Strategy is the name of the game, and in Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War, the U.S strategies and policies used throughout history are revisited. Weigley’s focus on the historic strategies of American warfare starts as early as 1775 This book is arranged in different sections depending on the location and strategy, not really sequential in some cases. Weigley went very in depth with his work and made his book a fun read and understandable. He also gave a very detailed amount of historic American military past. To wrap it up, The American Way of War was overall very enjoyable. In the starting chapter, Weigley introduces the book with George Washington and the Revolutionary War. Washington’s side was very limited to resources, so the strategy of attrition, which was a type of combat strategy, consisted of multiple attempts to starve the opposing side’s resources and men. Next we have the Partisan War strategy. Used by Nathaniel Greene, it was very similar to guerilla warfare in that it involves the act of using land as a cover to sneakily attack the opposing side. Although at the time …show more content…
Although his book is almost half a century old, it’s very thorough and people still refer to his work when needed. Personally in my opinion, this book could’ve been better if it included more illustrations or maps of battles. I think this could’ve helped the reader become more engaged while reading about the strategies. All in all, I think Weigley did a great job breaking down and evaluating the aspects of war in an epic fashion without making it seem boring. In conclusion, The American Way of War is an iconic book filled with the glorious moments of traditional strategic warfare. Weigley’s work was great on focusing purely on the details of American strategy. Weigley also did a good job in keeping it interesting knowing that it would be pretty difficult with this
A) The title of the book is The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War and the author is Andrew Bacevich. The book was published in New York, New York by the publisher Oxford University Press in the year 2005. It is the first edition and contains 270 pages.
The ways in which the United States has conducted its military operations since becoming an independent nation has largely depended upon the overall political and military objectives of each individual conflict. The United States first three hot wars after the end of World War II display the marked difference in US objectives and the operations used to achieve them better than any other modern wars in which American troops participated.
Carl Von Clausewitz and Helmuth Moltke the Elder were both practitioners and theorists of the war art in the 19th century. Their military thoughts on war’s character and its dynamics have influenced the later militaries in the conduct of war. Particularly, the Clausewitzian concept of the “culminating point of victory” and the Moltke’s principle of “Auftragstaktik”, or mission type tactics by a decentralized command were implemented and culminated in the battlefield of World War II. Moreover, today, the US Army has adopted both concepts in its latest refined “AirLand Battle” doctrine recognizing their importance in the operational art of modern warfare.
1. Although the war began in Massachusetts in 1775, it shifted south to the middle states, with a year. After 1779 the South became the primary theatre. Why did this geographic pattern develop, what was its significance, and why did the United States eventually win?
To be sure, a surprise strategic Chinese attack is a valuable worst-case scenario to study, but protracted multi-dimensional U.S.-China competition for Pacific influence—akin to the contemporary era—is arguably more likely and, thus, a more sensible scenario against which to wargame. Also, despite its plausible portrayal of a localized insurgency, the novel stops short of depicting mass civil unrest elsewhere and social stability considerations that would almost certainly accompany a future world war. Nonetheless, Ghost Fleet’s technical narrative provides ample realistic content for today’s security and defense officials to balance and refine tomorrow’s warfare strategies. Singer and Cole’s near-future depiction of U.S. technological vulnerability in warfare should spur those officials to enable American innovation and adaptation in warfighting solutions well before the onset of strategic
One may ask the question, “Why did small countries want to start wars with countries that were world powers?” Grant it, the U. S. become an independent country by starting a war with the world’s largest empire, Britain, during the 1700s. One may see it like a small boy picking a fight with the biggest boy in school, maybe the individual wanted respect or he did not want others to bully him. So, why did Japan start a war with the U. S.? Japan definitely had a large enough military, about 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 soldiers willing to die for their Emperor. Japan also welcomed any type of ground invasion, it was their homeland and obviously they knew the terrain. Japan understood that they would have the upper hand if the U.S. invaded and there would
The development of the allied military strategy in World War II (WWII) presented challenges for the U.S. and Great Britain as they worked together to defeat the Axis powers. First, this paper will review the environment at the time of WWII when Admiral Stark penned the “Plan Dog” memorandum and MAJ Wedemeyer’s War Defense Team put together the “Victory Plan”. Next, it will look at the advantages and disadvantages of coalition operations with supporting examples. Then, a review of two major meetings between U.S. and Great Britain will identify what strategic decisions were made and the effects they have on the war. Finally, this paper will explore the foundations of strategy (Clausewitz and Sun Tzu) by which the allied forces used and
Do you ever wonder what could make a nation split into two? On December 20, 1860, South Carolina was the first of eleven states to secede. In the years before that, the North and South of the United States were full of tension. They were arguing about one of the biggest controversies the nation had faced. The issue of slavery. This issue was the primary cause of one of the bloodiest wars America has ever fought; the Civil War. Historians have argued over the reasons that caused America to fight against itself. Slavery was one of the biggest, but it wasn’t all that led to the South seceding from the Union.
