, terrible mistakes, or hotly debated forever. Despite the difficulty, it is still necessary to do everything in our power to stop terrorists, including using drones to target and kill the terrorists. Despite the hypocrisy of going to war to end war, it is the only way when diplomacy fails. Ulysses S. Grant stated that “I have never advocated war except as a means of peace” (Grant 205). Although drones have their faults, they are the best tool we have available for targeting terrorists. Presently, the most practical approach, in terms of American lives and the lives of innocent civilians in other countries, is the use of drones to target terrorists for assassination. This practical advantage justifies the continued development and use of this
The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) – better known as drones - to target these terrorists during the war that’s now winding down in Afghanistan, have proven very effective. Drones have a number of advantages that could fundamentally enhance the US’ counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, but first their use as a weapon of choice needs to be put into policy.