Limits of China Soft Power:
China is experiencing significant military and economic powers that could create a threat for its neighbors. Therefore, soft power is indeed an important tool that China is trying to invest in in order to improve its image and recover from its unpopular policies, and to
1-Imbalance of soft-power resources:
It is undoubtedly true, that one of the major challenges which China nowadays is facing in the making of foreign policy is the ability how to make its cultural products more attractive. Although that we still recognise various products which are made in China, the Chinese culture cannot be compared to the United States when it comes to cultural attractiveness. This lack of cultural attractiveness may be explained
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The Iraqi war for instance could show the positive aspect of the EU soft power that overcame the US in fighting terrorism. However, EU soft power if facing many challenges due to economic and military powers that transferred the EU into a neutral and weak security actor that cannot play an influential role in the conflicts. This weak presence of the EU soft power can be realised in the Afghanistan conflict and Ukraine crisis. Another reason for the weakness of EU’s soft power is the fact that the formation of the EU based more on economic reasons rather than political values. It is true that the EU through its communities as the European Political Cooperation ( EPC) has strengthen its foreign policy, but it was only after the Cold War and the setup of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) when the EU’s foreign policy has really become influential and a resource of its soft power. Although that the EU has been strongly presented in some international conflicts as the Ache/Indonesian conflict in 2005, it did not gain any political presence as a powerful actor. This weak presence of the EU soft power can be realised in the Afghanistan conflict and Ukraine crisis. During the Afghanistan conflict, EU faced the challenge of how to make changes and to appear as a powerful actor that can lead as the US.
Nazi propaganda played an important role in the Holocaust, the extermination of millions based on race, religion, and ethnicity. It successfully secured the acquiescence of the general public to the crimes committed by the Nazis. The Nazi Party used their control of the media to fuel anti-Semitic belief and to persuade Germans to support the Nazi cause throughout the Holocaust and World War II.
Opposing Viewpoints College athletes should receive payment from the NCAA because the NCAA makes money off the student-athletes, they fully commit to the university and have more needs than the common student, lastly they make college sports without them the NCAA wouldn't exist. To simplify my argument college athletes are full-time student-athletes and do not have enough time to get a job and make money to provide for themselves, therefore the NCAA (an 11 billion dollar business) should provide the athletes with a small check to help them with all there personal/college needs. Due to the college athletes being exploited and not having time to get a job and not having that money to provide for themselves the NCAA should give the students
It is no longer appropriate to say, “China is quickly emerging as a global superpower.” The fact is China is just that. Realizing this the United States of America has attempted to once again turn its focus eastward. Continuing problems at home and in the Middle East however have made doing so difficult. Additionally more and more frequently attempts at influencing the ongoing narrative in the Asia- Pacific region have been rebuffed. Even allies have found strength in the emergence of a system that fails to conform to previously prescribed methods and ideals. This leads to a fundamental question America must answer quickly. Has the growing hypocrisy of idealistic political rhetoric versus actual foreign policy finally undermined American credibility with developing nations, or for the purposes of this paper more specifically China? The answer is yes.
While it is no secret that China seeks to become a great power, her goals are juxtapose to many other nations who sought the same goal over the last century. China is not out to impose an ideology upon the rest of the world as the Soviet Union did, nor does she plan to become a great military-industrial power as did Japan. China’s goals are multi-dimensional and seek slow and steady progress over the long run. In this respect, China is acting more like America: seeking to shape the world to fit its needs, rather than reacting to the world as others shape
It could, therefore, be argued that these increased political tensions may cause the US to lose key allies and in turn help China become the more favoured country. However, in recent times, China has proven to be arrogant, aggressive and rude when it comes to executing its foreign policy. Many countries, including Japan and India, claim to find it increasingly challenging to cooperate with China and this has done nothing but push said countries towards the US and cemented the US’s global power. Therefore, it is clear that even in terms of soft power, the US scores much higher than China and as a result there will be no shift in power which re-emphasizes the fact that the world order is not changing.
One of the main reasons China has a boost in soft power mentioned in the previous paragraph, as Joseph Nye said, is the significant rise of economic power, which is also one of the key elements of the Chinese Dream. Considering the economic history of imperial China, there are several strong points. Start from the earliest, the Han Dynasty (206 BC-AD 220), which has a massive urbanization, huge population growth, stable currency and very importantly, the open up of Silk Road. These allowed commercial activities developed in a rapid rate at that time, and enabled the trade with Europe through the Silk Road. Han achieved a very high level of gross domestic product at that time, which was roughly equals to $450 per capita in 1990’s US dollar.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become more integrated and willing to cooperate within the global political and economic systems than ever in its history. However, there is growing apprehension in the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. in regards to the consequences of rising in economic and military power in China. Descriptions about Chinese diplomacy in the policy and scholarly are less positive lately concerning China’s obedience to regional and international rules. There was little debate in the U.S. and elsewhere in regards to whether China was or was not part “the international community.” Scholars and experts in the early 1990s have contended
Snyder claims that realism failed to predict the Cold War. Given this, Mearsheimer states “China cannot rise peacefully.” Since realists describe the world as a self-help system, according to Posen, every country “must look to its own interests relative to those of others” and because “security is the preeminent issue in an anarchic world, the distribution of capabilities to attack and defend should matter.” Thus, because China’s strive for regional hegemony inevitably threatens the power dynamic of the global system, the U.S. will, according to Mearsheimer, take an offensive realist approach that will eventually lead to war. In addition, as seen in post-Cold War, economic stability greatly determines the distribution of power. Friedberg notes, that the projected “speed and magnitude of China’s growth in recent decades appears to be unprecedented” and as early as 2015, “China’s economy could overtake that of the United States.” Although the U.S. faces an unprecedented challenge to economic power, according to Ikenberry, China has signaled cooperation by “redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones.” Nevertheless, following the actions of the U.S. post WWII, China strategically makes “itself more predictable and approachable” to reduce “the incentives for other
China is a relatively new power, a new power that has developed faster than any other nation of its age on earth. China has grown at such a high rate because of its authoritarian government, the bureaucracy of democracy is non-existent. Take HS2 in the UK, the miles of red tape change causes mean improving transport links takes years to even get started. In China if the government wants a new railway it builds it the following day. Its this philosophy that has allowed china to grow economically at an exponential rate. Chinas economic growth is over double that of the USA’s, China is second to the USA in military spending, and geographically its position is strong.