In the two hundred years since 1775, there has been thirty-five years of fighting in what we consider major conflicts or wars. This averages out to about one year of war to every almost 6 years of our existence as a nation and during that time, we have not been without formal military organizations. Over the course of history, the United States has engaged in many battles that were a crucial phase in developing who and what we have become. Throughout this assessment, we will analyze what were some of the true tipping points that shaped (1) America’s paradoxical love-hate relationship with war and, (2) How this relationship influences American warfare.
There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of
The western way of war consists of five foundations that have shaped a significant amount of military cultures; the foundations are superior technology, discipline, a finance system, innovation, and military tradition. Perhaps people believe that discipline is not one of the most important foundations of the western way of war, since people tend to emphasize technology. However, discipline is the key to maximizing the other four foundations before and during conflict. Historian Geoffrey Parker agrees that technology can give a military advantage, but it is not sufficient without superior discipline. That is because discipline consists of the ability of armies to act within battle plans even when not supervised, obey orders, exercise loyalty, and restrain their fears when faced with danger. Discipline as a western way of war has influenced military cultures from the Roman Empire to today’s militaries. Discipline shaped military cultures by how they prepared for war, effectively giving them the ability to act during combat and expanding commander’s operational reach, thus aiding in conflicts throughout history and increasing the likelihood of defeating the adversary.
The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.
The American “way of war” is primarily based on the American interpretation of the national fundamentals and values to include capitalism and basic freedoms surrounding financial enterprising as applied in the democratic system. Along with these ideals concerning free marketing and democracy, the American “way of war” seeks to reinforce alliances with nations that uphold similar concepts and values through international trade and commerce. In doing so, the United States intrinsically denounces political ideologies that are contradictory, such as communism.
Parts five and six bring together the personal and professional relationship between Marines themselves and the American public. These relationships, forged by the millions of men and women who have donned the Marine Corps uniform, are a result of training methods and careful selection. General Krulak gives the reader a taste of why Marines do what they have come to be known as America’s force in readiness. First to Fight has many good traits. The book, while easy to read and addictively interesting, never sugarcoats the intense conflicts between high level officials. General Krulak enhances the “official” record with personal accounts of events and people now legendary. His no-holds-barred approach to his writing makes General Krulak’s book both honest and educational. His explanations of the struggle to keep the Marine Corps alive and the early development of amphibious doctrine make First to Fight a must-read for anyone interested in understanding the modern Marine Corps. In parts of the book, General Krulak provides a mountain of detail. While these facts would be of great historical value for a reader who knows military structure and nomenclature, they tend to bog down the reader at points. The political volleys also tend to get tedious when the General describes the how the Marine Corps had to fight tooth and nail for institutional survival. These
Technology, Discipline, Unique System of War Finance, Highly Aggressive Military Tradition, and Emphasis on Innovation are the five principles of the Western Way of War. Having a unique system of war finance, emphasis on innovation, and discipline are the aspects of the western way of war that describe warfare in the age of Napoleon (1789-1815).