Table 2 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Lisa and Mark, own wells th Time left 1:57 drinking water. Each week Lisa and Mark work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Lisa and Mark can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: Quantity (in gallons) 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 Price Select one: O a. 0 O b. 1,200 O c. 600 O d. 900 $120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Total Revenue (and Total Profit) $0 11,000 20,000 27,000 32,000 35,000 36,000 35,000 32,000 27,000 20,000 11,000 0 Refer to Table 2. If the market for water were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, how many gallo of water would be produced and sold?

Table 2 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Lisa and Mark, own wells th Time left 1:57 drinking water. Each week Lisa and Mark work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Lisa and Mark can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: Quantity (in gallons) 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 Price Select one: O a. 0 O b. 1,200 O c. 600 O d. 900 $120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Total Revenue (and Total Profit) $0 11,000 20,000 27,000 32,000 35,000 36,000 35,000 32,000 27,000 20,000 11,000 0 Refer to Table 2. If the market for water were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, how many gallo of water would be produced and sold?

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter13: Positive Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 25P: Becky and Sarah are sisters 1who share a room. Their room can easily get messy, and their parents am...

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