The Confederacy gained support after shots rang at Ft. Sumter on xxx 1861. Before that event, Arkansas preferred to remain neutral and hoped for a peaceful outcome to the divided country. President Lincoln’s decision to issue a call for troops signified an attempt to use violence to preserve the union, and triggered a vote that would change Arkansas forever. The elected leaders of Arkansas by a margin of 69 to 1 passed a disunion ordinance and chose to stand with the Confederate States to oppose Northern aggression, unfortunately there loyalty went underappreciated as Arkansas’ geographical and political significance went overlooked by confederate leaders and their war strategy. This strategic error resulted in limited government support …show more content…
Arkansas was now threatened and Tennessee could be next. He made a significant decision to move Van Dorn’s remaining forces across the Mississippi to assist in the defense of Tennessee. This decision effectively left Arkansas defenseless and sent a significant message to Arkansas that they were expendable. This is a significant strategic decision point for President Davis and the south where time and timing play a role in his ultimate cold shoulder to Arkansas. It presents questions about the overall war strategy and whether effective communication and the level of critical thinking that was applied individually or within the decision making circle. It most certainly created issues within a new government regarding political relationships with the …show more content…
Hindman assumed command of the Trans-Mississippi District, an area that stretched Missouri to Louisiana. Charged with the organization of troops to defend the states of Texas, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and the Indian Territory, he had the appropriate authority but very few resources. With limited forces, he imposed martial law throughout Arkansas in order to seize munitions, gather supplies, and enforce the Conscription Act. He initiated the rationing of goods and ordered the forming of independent “Guerilla” bands. Groups known as the “Bands of Tens” formed from his issuance of General Orders Number 17, which called for all citizens to assemble in groups of ten and elect a captain. The group’s sole mission was to annoy and harass the union army whenever and wherever possible, just as Hindman envisioned the Spanish doing to Napoleon’s Army. The strategic objective of this action was to “slow down the Union armies long enough to rebuild a conventional force.” His efforts were relatively successful as he was able to amass 18000 regular forces and over 5000 irregular troops. Even with limited resources, a leader with vision and an understanding of military theory can develop a strategy, which if given some assistance can prove to be extremely effective. His newly formed army showed promise against Curtis’s Army of the Southwest in June
McClellan’s apprehension robbed him of victory and allowed Lee’s forces to consolidate prior to the Battle of Antietam (Davis, 1999). If McClellan had defied Allan Pinkerton’s human intelligence information claiming the Confederacy consisted of 120,000 soldiers, he could have defeated Lee prior to the battle of Antietam (Cannon, 1994). Lee relied heavily on J.E.B. Stuart’s scout unit for reconnaissance missions to gather intelligence on the enemy’s position and troop strength (Cannon, 1994).
It is here that Gates makes a critical mistake. The very few Continental troops Gates managed to procure were very well trained, disciplined and weathered veterans who had experience with battle. His militiamen, however, were not well versed in military doctrine and experienced much hardship before and during the battle. Gates’ militiamen had suffered significantly due to lack of supplies creating severe dehydration, dysentery and starvation, “The troops of General Gates’ army, had frequently felt the bad consequences of eating bad provisions;” (29). Due to their experiences throughout their travel through South Carolina, many militiamen saw little reason to stay and continue the fight. They knew very little of where they were or the purpose of their movements and actions. Gates did very little to alleviate this as he himself seldom spoke, wrote or in any way communicated his plans or his strategies to his men or officers, “and the arrival of General Gates at Clermont was, when known, a subject of more surprise to the patriots, than to the enemies of the country” (28). This was a serious misstep by Gates as not only does this sever the connection between leader and follower, but it breeds distrust and disrespect for him by his own
Working with Governor Francis Pickens, Union general Major Robert Anderson was a little too ambitious with his plan to attack Fort Sumter. He rushed to put his plan into action, and didn’t allow his men or his partner to prepare for the event properly. Additionally, when his plan began to fail, he refused to surrender. This only made matters work. On the other end, Confederate general, Brigadier General P.G.T. Beauregard, began moving men and artillery into place to force
Introduction: On the twelfth of April 1861, Union troops had just taken refuge in Fort Sumter under the cover of darkness. They were out number out gunned and running out of time. The newly formed Confederate States of America (CSA) had now occupied the five other military installations within the Garrison. At 0430, the first shot of the American Civil War rang out and Fort Sumter was fast under the barrage that the surrounding garrison forts occupied by the confederate forces (sumter). Major Anderson was reluctant to return fire, as his previous orders were not to be the aggressor. The first shots returned in volley to the confederate forces was by a private under the Major Anderson, who raced up to the third story of Fort Sumter where the largest artillery guns were loaded and ready to fire. In following his lead, other soldiers in the fort also began firing on the confederate antagonists (Civil War Journal: Destiny of Fort Sumter, 1993). Thirty four hours later Major Anderson surrendered the fort over to General Beauregard without a single loss of life on either side of the battle. However, death was soon to befall the soldiers of Fort Sumter. Thesis: The complete lack of organized military and government intelligence solidified the abysmal start to the civil war. If the Union leadership during the Buchanan administration had anticipated the treachery of the southern officers and leaders within the federal government then they could have prevented the secession
The what-if ramifications of the aides has been debated as Current notes in the article, but the reality of the situation forced Jefferson Davis into aggression against Fort Sumter. This began a chain of events leading to the first shots. Jefferson Davis knew that he needed to gain the support of the border states in order to resist the North. Fort Sumter put a faster time clock on the issue. No longer could the South wait to unify the seceded states. Now Jefferson Davis needed to use a show of aggression sooner rather than later to gain the border states.
