Protector or Predator?
A book review of Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia integrating Olsonian and Tillyian views of statehood In Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?, Karen Dawisha relates Russian President Vladmir Putin’s rise to power. She overarchingly claims that Putin is an authoritarian leader who has obstructed and even reverted Russia’s path of democratization, citing, amongst many factors that enabled his ascension, his “interlocking web of personal connections in which he was the linchpin” (100), money-laundering to tax havens and personal projects, and the complicity of the West. With copious research, journalistic interviews, legal documents, and even sporadic informational diagrams, it is evident why her book is so popular amongst scholars and history enthusiasts. Unfortunately however, in spite of the grand yet oftentimes substantiated claims she generates, a more subtle yet noteworthy assumption is made: that the state is a protector, as Olson proffered. She employs this theoretical underpinning from the beginning, though is not representative of Putin’s actual authoritarian regime. In the book’s introduction, she harkens back to economist Mancur Olson’s belief (likely referring to his “Power and Prosperity” text) that as the state transitions from “roving” to “stationary” banditry, it provides security to its populace from self-induced, domestic, and foreign threats. According to Olson, in return, the state collects taxes, since wealth accumulation
Since then President Putin of Russia has gradually attempted to re-unite the Soviet Union by re-staking claims to certain of the previous member states. This post-cold war resurgence by Russia to dominate other states is another illustration of the struggle between power and freedom or
To modify Winston Churchill’s quote on Russia Putin “…is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” We can unwrap this mystery by analyzing Putin’s foreign policy through the eyes Morgenthau which will be the basis of this paper. By understanding the mystery we can say that Putin is following a Realist perspective and not the liberalist perspective especially with the Crimean Conflict.
Lastly, is the politics which would form from a dictatorship government across nations, and the effect that had on the economy. Marks demonstrates how each Russian theme influenced world history by citing before mentioned individuals and the regions which were impacted: United States, England, Mexico, and China to name a few. This is done using studies conducted on revolutionary violence, examinations of Russian characters in Chinese fiction, and visual examples embedded in the text. Counterevidence is not his burden, however had he touched on it more some of his connections would be more concrete, for example anarchism on its own is a stretch. There is a lack of context, or it is brief when he discusses how the topics influenced the world but is understandable as he deals with complex and broad topics. In general the book is an advancement in Russian inclusivity with world history simply by existing, a great addition to a topic long neglected. While it is an interesting read, it may seem incomprehensible to those with limited historical background, it is directed to the academia
19). That begin said, Russian politics have always governed around protecting themselves from threats inside and outside their boundaries both economical and militarily. In addition, Lynch elaborates that the capability of a state is so important in developing; in order to form a democracy since having been a built on post communist and Imperial auspices (Lynch, p. 5). In other words, a democracy does not merely come out of nowhere in a civil society, unless there is a capable national service where a political authority may draft, pass and enforce legislation. Furthermore, it is the neopatrimonial model that best describes the functioning of the Russian state that took hold in post communist Russia ruled by Yeltsin and Putin (Lynch, pp. 128-30). To clarify, it was significant that Russia established itself in a liberal economy, which was mostly supported by Western states, however the emergence and eventual consolidation under Putin established a neopatrmonial Political system.
The Russian state has been characterized by its strong heritage of powerful, autocratic leadership. This domination by small ruling elite has been seen throughout Russia's history and has transferred into its economic history. Throughout the Russian czarist period, to the legacy of seventy years of communism; Russia has been a country marked by strong central state planning, a strict command economy and an overall weak market infrastructure (Goldman, 2003). Self-interest, manipulation and corruption have all been present in the Russian economy, and have greatly helped the few as opposed to the many. To this day, Russia still struggles with creating a competitive and fair market.
Throughout its long history, Russia has been trapped in a continuous cycle of authoritarian regimes; only interrupted briefly with periods of tumultuous democratic transitions that were plagued by poor bureaucracy and weak institutions. Therefore, time and time again, Russia has turned towards authoritarianism. In the late 1900’s to early 2000’s, Russia again saw the fall of democracy coincide with the rise of a competitive authoritarian regime. This rise of competitive authoritarianism in Russia in the late 1900’s to early 2000’s was largely the result of the resource curse which granted Putin’s Administration false economic performance legitimacy. This in turn reinvigorated past strongman ideals, while at the same time solidified negative
In 1513, an Italian politician by the name of Niccolo Machiavelli distributed, though privately, a political treatise called The Prince. This treatise was, essentially, a guide on how to effectively rule one's country. It's important beforehand to define exactly what a Machiavellian is, before describing one. A Machiavellian is a leader who, through his power and influence, works toward the common good of his people. This can be done through fear, through deceit, even through manipulation. It is important to understand the main principle of a Machiavellian; the end justifies the means. The end being the common good of his people. Vladimir Putin is a Machiavellian in the ways he retains power, institutes reform, and executes economic
When looking at the concept of authority, Vladimir Putin does not have a problem as he is the elected President of a large and influential country—Russia. As such Putin uses his position as a Head of State to try and enhance his authority by calling for unity between the two countries. This op-ed was printed in the foremost newspaper in the U.S. on September 11, 2013. It is on this date that Americans celebrate their resolve and unity. To the global population, this authority would be enough to lend him credibility; but to a skeptical American populous, this could be seen as an outsider taking advantage of a
Machiavelli makes a point that to be a successful leader one must both be feared and loved by his people. One must instill enough fear so that they do not rebel against him. However, one has to present himself in such a way that his people overlook the bad because all they remember is the good. Putin’s military capability instills the fear that prevents actions such as rebellions, revolts, or uprisings.
