Two firms, Incumbent & Entrant, can produce the same good. The market demand for the good is given by P = 180 – Q, where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The firms must pay w = 45 per unit of output for labour and r = 45 per unit of output for capital (one unit of capital is used per unit of output), but Incumbent may choose capacity KI units of capital before Entrant decides whether to enter the market. Suppose firms each have fixed costs FI =600, FE=500. Incumbent chooses (as a Stackelberg leader) capacity Kl equal to the monopoly profit- maximizing quantity. When you answer the following questions, show your work. a. Would Incumbent be able to prevent entry by choosing capacity Kl equal to the monopoly profit- maximizing quantity? Explain. b. What is the Incumbent's equilibrium choice of capacity KI in this Dixit game? c. Does the Incumbent's choice of capacity KI in part (b) qualify as predatory conduct (here, limit output)? Explain.

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
Publisher:NICHOLSON
Chapter11: Profit Maximization
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 11.12P
icon
Related questions
Question
Two firms, Incumbent & Entrant, can produce the
same good. The market demand for the good is
given by P = 180 – Q, where P is the market price
and Q is the market quantity demanded. The firms
must pay w = 45 per unit of output for labour and r
= 45 per unit of output for capital (one unit of
capital is used per unit of output), but Incumbent
may choose capacity KI units of capital before
Entrant decides whether to enter the market.
Suppose firms each have fixed costs FI =600,
FE=500. Incumbent chooses (as a Stackelberg
leader) capacity Kl equal to the monopoly profit-
maximizing quantity. When you answer the
following questions, show your work.
a. Would Incumbent be able to prevent entry by
choosing capacity Kl equal to the monopoly profit-
maximizing quantity? Explain.
b. What is the Incumbent's equilibrium choice of
capacity KI in this Dixit game?
c. Does the Incumbent's choice of capacity KI in
part (b) qualify as predatory conduct (here, limit
output)? Explain.
%3|
Transcribed Image Text:Two firms, Incumbent & Entrant, can produce the same good. The market demand for the good is given by P = 180 – Q, where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The firms must pay w = 45 per unit of output for labour and r = 45 per unit of output for capital (one unit of capital is used per unit of output), but Incumbent may choose capacity KI units of capital before Entrant decides whether to enter the market. Suppose firms each have fixed costs FI =600, FE=500. Incumbent chooses (as a Stackelberg leader) capacity Kl equal to the monopoly profit- maximizing quantity. When you answer the following questions, show your work. a. Would Incumbent be able to prevent entry by choosing capacity Kl equal to the monopoly profit- maximizing quantity? Explain. b. What is the Incumbent's equilibrium choice of capacity KI in this Dixit game? c. Does the Incumbent's choice of capacity KI in part (b) qualify as predatory conduct (here, limit output)? Explain. %3|
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 4 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Monopoly
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
Microeconomic Theory
Microeconomic Theory
Economics
ISBN:
9781337517942
Author:
NICHOLSON
Publisher:
Cengage
Principles of Economics 2e
Principles of Economics 2e
Economics
ISBN:
9781947172364
Author:
Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Publisher:
OpenStax
Microeconomics: Principles & Policy
Microeconomics: Principles & Policy
Economics
ISBN:
9781337794992
Author:
William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow
Publisher:
Cengage Learning