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What is the maximum level of education the H-types will choose to get in any separating equilibrium?

What is the maximum level of education the H-types will choose to get in any separating equilibrium?

Principles of Economics 2e
Principles of Economics 2e
2nd Edition
ISBN:9781947172364
Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Chapter14: Labor Markets And Income
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1SCQ: Table 14.10 shows levels of employment (Labor), the marginal product at each of those levels, and...
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Question 13 Consider a market in which there are two types of workers L and H. Each type of worker has a different level of productivity, but that productivity is unobservable ex ante to potential employers. Before seeking employment at a firm in the market, all workers can (if they choose) get some level of education e. This choice of education e is observable to all, including potential employers. Assume that the market is competitive, so expected profits must be zero in equilibrium. The L-type workers have a productivity of 2 if they work for a firm in the market. They also have an outside option of 2. The utility function of the L-type workers UL - wL- eL, where wl is the wage received and eL is the level of education they obtain. The H type worker has an outside option of 2 and a productivity of 4 if they are employed by a firm in the market. The utility function for a H-type worker is UH=wH - (%)eH, where wH is the wage paid to a H-type and eH is the education they choose to get. What is the maximum level of education the H-types will choose to get in any separating equilibrium? O 1/2 O 1/4 02 O None of the other answers are correct. 04 4
Transcribed Image Text:Question 13 Consider a market in which there are two types of workers L and H. Each type of worker has a different level of productivity, but that productivity is unobservable ex ante to potential employers. Before seeking employment at a firm in the market, all workers can (if they choose) get some level of education e. This choice of education e is observable to all, including potential employers. Assume that the market is competitive, so expected profits must be zero in equilibrium. The L-type workers have a productivity of 2 if they work for a firm in the market. They also have an outside option of 2. The utility function of the L-type workers UL - wL- eL, where wl is the wage received and eL is the level of education they obtain. The H type worker has an outside option of 2 and a productivity of 4 if they are employed by a firm in the market. The utility function for a H-type worker is UH=wH - (%)eH, where wH is the wage paid to a H-type and eH is the education they choose to get. What is the maximum level of education the H-types will choose to get in any separating equilibrium? O 1/2 O 1/4 02 O None of the other answers are correct. 04 4
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