Oligarchy as it is known in Aristotle’s politics; is a government run by a small group of people, ‘elites’. However, the oligarchy which this essay addresses is currently referred to in Russia as “a very wealthy and politically well-connected businessman...one who is the main owner of a conglomerate of enterprises and has close ties with the president” (Aslund and Dabrowski, 2007; 144). In the 1990s Russia’s economic reforms are said to have created the rise of a small group of oligarchs who gained an overwhelming amount of power and control. By 1997, this small group of previously unknown businessmen and bankers, often with gangster ties, had acquired control of many of the key parts of the Russian economy. Why did they emerge? It is argued by David Satter that three processes facilitated the emergence of the oligarchs. The first was hyperinflation and the social, economic and political consequences. The second was the process of privatisation, and finally the third was criminalisation (Satter, 2003). However, were these powerful oligarchs just a phase during the transition from Soviet to Post-Soviet Russia? Even with Putin’s efforts and declaration to distance the oligarchs from politics and power, and start a war against them exemplified by the Khodorkovsky affair, are oligarchs still significantly powerful in contemporary Russia? What is the role they play in Russia? It seems that the power of those original oligarchs of the 1990s has decreased or been concealed in
Reforms and ethnic problems helped the Soviet Union collapse in 1991. What was the next move to help Russia be a major power in the world? Boris Yeltsin led Russia through most of the decade promoting something known as democracy and better living conditions than the Soviet Union. There were some failures along with success, however once Yeltsin was too old for the job he found a successor. Hence, Yeltsin passed the presidency on to Putin; the promotion of democracy was severely limited by an authoritarian leader wanting more power.
In recent times, no one can take total power by force alone; you must offer something favorable to the people in order to obtain support. Unfortunately, there are some countries that follow a dictatorship system, which is a form of government that includes social and political power to ensure that the individual’s capability remains strong. Vladimir Putin is a contemporary dictator of Russia. His rebelliousness as a child has led him to his leadership. His cold-heartedness to his rivals and invasion towards countries has led to an opposition towards him. Vladimir Putin’s experience as a street thug led him to his leadership, which easily rose him to power: Not only has he committed crimes against humanity, but he has made groups of people and countries oppose him.
Russia’s Return as a Superpower. There are concerns that Russia may once again “reassert itself militarily” (Wood 7). After the original fall of communism in 1991, Russia seemed to be on a path to democracy. Currently the notion of a democratic Russia seems to be fading as Russia “has been centralizing more and more power in the Kremlin” (Putin 2). Regional governors, who were once elected by the people, are now being appointed by Moscow.
The present day Russian Federation involves a democratic system, given the presence of elections, an independent judiciary, and the supremacy of law. Yet, in democracy, the crux of it involves an inevitable paradox: law limits state power, but the state must have the power to enforce the law. However, finding the balance of the ability to enforce laws, and therefore maintaining order, while not infringing on civil liberties, requires a mutual understanding, a social contract, between the rulers and the ruled. This requirement has not found its place in the Russian political arena, especially since “creating a rule-of-law-based sate out of dictatorship is not easy” (Bressler 2009). In addition, the Russian psyche views authority as a source of force and violence (Yakovlev 1996), an etymological result of a continuity beginning from imperial Russia. Although the Russian Federation, the Union Soviet Socialist Republics, the Russian Empire, and the Tsardom of Russia differ significantly, a strong state remains prevalent in the core of Russian history and politics. In short, the nature of political rule in Russia involves a never ending tug of war between the seemingly undying authoritative soulless entity known as the state and the equally undying Russian people’s hunger for liberty.
Through the research articles by Grigas and Feklyunina respectfully, this unsuccessful streak in Russia’s attempts for soft power were discussed as well as its reversion to hard power to attempt to redrive fear in the global space. Beginning with Grigas’ piece, the unsuccessful attempts of Russia in constraining the independence of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in order to undermine their political, economic and civilizational choices were discussed and focussed in what caused this turn. (Grigas, 2012) While Russia still retains its military might, economic strength and a culture to inspire the denizens to obey; they still largely found it difficult to coerce the Baltic people who once obeyed their commands as the USSR. (Grigas, 2012) Grigas believes in contrast to the United States not wishing to live in the past as a global enforcer after the Cold War concluded, Russia had desired to regain the strength it had as the USSR, yet it's living in the past may have diluted its influence as well. Through Feklyunina’s piece, this desire of recreating its once ‘Russian world’ philosophy of recreating the strengths of the USSR in order to recreate the common identity. (Feklyunina, 2015)