Annotated Bibliography On Intelligence

Paper 1: What are the capabilities and limitations of intelligence in supporting homeland security efforts?

2). Domestic terrorism is usually committed by citizens of the United States, and documentation of terrorist activities on American soil have dated back to the 1950s. The 1970s heighten domestic terrorism by a “rash of skyjacking”, that is, taking a commercial airline hostage (Sauter & Carafano, 2012). Skyjacking incidents compelled the FBI and CIA to develop undercover strategies to enforce terrorist groups; however, these tactics lead to civil right violations. The federal agencies covert tactics and aggressive intelligence collection, “prompted congressional hearings and led to dramatic restrictions on domestic intelligence operations, including the creation of a bureaucratic wall between intelligence gathering and law enforcement” (Sauter & Carafano, 2012, p. 25). The “wall” that was previously stated halted information sharing between the intelligence community and local law enforcement. Communication and information sharing prevents redundancy in high priority investigations, and it could also provide first responders advance notice in life threatening

Perhaps the most important change in how the federal government was reorganized after September 11th is the creation of both the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004 with the passage of the same IRTPA that created TSA. This concept had been first suggested in 1955 after a study by Congress then and was recommended time and again but only became a reality after the September 11th attacks drove the need for major intelligence reform home and the 9/11 Commission continued the push for the creation of such a position (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-5). As one can see from the mission and vision of the ODNI, the importance cannot be overstated. The mission includes leading intelligence integration while having the IC produce the most insightful intelligence products possible and the vision is fully integrating the IC thus making the nation more secure (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-2).

The 9/11 attacks opened the avenue for a scrutiny of the performance and ability of the intelligence community to detect any threats to the safety of the United States. The media, politicians, reformists and other interested parties would not comprehend how such an attack would happen without the knowledge of the intelligence community. However, it is important to consider the fact that the attack was one of its kind and could not be approached with the resources and expertise used in other initiative such as the cold war. Therefore, the need to restructure the intelligence community arose from the view that it was still operating in the mindset and spirit of the cold war even in the modern era that had seen a revolutionary change of warfare

Since 9/11, the intelligence community has improved greatly. It is not that they have been reconstructed from the ground up, or that their mission has completely changed, it is, in the community’s eye anyway, that they now all share information, no matter how important or how small. This information sharing now even includes all the way down to local and tribal authorities. The reasoning is that, even if it might be small or seem insignificant to you at your level, it may be the piece someone somewhere else in the country needs.

Upon analyzing 9/11 it was clear to focus on the limitations that the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency had faced. Security breaches and poor intelligence sharing were just some of the critical failures that were encountered. Moreover, the main focus is pointed towards the miscommunication between these two agencies. Evidently, the execution and tactical strategies went unnoticed despite the apparent red flags that presented themselves, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency failure to pursue threats and establish a baseline of security resulted in the disaster of 9/11. In conjunction to these mistakes, the restriction of shared information

values, building security partnerships, and building a culture of resilience (President 2011, 4). The DHS has shown progress in building security partners through the department’s efforts in information sharing efficiency as demonstrated in fusion centers. Building a culture of resilience entails the DHS mission of understanding and reducing the vulnerability of the nation, and mitigating the damage from an attack. Evaluating the DHS’s progress in this task is difficult, because it is uncertain how much of the nation’s resilience is inherent, and how much is a product of the DHS’s actions. Future terrorism projections state that weapons of mass destruction and explosive devices will be more accessible to terrorists and organizations (West 2012, 4). A suggested strategy to combat this forecasted threat is to develop stronger relationships with foreign governments and other stakeholders. The DHS will need to build a stronger relationship with other government departments in order to access the resources and intelligence to build the suggested relationship with foreign governments and stakeholders to meet this future threat.

The 9/11 commission clearly identified a problem with communication between the Intelligence Community and State and Local Law Enforcement which resulted in a new edict (from the IRTPA) of Information Sharing yet clearance levels and accesses quickly became an issue in disseminating information to those with a need to know. To help bridge this gap, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was passed to crate the DHS by bringing 22 under its umbrella with a primary mission of protecting the homeland from terrorism (Blum, 2010). To do so, DHS’s key mission is to collect, analyze, and disseminate key/related information and share it with the IC and nontraditional partners (state/local governments as well as the private sector) (Blum, 2010). Likewise,

The report of the "Strategies to improve the Department of Homeland Security, United States" has been presented to President of the United States of America by Director of National Intelligence, in accordance with Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2012). This report reflects the important steps that can be taken to improve the intelligence of Department of Homeland Security. This report will help the Department of Homeland Security to improve the functions of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) required by the department.