The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.
Throughout his time as commander in chief of the union army, Ulysses S. Grant understood and appreciated the commitment his soldiers made, as suggested by letters to his family, which forced him to focus greatly on war technique, ultimately allowing him to be a great leader of the Union army. In a letter written to his Father, in which he discusses the war, Grant states, “I do not wish to act hastily or unadvisedly in the matter.” Grant’s cautiousness and attention to details, when his troops and his army are concerned, shows that all decisions he makes concerning his troops have been carefully thought out, so he doesn’t put his troops in danger. Grant wishes to give “all the
They had no interest in invading union territory. As the Union army went on the offense and prepared to invade the south, the Confederate army went on the defense and prepared themselves for attack. Due to the Confederate army’s small size, Confederate president Jefferson Davidson planned to avoid major battle with the union army to prevent complete destruction of his army and instead planned to only participate in small, limited engagements when the odds were in their
Once members were captured they were given a choice of joining the confederacy and fighting loyally or getting tried for treason. They were at a loss if captured. During the despair of the Civil War only the brave opposed the Confederacy. It was a life or death situation. In my opinion, I believe that more Arkansans would have verbally opposed the war if such harsh repercussions were not t at stake. These people had families and farms to take care of, children to raise, lives to live. It was much safer to agree with
Dated July 18, 1864, the message from General Joseph E. Johnston, commander of the Confederacy’s army of Tennessee, spelled the downfall of Atlanta. For weeks Davis had watched Johnston’s operations in Georgia with mounting dissatisfaction (Wert 1). If the federals captured Atlanta, Southerners perhaps faced inevitable defeat. On July 10, the Yankees crossed the Chattahoochee River, forcing the Rebels to abandon their works North of the stream. The Chattahoochee was the last natural barrier between Sherman’s troops and Atlanta, which lay 6 miles from the river. Throughout these weeks, Davis and Johnston exchanged numerous telegrams concerning the conduct of the campaign. Neither man liked the other (Wert
He had over sixteen thousand men and sixty-five large guns (Civil). This was a three to two advantage over the Federal group of 10,250 men (National).
This paper describes a campaign that helped decide the American Civil War. A General of the Union army named William Tecumseh Sherman helped lead a campaign that started in Georgia go the sea in Savannah, and finish to help aid the main forces in the Carolinas. During this march the soldiers lived off the land and the Southern people’s food and burning anything that could be of military use to the South’s forces. This march helped decisively end the war, and struck many blows to the South’s forces and its people’s morale, that Sherman’s army could march unopposed through the South.
The Union Army’s strategy of the Civil War consisted of three parts and was very simple; but if all three were not completed, it would spell disaster for the North. The first
After the defeat at Fort Sumter there were some northerners that tried to get Lincoln to let the south go. When deciding weather to take Fort Sumter by bombardment, one of Davis's ideas was a bargain with Washington , maybe purchase, for the peaceful turnover of the fort and other federal holding in the seceded states. Thinking Confederate independence was inescapable, Davis prayed that they would slow down long enough to recognize that they could save millions of dollars and many lives by stopping this. He believed that the honor of the Confederate States of America (CSA) would be reestablished if everyone seen Davis challenge Lincoln successfully. While dealing with all of this he still was ready to take Fort Sumter. Davis just wanted peace and to be left alone. The South was fighting a defensive war, which gave it inherent advantage.
While many Arkansans had followed Van Dorn to Tennessee, others had deserted their positions and fled back to their homes to protect their families (Whayne, et al. 198-199). Confederate authorities appointed Thomas Hindman, a veteran of the Mexican War, to replace Van Dorn’s command over Arkansas. A great “organizer, recruiter, and administrator” (Whayne, et al. 201), Hindman was prepared to use any means necessary to ramp up the number of men serving in Arkansas. “[Fanatically devoted]” to the Confederacy, Hindman declared, “I have come to drive out the invaders or perish in the attempt” (Whayne, et al. 198). He assumed his command with a “dictatorial [power]” by establishing supply factories, enforcing conscription laws, and “declaring martial law” over Arkansas (Whayne, et al. 198). In addition, Hindman employed the use of guerrilla warfare to harass the enemy and raid their supply lines. Many of these guerillas were not legally bound to protect their state and acted against Confederate commands. Instead, many were armed bandits and ruffians who had personal grudges to settle with anyone of their choosing. Regardless of political affiliation, many citizens in Arkansas would find themselves living in a state of anarchy. Although Arkansas was a Confederate state, many citizens were divided in their politics, but this mattered nothing to the bands of guerillas that would continuously contribute to the breakdown of the state for