November 8 Case Briefs
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Southern New Hampshire University *
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PROPERTY
Subject
Law
Date
Feb 20, 2024
Type
docx
Pages
9
Uploaded by anorajon10
1. Case Name, Court, Date of Opinion
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., Supreme Court of the United States, 2015 2. Factual summary (a brief paragraph, 3-5 sentences)
The Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (Department) (defendant) was a state agency that distributed federal tax credits to developers to build low-income housing. The Department
determined which developers would be distributed credits based on specific selection criteria that the Department had established. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (ICP) (plaintiff) was a nonprofit corporation that aided low-income families in obtaining housing. ICP claimed that the Department’s selection criteria had resulted in a disproportionately high allocation of tax credits to predominantly black neighborhoods as compared to white neighborhoods. ICP argued that the Department’s conduct was unlawful in that it created a disparate impact on black neighborhoods. ICP sued the Department for violating provisions of the Fair Housing Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. § 3601
et seq.
Specifically, ICP claimed that the Department had violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), which prohibited an entity from otherwise making a dwelling unavailable to a person because of the person’s race, color, or national origin. ICP also alleged that the Department had violated 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), which similarly prohibited an entity involved in real-estate transactions from discriminating against a person because of race, color, or national origin.
3. Procedural History (what happened in the court(s) below)
The district court found in favor of ICP, and the Department appealed. The court of appeals held that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Act but reversed and remanded the case on the merits. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question of whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Act.
4. Issue(s) on Appeal
Was the disparate-impact claims were cognizable by the Fair Housing Act?
5. Rule of Law
After a plaintiff does establish a prima facie showing of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2). The Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development has clarified that this step of the analysis is analogous to the Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 requirement that an employer’s interest in an employment practice with
a disparate impact be job related. Once a defendant has satisfied its burden at step two, a plaintiff may prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.
5. Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
The Court held that the disparate-impact claims are cognizable under FHA
.
The Court noted that under the FHA, it was unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a person because of race” or other protected characteristic, §804(a), or “to discriminate against any person in” making certain real-estate transactions “because of race” or other protected characteristic, §805(a). The results-oriented phrase “otherwise make unavailable”
referred to the consequences of an action rather than the actor's intent. this phrase was equivalent
in function and purpose to Title VII's and the ADEA's “otherwise adversely affect” language. In all three statutes the operative text looked to results and plays an identical role: as a catchall phrase, located at the end of a lengthy sentence that begins with prohibitions on disparate treatment. The introductory word “otherwise” also signaled a shift in emphasis from an actor's intent to the consequences of his actions. This similarity in text and structure was even more compelling because Congress passed the FHA only four years after Title VII and four months after the ADEA. Although the FHA did not reiterate Title VII's exact language, Congress chose words that serve the same purpose and bear the same basic meaning but are consistent with the FHA's structure and objectives. The FHA contained the phrase “because of race,” but Title VII and the ADEA also contained that wording and this Court nonetheless held that those statutes impose disparate-impact liability. Recognition of disparate-impact claims was also consistent with the central purpose of the FHA, which, like Title VII and the ADEA, was enacted to eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of the Nation's economy. Furthermore, the Court asserted that an important and appropriate means of ensuring that disparate-impact liability
was properly limited was to give housing authorities and private developers leeway to state and explain the valid interest their policies serve, an analysis that was analogous to Title VII's business necessity standard. A disparate-impact claim relying on a statistical disparity must fail if
the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant's policy or policies causing that disparity. When courts do find liability under a disparate-impact theory, their remedial orders must be consistent with
the Constitution. Remedial orders in disparate-impact cases should concentrate on the elimination of the offending practice, and courts should strive to design race-neutral remedies. The Court affirmed the appealed decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
6. Court’s Holding
Yes.
9. Result (who wins, and disposition, such as “affirmed,” “reversed,” “remanded,” etc.)
Affirmed. 10. Why you think this case is significant
The Court held that the disparate-impact claims are cognizable under FHA
.
The Court noted that under the FHA, it was unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a person because of race” or other protected characteristic, §804(a), or “to discriminate against any person in” making certain real-estate transactions “because of race” or other protected characteristic, §805(a).
