Consider the following volunteer-dilemma game among 5 players. A benefit B=5 can be enjoyed if at least one of the 5 players decides to help. More than one person helping is redundant. The player that chooses to help incurs a cost, C=1 (note: B>C>0). If no one helps, all players’ utility is 0. a) There are _____ pure-strategy equilibria in this game. b) In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player helps with probability _______ (round your answer to the second nearest decimal). c)  In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, the probability that no one helps is _______ (round your answer to the second nearest decimal).

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Chapter15: Strategic Games
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Consider the following volunteer-dilemma game among 5 players. A benefit B=5 can be enjoyed if at least one of the 5 players decides to help. More than one person helping is redundant. The player that chooses to help incurs a cost, C=1 (note: B>C>0). If no one helps, all players’ utility is 0. a) There are _____ pure-strategy equilibria in this game. b) In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player helps with probability _______ (round your answer to the second nearest decimal). c)  In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, the probability that no one helps is _______ (round your answer to the second nearest decimal).
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