To be able to successfully evaluate the role of the rise of China in the security of states, the international order must be looked at first. Due to the anarchical nature of the international order, survival is the supposedly the most important interest of any independent state, as it forces states to be fearful of each other as each state is concerned about their security and their abilities to compete with each other for power according to realism. It is this system that causes the
It is no doubt that China is becoming both a military and economic power in the international system. This emergence in power however poses a threat to the United States; the current world hegemon. To assess China’s rise as an economic power, it is important to analyze state relationships in the international system. The IR theories of Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism are crucial in predicting the future of Sino-U.S. relations, as each theory holds a distinct position on state relations in the international system.
Realism assumes that under a balance of power, the overriding aim of all states is to maximize power and become the only hegemony in the system. States only help themselves in the anarchic international system. Therefore, China’s rise is regarded as a disconcerting threat to the U.S.’s primacy of power in the present international stage. The power shift in East Asia is creating security dilemmas; the U.S. thus demands more security to its Asian allies including Philippines, Japan and South Korea. The rapidly-rising Chinese power would inevitably challenge the current international balance of power and appear aggressively in the eyes of weaker power such as the Philippines. Therefore it seeks help to its ally, the U.S., to counterbalance the power of China. China intends to gain more resources and to transform current international order to its favor according to its national interests. The 2010 Chinese White Paper on National Defence states that: “Contradictions continue to surface between developed and developing countries and between traditional
A profusion of scholarly works and articles lament the fact that the European Union does not develop a grand strategy and militate to confer an enhanced military dimension on the EU. These views imply that the European Union has no grand strategy or has an inadequate one. However widespread, these conclusions do not fit with all existing conceptions regarding grand strategy. In the meantime and interestingly enough, people seem more inclined to accept that NATO has a grand strategy. This observation and its potential implication for the international order inspired and initiated this study. They lead to the two following questions that guided the analysis. Do the European Union and NATO have grand strategies? If yes, what are these grand strategies and what are their possible impacts on the international order? Answering these questions required, first, to understand grand strategy. In chapter 1, the study began by scrutinizing the concept of grand strategy, which has historically been intimately intertwined with the concept of strategy. Rigorous investigations into the nature and history of strategy combined with the application of different lenses to the canon of work of recognized authorities in the field of strategy supported the analysis. The etymological, historical, and epistemological lenses applied to strategy provided the basis to assess the dominant schools of thought, understand the contemporary developments, and ultimately comprehend grand strategy. This
Morrison, Bruce Vaughn, and William Kennedy; the evolution and rise of China’s strength through soft power were discussed. Beginning on Yiwei Wang’s piece, its focus point aims at the redefining of China from a hard power into a soft power by rebranding its international image to suit its goals. (Wang, 2005) In the piece, China’s difficulties in achieving a full rebranding began the piece, yet its transformation has seen its return in success by going “from soft power to soft rise” with its ambitions in achieving this power. Going into Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn’s piece, the means China had used to actually reach this point of soft power were discussed especially focussing on its focus in Southeast Asia by conducting non-military inducements including culture, diplomacy, foreign aid, trade, and investment throughout the region. Through these non-military acts throughout the region, negative imagery previously associated with China during the Mao era had begun to be forgotten, in order to think of China as their hero of sorts. (Lum, Morrison, Vaughn, 2008) Lastly, through Kennedy’s piece these goals are reiterated in both the means China has been using to boost its soft power as well as the benefits of economic and diplomatic gains through the success of their gains in soft power, as well as reiterating Nye’s point in the strengths achievable through successful soft power usage. (Kennedy, 2016)
The study also revealed a corollary finding. Chapter 1 divulged that the Western Civilization is displaying a bias for oppositional responses. Since Antiquity, the West seems to see strategy as competitive in nature and often consider that the military is an inescapable means to resolve international issues. This bias contributes to explaining the surprising proposition that neither the European Union nor NATO seems willing to acknowledge that it develops a grand strategy. One can advance that the EU and NATO do so because they project their biases onto other actors and, therefore, fear that opponents as well as partners might interpret such acknowledgment as a move towards power politics. This bias deserves further scrutiny and substantiation and presents a potential lead to elaborate on this study. It might also offer an opportunity for rejuvenating the field of strategy. Indeed, this bias is the occasion for strategists to broaden their analytical spectrum as well as the variety of tools at their disposal. In particular, they have to acknowledge that the use of force or the threat of it might not be the only ways to coerce a third party, be it with a design of deterring or compelling it. For instance, in an international regime favoring cooperative relations, the threat of diminishing economic cooperation or of diplomatic sanctions, which can range from minor actions to complete isolation, might procure similar effects. The works of Robert Axelrod are remarkably