Phil 103 Midterm 4
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2.
What main arguments does Socrates give, in the
Crito
, for the conclusion that it would be wrong for
him to escape and evade his death sentence? What are some objections and potential replies? How
might we critique even the best version of Socrates’ argument in the
Crito
? What do
you
think about
the extent of our obligation to obey the law?
Premise: P1One should never do anything that is ethically wrong, and P2: for Socrates to attempt to
escape and evade his death penalty would be ethically wrong.
Support to P2:
1.Argu from Consequences: it is ethically wrong to bring sign harm to laws and state, even for self-
preservation. And attempt to escape will …..
Therefore, P2
2.Argu from Agreement:
a long time citizen should obey the laws of the state. And It is always eth wrong to break…
Thus, it is ethic wrong for a long-time citizen to break…
+ Socrates is a long time citizen, so P2
Objections: if the law of states is unjust, than to obey it is ethically wrong, which contradict with P1
Revision: only obey just laws…, and Socrates trial was conducted fairly, according to just laws…, so it
would be wrong for S to escape.
Final Objection: can escape without denying/doing harm to the authority/the laws (by claiming that the
authority/state is right, but still run)
3.
What is the definition of
merely instrumental value
, or a
merely instrumental good
? What are some
examples, and why? Similarly with
non-instrumental value
or
non-instrumental goods
. How did this
distinction figure into one of the major issues we’ve looked at so far? What was one claim made by
one philosopher about non-instrumental value (i.e.,
what
did he say had non-instrumental value as well
as instrumental value)?
IV: things valued only for their results. E.g. Not to steal money. Non-IV: things valued only in
themselves. E.g. play music for fun
Major issue: Do people do just for IV or Non-IV or both.
Both value:
Well, is there another class, do you think, c of those which we value, both for their own
sake and for their results? Such as intelligence,
and sight, and health—all of which we surely welcome on both accounts.
(Plato, The republic)
4.
What was Glaucon’s account of the origin, nature and value of justice? (How can we illustrate his
account of the origins of justice using the logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in a social setting with repeated
interactions?)
Social Contract Theory of Justice: people are more scared of getting harmed that they won't harm others.
We have more to fear than we have to gain, therefore we all come together and make laws that are our
protection. It is a contract among us. Just as the the two prisons who are trapped in the “prison dillema”,
they will only act for their best interest.
Why did he give that account of the origin, nature and value of justice, and what was it supposed to show
about justice?
He wants to prove that injustice people would have a better life than justice people, and the so called
justice is just the disguise of injustice.
“ the story of the ring of Gyges”
How did Socrates ultimately respond to that challenge (later in Plato’s Republic)? What metaphor did he
use in giving his argument, and what did the various aspects of the metaphor represent in literal terms?
Does NOT believe in the Social Contract Theory view.
-We are inherently social. Each person has a specialty, no person is entirely self-sufficient, and we come
together out of need, not fear.
-Human nature is to share and exchange. It is only when we want more and more that things begin to get
tricky.
We must look to a larger example where it's more obvious, and that will help us see
it. So we look at the state and train that vision on the individual.
(
City
)
How does Socrates ultimately define justice and injustice? How does that answer Glaucon’s challenge
about the value of justice for the just person? What exactly does the soul have to do with this?
Justice is getting all and only what they deserve.
Tyran can’t be happy and the city would eventually collapse.
Socrates divided people into three dividend - rational, spirited, appetitive, which refers to three parts of
the soul - reason, spirit, appetite. People only have real justice when a person's soul is ruled by reason.
Although the other two types of people can't do the true sense of justice, the rationality of the soul from
justice can still constrain their appetite to honor and money, so that they are close to real justice.
5.
What is Divine Command Theory? How does it differ from other theistic theories that might equally
claim that everything that is morally wrong is also something that God commands us not to do? In
other words, what sets Divine Command Theory specifically apart from the other theistic view (such
as natural law theory)? Is it a form of Divine Command Theory to claim that God tells us not to
commit murder because he is omniscient and therefore knows it’s wrong? Why or why not? What are
some objections to Divine Command Theory, such as the evil demon objection? How might a Divine
Command Theorist respond to the evil demon objection? What problems remain for Divine Command
Theory even after the theory has been modified to avoid the evil demon objection? What dilemma does
the Divine Command Theorist face with respect to the issue of whether or not God has good reasons
for giving us the commands that are given?
