4. In 2056, there are two mining firms operating on the moon, extracting Helium 3. Once both firms have entered the market, they compete a la Cournot. The market inverse demand function is given by P(Q) = 8 - Q. Assume that both firms have the total cost functions C(q) =2+2q. Let the star superscript* denote equilibrium quantities/prices/profits. Which of the following statements is true? (a) qi = 92 = 4 (b) qi > 92 (c) p*=6 (d) T₁ < ₂ (e) ₁ = ₂ = 2 the

4. In 2056, there are two mining firms operating on the moon, extracting Helium 3. Once both firms have entered the market, they compete a la Cournot. The market inverse demand function is given by P(Q) = 8 - Q. Assume that both firms have the total cost functions C(q) =2+2q. Let the star superscript* denote equilibrium quantities/prices/profits. Which of the following statements is true? (a) qi = 92 = 4 (b) qi > 92 (c) p*=6 (d) T₁ < ₂ (e) ₁ = ₂ = 2 the

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.3P

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4. In 2056, there are two mining firms operating on the moon, extracting Helium 3. Once both firms have entered the market, they compete a la Cournot. The market inverse demand function is given by P(Q) = 8 – Q. Assume that both firms have the total cost functions = 2+ 2q. Let the star superscript* denote equilibrium quantities/prices/profits. Which C(q): of the following statements is true? (a) qi = 4 = 4 (b) qi > qž (c) p* = 6 (d) nj < T (e) Tỉ = = 2 5. Assume the same demand and cost structures as in question 4, but now firm 1 enters the market first and firm 2 follows, as in the Stackelberg model from lecture (both firms are guar- anteed to enter; the only choice is quantities produced). Which of the following statements regarding the equilibrium outcome is FALSE? (a) The first mover produces a greater quantity than the second mover (b) Total market output is Q* = 4.5 (c) The second mover will receive a negative profit (d) The first mover will receive a greater profit than the…
A study of ethanol as a transportation fuel reveals that the competitive equilibrium is expected to be at a price of $4 per gallon and a consumption rate of 100 million gallons/day. For a production rate of 10 million gallons/day, the marginal cost is found to be $1 per gallon. Also, a a price of $10 per gallon the demand is 10 million gallons/day. Answer the following questions for this system. 1. Determine the equations for the demand and marginal cost lines. 2. Calculate the consumer and producer surplus for the market equilibrium. 3. It was discovered later that the above information ignored a government subsidy of 50 cents per gallon. How will the demand and marginal cost lines, and the competitive equilibrium, change if this subsidy is removed?
usiness EconomicsQ&A LibraryTwo firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB = Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in the industry that manufacture this product. Their marginal cost (MC) is equal to their average cost (AC) and it is constant at MC = AC = X, for both firms. Market demand is given as Q = Y – 2P (where P = price and Q = quantity). Select any value for X between [21 – 69] and any value for Y between [501 – 999]. Using this information, calculate the Industry Price, Industry Output, Industry Profit, Consumer Surplus and Deadweight Loss under each of the following models: (a) Cournot Model Two firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB = Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in…
1. It is 1908 and you are the CEO of Ford Motor Company. General Motors startedproducing cars this year and has quickly become your chief rival. Their recent entrance, as wellas your assembly line methods, allows you the advantage of producing cars faster and choosingyour output levels first. Assume the 1908 inverse demand function for cars is P = 3900 - Q(customers view cars as identical products at this point in time) and production costs are C(qi) =100qi. a. What is Ford’s profit-maximizing output level? GM's?b. What is the market equilibrium price?c. How much profit does each firm earn?d. As the assembly line is used by other firms, the first-mover advantage disappears (fast forward100 years to present day), and more firms have entered the market (e.g. FCA, Tesla, Hyundai,Toyota, Honda, etc.), what do you expect to happen to Ford’s profit (assume demand andcosts are the same)? Explain.e. From 1908 into the 1920s, Ford offered customers one car: the Model T. Further, Henry isfamous…
1. The market (inverse) demand function for a homogeneous good is P(Q) = 10 - Q. There are two firms: firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 2 for producing each unit of the good, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 1. The two firms compete by setting their quantities of production, and the price of the good is determined by the market demand function given the total quantity. a. Calculate the Nash equilibrium in this game and the corresponding market price when firms simultaneously choose quantities. b. Now suppose firml moves earlier than firm 2 and firm 2 observes firm 1 quantity choice before choosing its quantity find optimal choices of firm 1 and firm 2.
