Milly and Rob are the only two growers who provide organically grown corn to a local grocery store. They know that if they cooperated and produced less corn, they could raise the price of the corn. If they work independently, they will each earn $100. If they decide to work together and both lower their output, they can each earn $150. If one person lowers output and the other does not, the person who lowers output will earn $0 and the other person will capture the entire market and will earn $200. The table represents the choices available to Milly and Rob. What is the dominant strategy for Milly ? Milly Keeps Producing Milly Lowers Output Rob Keeps Producing $100, $100 $200, $0 Rob Lowers Output $0, $200 $150, $150 Group of answer choices Milly should keep producing Milly should work independently from Rob Mily should lower output

Milly and Rob are the only two growers who provide organically grown corn to a local grocery store. They know that if they cooperated and produced less corn, they could raise the price of the corn. If they work independently, they will each earn $100. If they decide to work together and both lower their output, they can each earn $150. If one person lowers output and the other does not, the person who lowers output will earn $0 and the other person will capture the entire market and will earn $200. The table represents the choices available to Milly and Rob. What is the dominant strategy for Milly ? Milly Keeps Producing Milly Lowers Output Rob Keeps Producing $100, $100 $200, $0 Rob Lowers Output $0, $200 $150, $150 Group of answer choices Milly should keep producing Milly should work independently from Rob Mily should lower output

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 12E

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	Milly Keeps Producing	Milly Lowers Output
Rob Keeps Producing	$100, $100	$200, $0
Rob Lowers Output	$0, $200	$150, $150

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