9/11: Underestimated The Power Of Al-Qaeda

It was a clear Tuesday morning; September 11, 2001, nineteen Islamic terrorists from Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations boarded four fully fueled American airliners. These airliners were set to depart to cities in California. Little did the staff for each of the planes or the people boarding them know that plans had changed. Within the space of an hour, al Qaeda

The intelligence community knew that Osama bin Laden had threatened to “cut off the head of the serpent” (the US) and cause mass casualties; it also knew that Bin Laden was planning to do something with aircrafts. An FBI field office knew that several pilots were in training, but didn’t seem to piece it all together (Simonsen & Spindlove, 2013, Pg. 69) However, the past “Dots” lead to a buildup by internationalized terror fanatics from the Islamic world, with serious planning for perpetrating attacks against the U.S. The U.S. had no idea that the attackers were actually being flight trained in Florida and the U.S. were

Beginning in 2001 Intelligence about the impending nature of an attack was increasing, not only from US Intelligence sources but also from 11 other countries such as Britain, Israel, India, Egypt, Morocco and even a top Taliban commander from Afghanistan (Thompson.) Beginning in August warnings become coming in from everywhere, foreign governments, CIA and FBI sources and so on however, next to none of this information was shared between the many intelligence agencies. In April, NORAD launched a training scenario in which the pentagon was to be incapacitated by a hijacked airliner however the Joint Chiefs of Staff disregarded the scenario as “too unrealistic” (September 11 attacks advance-knowledge debate.) On august 19th the Israeli’s gave US intelligence personnel credible information including, the list of 19 suspected terrorist’s names and the fact that a large aircraft would be the primary weapon involved. The names were not shared by the CIA with other intelligence agencies (Robinson.)

Prior to September 11, 2001, the government intelligence agencies truly failed. Both the FBI and CIA are to blame because they failed to share the “information that appears relevant to the events of 9/11” (Theoharis and Immerman). Neither agency thought that the information about terrorists that may be in the U.S. is important to act upon or tell the other organization. This led to nothing happening to try

The day 9/11, was ranked the most audacious attack in American history, because of the tragic bombing that occurred, the hijackers rammed jetliners into the world trade center in new york, and the pentagon in virginia, this left a storm of ashes,smoke and fallen victims. I believe that the american response to this attack is not good because of the steps they took to handle the situation,like attacking states that may harbor these people, or by doing unreasonable search on people that may be clean on all the searches, and to just pick a random person to get cuffed for no reason is a bit harsh.

In the Communist invasion of Korea in the summer of 1950, Stalin believed North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung when he said he was “absolutely certain of success.” However, Stalin made it clear the USSR would not be footing the bill for a war in Korea if Sung was wrong, and he was. Once the United States sided with the South Koreans, the war became a fiasco instead of the quick, easy, and cheap spread of Communism Stalin thought he was signing on for, and Korea has never been stable since. Similarly, on September 11, 2001, al Qaeda underestimated American retaliation when they orchestrated and executed terror attacks on U.S. soil. Since Americans started a “war on terror,” al Qaeda’s efforts have become “desperate self-promotion” and most of “their” attacks have been made by affiliated and never again had such a catastrophic impact as 9/11 (p 123).

2001-Al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan are targeted by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the CIA’s

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the Islamic terrorists group al-Qaeda hijacked four planes and crashed into the United States’ centers of power: the

Recognizing the threat Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups posed provided homeland security with the basis which is now important to state and local law enforcement agencies (Sheehan, Michael, 2011). After nearly a decade after the September eleventh, more than twenty terrorist related plots were uncovered by the federal government. As the war against terrorism continues, it has cost America the lives of more than six thousand service members and nearly 1.5 trillion dollars (Ortmeier, P, 2009).

Upon analyzing 9/11 it was clear to focus on the limitations that the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency had faced. Security breaches and poor intelligence sharing were just some of the critical failures that were encountered. Moreover, the main focus is pointed towards the miscommunication between these two agencies. Evidently, the execution and tactical strategies went unnoticed despite the apparent red flags that presented themselves, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency failure to pursue threats and establish a baseline of security resulted in the disaster of 9/11. In conjunction to these mistakes, the restriction of shared information

It is practically impossible for a nation’s intelligence community to detect and prevent every attack on its soil. However, the American failure to uncover the 9/11 plot should be considered a massive failure considering the scope of the attack which involved careful planning, training many perpetrators, and a high profile target with many victims. Furthermore it can be demonstrated that there were many signals and opportunities to discover the plot that the intelligence machinery missed. “Hindsight is 20/20” and there needs to be an understanding of how easy it is to look back at how the intelligence gathered before the attacks should have signaled a serious threat, and thus provoked the unraveling of the 9/11 plot had the intelligence community

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 were the direct result of the failure of US agencies, ranging from the White House to airport security, to recognize vulnerabilities present in the various symptoms. The reason why these vulnerabilities were not acknowledged and repaired is that these various agencies were trapped in a cognitive dissonance cycle of thinking. After the Cold War, terrorism was seen as a regional problem (9/11 Commission, 92). The majority of terrorist groups were either groups sponsored by governments or militants trying to create governments (i.e. Palestine Liberation Organization). As a result, the tactics used for fighting terrorism were centralized mostly in the Middle East and were restricted to

The attack on the World Trade Center was not the first attack and was not the first time the US Intelligence Community had heard of Al-Qaeda or Osama Bin Laden. The role of counterintelligence from both sides the US and Al-Qaeda, lent to the information flow not only form the attackers but also to the ones who would ultimately respond. The FBI, the CIA, the DIA, have integral parts in these series of events from the information collection to the information flow. In a time where it was realized that Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism have a similar need, as well as information sharing across agencies, have led to the CI and IC we see today.

When the September 11, 2001 attacks occurred the United States responded in a manner which was seen as a traditional reaction to such an attack; it used its overwhelming superior military to invade the nation of Afghanistan. As Afghanistan was the operating base of the terrorist group responsible for the attacks, Al Qaeda, the invasion all but destroyed the group's operating capacity. But in response to the United States' apparent victory the terrorists have re-organized themselves into a looser confederation and turned to alternative methods of finance and operation. One could say that the success of the American military's answer to the September 11th attacks have created a new environment in which terrorists currently operate. This includes the use of the internet, unconventional alliances with international criminal organizations, as well the inception of the "lone wolf" terrorist. Faced with these new type of threats, the United States and its allies must find a way to identify and deal with them.

As a direct consequence of September 11, a number of substantial challenges lie ahead in the area of counter-terrorism..   The most prominent of these is the changing nature of the terrorism phenomenon.  In past years, when terrorism was largely the product of direct state sponsorship, policymakers were able to diminish prospects for the United States becoming a target using a combination of diplomatic and military instruments to deter potential state sponsors.  Today, however, many terrorist organizations and individuals act independently from former and present state sponsors, shifting to other sources of support, including the development of transnational networks.