The Stag Hunt Game - A group of 10 hunters are hunting, where the games includea stag and several (>10) hares. Each hunter can choose whether to hunt the stag orgo after a hare. It takes the joint effort of all 10 players to catch the stag, but eachhunter on their own is able to catch a hare. Suppose that a stag is worth $100 and ahare is worth $9. Suppose also that when all 10 players together catch the stag, theyeach get $10 after the game is sold.(a) Formulate this situation as a strategic game and find the Nash equilibria.(b) Now suppose that there are still 10 hunters, who need to choose to either huntthe stag or catch a hare. However, suppose that only 6 hunters are needed tocatch a stag. Assume further that after the stag is caught, it can still be sold for$100 and the money shall be divided evenly among the hunters who have chosento join the stag hunt only. On the other hand, each hunter can always catch ahare on their own and sell it for $9. Formulate this situation as a strategic gameand find the Nash equilibria. (Hint: when specifying the payoffs, you might findit useful to look at action profiles where k hunters choose Stag, where k ≥ 6 ork < 6.)(c) Now suppose that the stag can only be sold for $60. What are the Nash equi-libria?

Stag or hunt share game cooperates game or assurance game. The game is a prototype of thesocial…

The Stag Hunt Game - A group of 10 hunters are hunting, where the games include a stag and several (>10) hares. Each hunter can choose whether to hunt the stag or go after a hare. It takes the joint effort of all 10 players to catch the stag, but each hunter on their own is able to catch a hare. Suppose that a stag is worth $100 and a hare is worth $9. Suppose also that when all 10 players together catch the stag, they each get $10 after the game is sold. (a) Formulate this situation as a strategic game and find the Nash equilibria. (b) Now suppose that there are still 10 hunters, who need to choose to either hunt

The Stag Hunt Game - A group of 10 hunters are hunting, where the games include a stag and several (>10) hares. Each hunter can choose whether to hunt the stag or go after a hare. It takes the joint effort of all 10 players to catch the stag, but each hunter on their own is able to catch a hare. Suppose that a stag is worth $100 and a hare is worth $9. Suppose also that when all 10 players together catch the stag, they each get $10 after the game is sold. (a) Formulate this situation as a strategic game and find the Nash equilibria. (b) Now suppose that there are still 10 hunters, who need to choose to either hunt

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.5P

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