Two firms are competing in a Bertrand setting. The demand and costs equations are: Q1 = 88–4P1+2P2, Q2 = 88–4P2+2P1; MC1 = 9; and MC2 = 10. Instructions: Use no decimals. Do not round values if used for other calculations. d. Profits Firm 1 = $ and profits Firm 2 = $ e. If Firm 1 instead produces P1 = 16, the optimal P2 = . f. When one of the firms set a P < P-Duopoly, the best strategy for the other firm is to set: A. a P-BRF, and continue with this strategy afterward with the risk of economic profits = 0. B. a P-BRF, and after this one time, then continue with P-Duopoly. C. a P > P-Duopoly from now on, until the market reaches P-Monopoly. D. also P < P-Duopoly one time, then set P-Monopoly.
3. The (market) inverse demand function for a good is as follows: 12- 2q if q = [0,6], if q> 6. Pp(q) = { 12 There are two firms: N = {1,2}. Each firm's cost function is such that producing a units of the good incurs cost 2r. We consider the Cournot competition of the two firms. That is, they simultaneously choose their quantities. The firms are profit-maximizers. (1) Find a Nash equilibrium. (2) What is the size of the deadweight loss incurred by the Duopoly, compared to the competitive equilibrium allocation?
Two firms face the same inverse demand curve: P= 370– q, – 92 . Both firms have the same constant marginal cost: MC = 10. (a) %3D if both firms choose their output levels simultaneously, how much profits and consumer surplus will be earned in equilibrium? (b) Firm 1 is offered the following deal: by paying Z it can either (i) acquire a new technology that lowers its marginal cost to zero or (ii) have to opportunity to produce output before firm 2. Which option would it take and what is the maximum Z it would be willing to pay?
A computer hardware firm sells both laptop computers and printers. Through the magic of focus groups, their pricing team determines that they have an equal number of three types of customers, and that these customers' reservation prices are as illustrated in the figure below. Bundle Laptop $700 $950 $600 Printer Customer A $100 $150 $50 $800 $1,100 $650 Customer B Customer C Assume for simplicity the marginal cost of production for laptops and printers is zero. If the firm were to charge only individual prices (not use the bundle price), what prices should it set for its laptops and printers to maximize profit? Assuming for simplicity that the firm has only one customers of each type, how much does it earn in total? To maximize profit using individual prices, the firm should charge a price for laptops of and a price for printers of p=: (Enter your responses as whole numbers.)
Question 3 The inverse market demand for fax paper is given by P=100-Q. There are two firms who produce fax paper. Firm 1 has al cost of production of C₁= 15*Q₁ and firm 2 has a cost of production of C₂=20*Q₂. 1) Suppose firm 1 and firm 2 compute simultaneously in quantities. What are the Cournot quantities and prices? What are the profits of firm 1 and 2? 2) Suppose firm 1 and firm 2 compete simultaneously in prices. What are the Bertrand quantities and prices? What are the profits of firm 1 and 2? 3) Suppose that firm play a Stackelberg game. First firm 1 sets the quantity in t=1, then, knowing which quantity firm 1 has set, firm 2 chooses the quantity in t=2. What are the Stackelberg quantities and prices? What are the profits od firm 1 and 2? Compared to part a) which firm benefits and which firm loses?
Consider an industry with N firms that compete by setting the quantities of an identical product simultaneously. The resulting market price is given by: p = 1000 − 4Q. The total cost function of each firm is C(qi) = 50 + 20qi . (a) Derive the output reaction of firm i to the belief that its rivals are jointly producing a total output of Q-i . Assuming that every firm produces the same quantity in equilibrium, use your answer to compute that quantity. (b) Suppose firms would enter (exit) this industry if the existing firms were making a profit (loss). Write down a mathematical equation, the solution to which would give you the equilibrium number of firms in this industry. You don’t have to solve this equation.
COURSE: MICROECONOMICS - Stackelberg ModelIn a given market good there are only 2 firms that satisfy the demand, and their respective total cost functions are: CTi = 400 and the demand that is estimated is P = 120 - 2QIf the exception variable of both firms is the quantity they will produce, such that the decisions to produce are made sequentially firm number 1 will be the leader who decides the quantity to produce and firm number 2 (follower) decides based on the production of firm number 1, we ask:(a) quantity produced by each firm and its equilibrium price in the market.(b) Profit of each company at equilibrium and (c) Graph your results