Analysis Of Defendant Attributes In Plea Bargaining By Douglas Maynard

In chapter 18 “The Case against Plea Bargaining” by Timothy Lynch, it discusses the use of plea barging in cases which involve defendants admitting guilt in exchange for a reward. According to Lynch, some of the benefits include being charged with a lesser offense or in other words a reduced sentence, a decrease in counts when a defendant is charged with numerous counts of crime, and a promise by the prosecutor to recommend to the judge that a soft sentence is forced. Another benefit is the modification in the charges filed against the defendant to be somewhat more acceptable.

Calling Your Bluff: How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Adapt Plea Bargaining Strategies to Increased Formalization

A plea bargain is a negotiation between the defendant and their attorney on one side, and the crown prosecutor on the other side. A plea bargain may give the defendant a lightened sentence, in exchange for either confessing to some crimes, or giving information that is related to the offence, for example, the location of stolen goods or the names and locations of other participants, as well as their part in the offence.

More than 90 percent of criminal convictions come from negotiated pleas, also known as, plea bargaining. Plea bargains are used every day at both the federal and state court level. They certainly have their “proponents” as well as their “opponents”. A plea bargain basically is any agreement in a criminal case between the prosecutor and defendant whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty to a particular charge in return for some concession from the prosecutor. That agreement is usually in the form of a defendant pleading guilty to a “lesser” crime with a reduced sentence in return for the prosecuting authority not having to expend the time, energy, expense and manpower in seeking a conviction in a trial of a more serious charge. An evaluation of the evidence against the defendant is usually a significant factor by the prosecutor in determining whether or not a plea bargain should be offered. If the prosecutor’s case is strong, the chances of a plea bargain being offered to the defendant are lessened. While at the same time, if the prosecutor feels that his evidence is on the weaker side, the probability of a plea bargain being offered is enhanced.

But while this revelation complicates and adds relevance to Rakoff's topic, he also asks “What's wrong with that?” – a variation of “so what?” In answer to this question, he says that plea bargains are “secret negotiations” that “invite[] arbitrary results.” Both innocent and guilty defendants, in other words, are placed in the same pot, and the goal is to achieve the appearance of fairness, not the realization of it. Considering ninety-seven percent of federal convictions are the results of guilty pleas (Rakoff), that is a haunting injustice.

Many people believe that plea bargains should be abolished because they see them as unconstitutional since plea deals take away a defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by jury. Accepting a plea bargain waives a defendant’s right to three of their basic rights protected by the constitution-the fifth amendment’s right against self-incrimination, the sixth amendment’s right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront hostile witnesses. The latter, has been made even more accessible by the 14th amendment which expands the sixth amendment not only to state courts, but also to federal

The plea bargaining process is no stranger to the justice system. The issue of plea bargaining has been subject to never-ending debate as to whether or not this system is still viable. Some believe that we should abolish this system of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is criticized for failing to take into account the victims’ desires. Rampant is the belief that people are not being properly punished for their crime and, as such, leads to a diminished respect for the criminal justice process. Others believe that the plea bargaining system is necessary in order to prevent overwhelming case loads for the justice system and it also helps save court time and money by resolving cases early on in the criminal process. It can also help secure a conviction if it is unclear if there is enough evidence for the accused to be found guilty of his or her crime. Despite some of its limitations raised by critics, we should not go so far as to demand the abolishment of plea negotiations. The plea bargaining system is a necessary evil. While the system of plea bargaining is indispensable, it is important to note that the plea bargaining process in Canada is far from perfect. Thus, suggestions will be recommended for a reform of the process of plea bargaining. Directions for future research will be discussed as well.

Plea bargaining is when the defendant and prosecutor negotiate an agreement between each other where the defendant pleas guilty to reduced charges.

In an almost seeming “backfire” of intent, federal sentencing guidelines can be argued to have increased the potential for disparities in sentencing through the proliferation of differential plea-bargaining and charging negotiations (Eisenstein, Kramer, & Miller, 2005) (Albonetti, 1997). These negotiations often rely upon what information of value the criminal may have to sell, or what personal characteristics the defendant may possess that have weight on the prosecutor’s charging decision (Albonetti, 1997). Charging discretion is a departure from the federal guidelines’ intent of having the outcome of sentencing being uniformly derived from an equation that consists of the crime committed, the addition of factors that may heighten the penalty (for example use of a gun), the subject’s previous criminal history, and where the subject’s “score” falls within a predetermined sentencing matrix. Using this methodology, factors such as sex, race, marital status, employment history, community ties, etc., are considered irrelevant for a judge’s consideration (Albonetti, 1997). They are not however irrelevant for the prosecutor’s consideration in negotiations about charging decisions that would have an effect on the overall penalty “score” of the convicted criminal, and thus could be used as leverage points in guilty-plea negotiations (Albonetti, 1997). Returning to Chief Justice Robert’s baseball analogy, the federal prosecutor is now in the position to call the pitch, make the pitch, and even decide whether-or-not to swing for the fences or walk the

In a Frontline Program- The Plea we watched in class there were interviews of people involved in three separate cases that had involved the plea bargain. In this video a man named Charles Gampero had gotten into a

I did not watch the film, Criminal Justice: Nothing Cuts Deeper, but I thought you both brought up interesting points about plea bargaining in your analyses. I did not realize that plea bargains were as common as they are until Crystal pointed out that in 1989, less than 2% took their cases to trial. That is a shockingly low number! Abraham also pointed out that this means that defendants are waiving important rights, “protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: the right to a jury trial, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to confront hostile witnesses.” As far as I understand, the foundations of the American criminal justice process are built around these essential rights! In reality, very few people have faith in and are

Plea-bargains in criminal cases should not be used as much as they in today’s justice system because their drawbacks outweigh their benefits.

It has been understood that many successful criminal prosecutions in the United States end not with jury trial, rather yet plea bargain. Plea bargains are agreements between prosecutor and defendant, where the defendant agrees to plead guilty in order to receive a lesser offence or sentence. “The mode of plea-bargaining is most closely associated with high volume, low-stakes cases like misdemeanors and low grade felonies, as well as cases in which the prosecutor and defense lawyer have a good relationship and a long history of past dealings,”(O’Hear,2008). Throughout the following report I will be creating a scenario as a prosecutor proposing a plea offer alongside with a role of defense counsel and preparing a counteroffer

By using Sanborns paper as a reference, it shows us that the concept of plea bargaining we use today has only been around for about 50 years. In these past 50 years, although still relatively new, plea bargaining has become such an incremental part in the court system. Within the last few years ir has especially picked up momentum. According to the Bureau of Justice statistics in 2003, scholars have drawn the conclusion that 90-95% of all trials were fixed by the process of plea bargaining (Devers, 2011). At that rate, it is not hard to imagine that eventually almost all of our court procedures will be carried out through this process. To put it into perspective, this means that 5% of all court cases actually go onto trial. Typically, plea bargaining is a relatively private process, but as always this is ever changing. Victims’ rights groups are starting to become recognized more and more, which leads to more input being given in the plea bargain process. How this affects the plea process is simple, more input means less flexible sentencing which can usually stall the negotiating process, prolonging an agreement between the two parties. The theory of plea bargaining is constantly shifting, with many viewers constantly trying to decrease the use of it.

Plea bargain provides that flexibility necessary to make adjustments and produce substantive justice (Neubauer qtd. in McCoy 325).