Problem 3 Consider the following simultaneous normal form game: P.2 R P R 0,0 -1,1 1, -1 P.1 P 1, -1 0,0 -1, 1 -1, 1 1, -1 0,0 Now assume the game is not simultaneous and player 1 gets to play first. Create a game tree that represents the sequential game. Also, name each node, define the set of information sets for each player, show which nodes are in which information set and add define action sets at each info set.
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- Consider the following extensive form game between player 1 and player 2. T B (2, 2) L R R (3, 1) (0, 0) (5, 0) (0, 1) (a). Find the normal form representation of this game. (show the bimatrix) (b). Find all pure strategy NE. (c). Which of these equilibria are subgame perfect?5) Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Consider a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the following coordination game: Player 2 Player 1 A B a 5.5 6.-2 b -2,6 1,1 a) In the above game, explain in words what condition player 1's probability p of playing strategy A must satisfy to induce player 2 to mix strategies between a and b in equilibrium. b) Solve for the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where player 1 chooses A with probability P and player 2 chooses a with probability p, for 0 < p, P < 1.7 Find all subgame perfect equilibria of the game
- NE 2). Consider the following extensive form game between two players. (1,10) u D 1 B X (a) List all pure strategies of player 2. (b) Represent this game in normal form. (c) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. (d) Find all SPNE (in pure strategies) of this game. (6,3) (4,2) (5,1)Subgames • • • At each node where a player makes a decision, we can think about the "subgame" starting at that node A subgame is the portion of the tree following a particular node How many subgames does our first sequential move example have? • How many subgames does our entry game have? • How many subgames does the game on the right have? • What are its Nash equilibria? Player 1 (1,4) T Player 2 U B (5,2) (3,3) р Player 1 D L 9 (2, 0) Player 2 R (6, 2)(a) In the extensive form below, player 1 moves first, and player 3 moves last. (3) Note the two information sets including the nodes where player 3 moves: P1 L R P2 P2 A B P3 P3 d 2,3.2 2,1,1 3,0,4 3.4,0 3,1,1 Ennio Stacchetti December 17, 2021 (a) Find all subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies. (b) Find a Nash equilibrium that is not a subgame perfect equilibrium.
- Exercise 6.1Suppose that two airlines decide to collude. Analyse the game between these two companies. Suppose that each of them can charge for tickets a high price or a low price. If one of them charges 100 euros, it gets few profits if the other also charges 100 euros and high profits if the other charges 200 euros. On the other hand, if the company charges 200 euros, it obtains very little profit if the other charges 100 euros and an average profit if the other also charges 200 euros. a) Represent the matrix of results of this game. b) What is the Nash equilibrium in this game? Explain your answer. c) Is there an outcome that would be better than the Nash equilibrium for the two airlines? How could it be achieved? Who would lose out if it were reached?Problem (15qsq doserse) Find all pure-strategy pooling and separating perfect Bayesian equilibria in the following game. 2,1 0,1 u 1,00 2,00 3,1 Receiver 1 น L 2/3 1/3 R น t₂ R P Nature Receiver T 3,0 0,0 1,1You and a coworker are assigned a team project on which your likelihood or a promotion will be decidedon. It is now the night before the project is due and neither has yet to start it. You both want toreceive a promotion next year, but you both also want to go to your company’s holiday party that night.Each of you wants to maximize his or her own happiness (likelihood of a promotion and mingling withyour colleagues “on the company’s dime”). If you both work, you deliver an outstanding presentation.If you both go to the party, your presentation is mediocre. If one parties and the other works, yourpresentation is above average. Partying increases happiness by 25 units. Working on the project addszero units to happiness. Happiness is also affected by your chance of a promotion, which is depends on howgood your project is. An outstanding presentation gives 40 units of happiness to each of you; an aboveaverage presentation gives 30 units of happiness; a mediocre presentation gives 10 units…
- QUESTION (1) Consider the following game tree of a two-stage dynamic game. Write the players' information sets and their associated pure strategies. Also, show all the subgames. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game. (a) (b) (c) Find all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the two games below by specifying the beliefs. (d) Compare outcomes in (b) and (c). Player 1 + 2 A 3 L Player 2 D U 3 0 R 0 8 0 D Player 2 U 2a W 3,5 3,4 8,4 0,0 3,3 8,9 y 0,1 5,9 9,8 Describe a strategy for player 1 that dominates x. O (1/3.0. 2/3) 1.0,0) O01.1) to4 A recently discovered painting by Picasso is on auction at Sotheby's. There are two main bidders Amy and Ben {1,2}. Bidding starts at £10M but the value of the painting is certainly not more than £20M. Each bidder's valuation v; is independently and uni- formly distributed on the interval [10M, 20M], and this is common knowledge among the players: A bidder knows their own valuation but not of their opponent. Consider an auction where an object is allocated to the highest bidder but the price paid by the bidder is determined randomly. With probability 3/4, the bidder pays their own bid, and with probability 1/4 the bidder pays the losing bid. The person bidding lowest pays nothing. If the bids are equal, each bidder gets the object with probability one-half, and in this case, pays their bid. Suppose that bidder 1 assumes that bidder 2 will bid a constant fraction, Y, of bidder 2's valuation (and similarly, bidder 2 assumes bidder 1 will bid the same constant propor- tional value y of…