Difference: DCT believes even the rightness or wrongness of an act is defined by God, not that God
commands us not to do morally wrong thing but the morality is under God’s Commands. It is not a
form because God’s do not know what is right or wrong and then forbid us do things but rightness or
wrongness is under his command. Evil demon: if God, or anyone who commands is an evil demon,
then the rightness or wrongness may not be morally acceptable.
Modified: the creator god must also be sufficiently good and good to us.
Objection: Our overarching, general obligation to obey the god’s commands in the first place is itself
rooted NOT in a divine command, but
in divine goodness to us
!
Dilemma: if God’s goodness to us (which is not a divine command) can directly ground an obligation on
our part (to obey God’s commands), then by the same token,
other people’s goodness to us should
similarly be able to directly ground certain moral obligations, independently of divine
commands
6.
What is moral relativism? How does it
differ
from related anthropological or sociological claims about
variation in moral beliefs and practices, or from claims about the importance of tolerance, or claims
about lack of empirical proof for moral statements? What is the difference between Weak and Extreme
Moral Relativism, and what is Moral Universalism? What are some examples of weak relativist
claims? (Identify which circumstances are making the moral difference and why they do so.) How
might those claims still be compatible with Moral Universalism? What are some plausible examples of
‘morally irrelevant variation’? What are some examples of ‘multiple realizability’ of certain objective
values?
MR is not about beliefs (whether a belief is right or wrong), it is about moral truth. Extreme MR thinks
all moral truth is relative, while Weak MR thinks some are relative, but not all.
What are some objections to Extreme Moral Relativism, and what are some plausible examples of
objective, universal moral values or principles or truths? If we reject Extreme Moral Relativism and
judge that some practice in another time or cultural was/is simply
wrong
, are we thereby automatically
committed to
blaming
the people who engaged or engage in it? Are we automatically justified in
interfering
with them to stop it, if it’s still happening? (In other words, be able to discuss the
differences between what the Moral Universalist is claiming when rejecting Extreme Moral
Relativism, and these other issues of blame or interference, which bring in other issues.) Does being a
Moral Universalist mean that we think
we
have flawless moral beliefs (unlike our ancestors or people
in other cultures, some of whose beliefs and practices we criticize as objectively mistaken)?
7.
What is
Psychological
Egoism? (Make sure you can state it carefully and clearly.) Is it a normative or
a descriptive claim? Is someone a psychological egoist just because all her actions are in accordance
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with her own desires (so that she does what she most wants to do)? What is
Hedonistic
Psychological
Egoism in particular? What is an important philosophical argument against a strong form of this view?
PE: Psychological egoism is simply a
descriptive claim
about actual human psychology.
some
self-regarding or self-interested motives
crucially
underlie
all
our actions.
Hedonistic Psychological Egoism
: All actions, even apparently altruistic ones, are
really
done ultimately
in order
to feel good
in some way, or
to avoid feeling bad
.
Objection
:
(1 Note first that it would be fallacious to infer, from the mere presence of pleasure in action,
that getting the pleasure was the real purpose of the action. That doesn’t follow; too quick.
(2 Egosim: content of desire is selfish, but to help sb else vonlu is not selfish because the content of the
act is altruistic… Thus, even though we are helping others under our sesires does’nt necessarily implies
egoism.
What is
Ethical
Egoism? (Make sure you can state it carefully and clearly.) Is it a normative or a
descriptive claim? What is the difference between
Constrained
and
Unconstrained
Ethical Egoism?
What is an objection to Ethical Egoism?
Normative.
Unconstrained Ethical Egoism
: there are
no ethical obligations of any sort
to do anything
that does not
maximally serve one’s self-interest. (Extreme)
Constrained Ethical Egoism
: While
there are negative obligations
to refrain from violating other
people’s negative rights (i.e., their rights of non-interference, non-injury), there are
no positive
obligations to aid others
in any ways that do not maximally serve one’s self-interest. There are
no
obligations of altruism.
(Still extreme, but somewhat less so than unconstrained ethical egoism.)