Regulations that direct the operations of DHS are Title 6 of the Code of Federal Regulation; Part 7, 25, and 29. Part 7 Classified National Security Information ensures that information within the Department of Homeland Security in relation to the national security is classified, safeguarded, and declassified4. Our democratic principles require that the American people be informed of the activities of their Government. Part 25 The Regulations to Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies also known as the Safety Act provides important legal liability protections for providers of Qualified Anti-terrorism Technologies, whether they are products of services5. The goal of the Safety Act is to encourage the development and deployment of new and innovative anti-terrorism products and services by providing liability protections. Part 29 Protected Critical Infrastructure Information implements sections 211 through 215 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) through the establishment of uniform procedures for the receipt, care, and storage of Critical Infrastructure Information. Consistent with the statutory mission of DHS to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States and reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, DHS will encourage the voluntary submission of CII by safeguarding and protecting that information

The United States Intelligence community draws on advanced technology and analytical techniques. An intelligence process that sets objectives, collects, analyzes, and report findings, with feedback loops integrated throughout. Explicitly, the intelligence community advantages technology and tradecraft within a proscribed process. However, estimation of threats and decision-making are outcomes of human thinking. Analysts and policymakers create mental models, or short cuts to manage complex, changing environments. In other words, to make sense of ambiguous or uncertain situations, humans form cognitive biases. Informed because of personal experience, education, and specifically applied to intelligence analysis, Davis

The intelligence Cycle consists of the following six steps. First, requirements; In this area the agents gather information to safeguard the nation. According to the FBI bureau of investigation “Intelligence requirements are established by the Director of National Intelligence according to guidance received from the president and the national and homeland security advisors” The purpose for the requirements is to protect the United States from national security and criminal threats. Second, planning and Direction; In this area the agents identifies, involves and draw specific requirements to support policy decisions. Third, collection, in this area the agents gather information based on the requirements. According to the FBI bureau of investigation,

Data can be collected through human sources, satellites, wiretapping, signals, and internet traffic. However, intelligence organizations must be in compliance with the law to ensure that they are not illegally collecting information (Chesney, 2012). Collection occurs because a threat is likely to occur or agencies are trying to find out what information our foreign adversaries possess about the nation’s assets. Intelligence collection occurs in both domestic and foreign territories. Intelligence agencies collect information about foreign adversaries in order to exploit their weaknesses or vulnerabilities (Gentry, 2008). Furthermore, government agencies and political leaders want to discover which of the nation’s assets are seen as vulnerable to the enemy (Gentry, 2008).

Intelligence is one of the first lines of defense used by the United States to protect the Country against both foreign and domestic threats (Johnson, 2010). There are many ways and methods of intelligence collections employed by the intelligence community such as “spies, eavesdropping, technical sources, and openly available materials” etc (Clark, 2013). Method used also depends on many factors such as available resources, time, agency involved, and intelligence collection source. U.S Intelligence agencies use different collection and analytical method that suit their collection function, structure and pro¬cess. For example, DNI/OSC relies on open source (OSINT), CIA uses human intelligence (HUMINT) tactic, DIA uses measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT), NSA employs signals intelligence (SIGINT), and NGA utilizes imagery intelligence (IMINT) techniques for their intelligence collections (Clark, 2013).

Counterintelligence (CI) involves actions aimed at protecting the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage from penetration and disruption by hostile nations or their intelligence services (Lowenthal, 2014). Three main components of Counterintelligence include collection, defensive and offensive. The collection is the ability to gather intelligence information about rivalry capabilities against own nation; defensive part of CI involves measures to prevent and thwart other nations ' attempts to penetrate into own nation 's intelligence system; while an offensive aspect deal with running double agents to penetrate, manipulate, exploit, and control targeted adversaries. CI is said to be the most essential aspect of the intelligence disciplines, in the sense that it helps in collecting vast quantities of secret information and produce an excellent analysis of intelligence, although, ineffective counterintelligence measures may diminish confidence in the final results (Van Cleave, 2013).