1. Case Name, Court, Date of Opinion
Neithamer v. Brenneman Property Services, Inc., United States District Court, District of Columbia, 1999 2. Factual summary (a brief paragraph, 3-5 sentences)
William Neithamer (plaintiff), who was gay and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive, applied to rent a townhouse in September 1997. Neithamer provided Brenneman Property Services, Inc. (Brenneman) and its agents (defendants) with bank statements and credit reports. Neithamer explained to Brenneman’s agents that he had failed to make payments to creditors years before, because Neithamer had exhausted his financial resources paying the medical bills of his lover, who died of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in 1994. Neithamer maintained good credit since 1994. Brenneman rejected Neithamer’s application despite Neithamer’s offers to pay a second month’s rent as security, obtain a co-signor, and pre-pay a year’s rent.
3. Procedural History (what happened in the court(s) below)
Neithamer sued Brenneman and its agents under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 46 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and medical disability. Brenneman moved for summary judgment, arguing it rejected Neithamer’s application because of his poor credit
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history and that Brenneman was merely acting as the property owner’s agent. Neithamer provided evidence that Brenneman did not consistently reject applicants with poor credit and did not present the
property owner with all of Neithamer’s offers.
4. Issue(s) on Appeal
Was the plaintiff's burden of proving a prima facie case of perceived disability in a housing discrimination case satisfied in this suit?
5. Rule of Law
When a plaintiff offers no direct evidence of discrimination, his claim of discrimination under the
Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C.S. § 3601 et seq.
, is to be examined under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. established in cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
5. Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
There are no cases which address the question of the plaintiff's burden of proving a prima facie case of perceived disability in a housing discrimination case. First, HIV status is not easily identifiable as race usually is. Second, dismissing a case at the summary judgment stage because a plaintiff cannot prove a defendant's suspicions would subject HIV-positive individuals to the very discrimination that Congress sought to prevent, by denying them a remedy even when such discrimination existed. The very fact that this case is brought under the
perceived
disability section of the FHA informs how the question of the plaintiff's burden of proof at the prima facie stage must be approached. Given the difficulty of identifying a person's HIV status, rarely will another's perceptions of that status be obvious. Even if someone had suspicions of another's HIV status, such perceptions could easily be denied. Therefore, requiring a plaintiff to show definitive
proof of a defendant's perceptions at the summary judgment stage creates an impossible burden of proof, one that is inappropriate at the prima facie stage. It is sufficient for a plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a material dispute as to the defendant's perception of him as an individual with HIV or AIDS. Defendant's credibility regarding denials of such perceptions is for
the jury to decide.
6. Court’s Holding
Yes
9. Result (who wins, and disposition, such as “affirmed,” “reversed,” “remanded,” etc.)
Affirmed. 1. Case Name, Court, Date of Opinion
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, United State Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 2012
2. Factual summary (a brief paragraph, 3-5 sentences)
Roommate.com, LLC (defendant) operated a website where individuals could post information about themselves, including sex, sexual orientation, and familial status, to assist in their search for a roommate. The Fair Housing Councils of San Fernando Valley and San Diego (plaintiffs) brought suit, alleging among other things that Roommate.com’s website was discriminatory in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color, sex, familial status, or national origin" with respect to the rental or sale of a "dwelling." The FHA defines "dwelling," in turn, as "any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families."
3. Procedural History (what happened in the court(s) below)
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding that Roommate.com violated the FHA by prompting users to enter discriminatory preferences, matching users based on those preferences, and publishing the preferences. The district court enjoined Roommate.com from continuing those practices. Roommate.com appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
4. Issue(s) on Appeal
Whether the Fair Housing Act applies to the selection of roommates
5. Rule of Law
The Fair Housing Act does not apply to the selection of roommates.
An organization has direct standing to sue when it shows a drain on its resources from both a diversion of its resources and frustration of its mission. However, standing must be established independent of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff. An organization cannot manufacture an injury by
incurring litigation costs or simply choosing to spend money fixing a problem that otherwise would not affect the organization at all. An organization cannot, of course, manufacture the injury necessary to maintain a suit from its expenditure of resources on that very suit
5. Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
The FHA prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of color, sex, religion, race, national origin, and familial status in the “sale or rental of a dwelling.” Nevertheless, the FHA does not expressly include the selection of roommates, even though the court noted that it could be interpreted in the context of shared living units as well. The court further explained that one has the right to intimate association, as well as the right not to associate, which are fundamental liberties. Also, the choice of a roommate has substantial safety precautions, given the intimate nature of the relationship in a home. Therefore, the court construed the FHA narrowly and inapplicable to shared living units. Defendant’s website does not violate FHA.
There is a protection of possible discrimination on basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin by the FHA. However, it does not simply apply or allow the selection of
roommates. A roommate relationship is considered an intimate one that the government cannot interfere between them. The court also found that FHA is inapplicable to shared living units. The
district court's judgment was vacated and remanded for entry of judgment for the operator.
6. Court’s Holding
No. 9. Result (who wins, and disposition, such as “affirmed,” “reversed,” “remanded,” etc.)
Reversed.
1. Case Name, Court, Date of Opinion
Effel v. Rosberg, Court of Appeals of Texas, 2012
2. Factual summary (a brief paragraph, 3-5 sentences)
Robert Rosberg (plaintiff) reached a settlement agreement with Henry and Jack Effel. As part of the agreement, Rosberg bought residential property from Henry and Jack. The agreement provided that the current resident of the property, Lena Effel (defendant), would continue to live on the property for the rest of her life, unless she voluntarily chose to vacate. Rosberg and Henry, with power of attorney for Lena, signed a lease incorporating these terms. The lease contained certain covenants governing Lena’s maintenance of the property. The lease did not reserve a life estate. Lena installed a wrought iron fence in violation of the covenants in the lease. Rosberg terminated the lease and ordered Lena to vacate the property.
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3. Procedural History (what happened in the court(s) below)
Lena did not vacate, and Rosberg filed a forcible detainer action. The trial court awarded possession of
the property to Rosberg. Lena appealed
4. Issue(s) on Appeal
Was Rosberg authorized to terminate the lease?
5. Rule of Law
It is the long-standing rule in Texas that a lease must be for a certain period of time or it will be considered a tenancy at will. Courts that have applied this rule to leases that state they are for the term of the lessee's life have concluded that the uncertainty of the date of the lessee's death rendered the lease terminable at will by either party
5. Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
The appellate court noted that the evidence demonstrated that the resident's legal status in connection with the property was solely that of a tenant. The fact that it was necessary to introduce evidence of title to prove the landlord-tenant relationship did not deprive the court of jurisdiction because the validity of the title was not at issue. The resident was a party only to the lease. It was the lease, and not the settlement agreement, that formed the basis of the forcible detainer action. The rule continued to be that a lease for an indefinite and uncertain length of time was an estate at will. Not only was the term of the lease stated to be for the uncertain length of the resident's life, but her tenancy was also until such time that she voluntarily vacated the premises. If a lease could be terminated at the will of the lessee, it could also be terminated at the
will of the lessor. The evidence showed that the landowner's notice to vacate the property complied with
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.005
. The landowner's February 24 notice letter complied with
§ 24.005
as the claimed false statements were irrelevant to the sufficiency of the notice
6. Court’s Holding
Yes. 9. Result (who wins, and disposition, such as “affirmed,” “reversed,” “remanded,” etc.)
Affirmed. 1. Case Name, Court, Date of Opinion
Keydata Corp. v. United States, United States Court of Claims, 1974 2. Factual summary (a brief paragraph, 3-5 sentences)
In 1968, Keydata Corporation (Keydata) (plaintiff) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) both leased space in a building owned by Wyman Street Trust. Keydata’s rented space included a computer room. Keydata and the United States (defendant), acting for NASA, agreed that on January 1, 1969, Keydata would surrender possession of the computer room, and the United States would begin to lease it. Keydata and the United States also agreed that the United States would pay $39,000 for improvements to the computer room. Keydata did not vacate the computer room on January 1, 1969. The next day, the United States sent Keydata a letter canceling the United States’ lease of the computer room, because the room was not available for occupancy. The United States also did not pay the $39,000 for the improvements.
3. Procedural History (what happened in the court(s) below)
Keydata brought suit against the United States for payment of the $39,000 as Wyman's assignee. Keydata argued Wyman fully performed its obligations as landlord, because Wyman was only obligated to convey to the United States the right of possession of the computer room, not actual possession of the room. Keydata argued the United States’ rescission of the lease was therefore illegal,
and the United States owed the $39,000. Both parties moved for summary judgme
4. Issue(s) on Appeal
Did the defendant have a right to revoke?
5. Rule of Law
Contracts of the federal government are normally governed, not by the particular law of the states where they are made or performed, but by a uniform federal law
5. Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
The court granted defendant U.S. summary judgment, holding that it had right to rescind lease, since court had the power to choose the "English" rule requiring a landlord to take prompt action to remove a holdover tenant within a reasonable time, as it was necessary that federal government leases be governed by a uniform federal law. The court denied summary judgment on plaintiff assignee's waiver and estoppel claims since fact issues remained.
6. Court’s Holding
Yes
9. Result (who wins, and disposition, such as “affirmed,” “reversed,” “remanded,” etc.)
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