The owner of a firm must hire a manager to launch a new product. The new product can be successful and generate a revenue of 5000 or fail and generate a revenue of 1000. The probability of success is 0.7 (and hence the probability of failure is 0.3). If the manager exerts low effort (=e,) then the probability of success is 0.2 (and hence the probability of failure is 0.8). The manager's effort chosen by the manager, with D(e)-10 and D(e)-o. The manager's reservation utility is -40 The wage paid by the owner to the manager is the owner's only cost. The owner is risk neu If the owner could observe the manager's effort and would want the manager to exert high effort, what contract would he offer to the manager? What is the Assume from now on that the manager's effort is unobservable. Suppose that the owner still wants to ensure that the manager accepts the proposed contrac a) b) this to happen. c) a)? It can be shown that the constraints in point b) must be binding, i.e. they must hold with equality. Given this fact, compute the contract that the owner should offer to the manager. Wh

Microeconomic Theory
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Chapter7: Uncertainty
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and generate a revenue of 5000 or fail and generate a revenue of 1000. The probability of success depends on the effort exerted by the manager. If the manager exerts high effort (=e) then the probability of
e probability of success is 0.2 (and hence the probability of failure is 0.8). The manager's utility function is w-D(e), where w denotes the wage paid by the owner to the manager, and D(e) is the disutility of the
me wage paid by the owner to the manager is the owner's only cost. The owner is risk neutral.
o exert high effort, what contract would he offer to the manager? What is the owner's expected profit.
the owner still wants to ensure that the manager accepts the proposed contract and exerts high effort. Write down the inequality constraints that the contract must satisfy in order for
uality. Given this fact, compute the contract that the owner should offer to the manager. What is the owner's expected profit? How can we explain the difference with respect to the expected profit computed in point
FEE
m
Transcribed Image Text:and generate a revenue of 5000 or fail and generate a revenue of 1000. The probability of success depends on the effort exerted by the manager. If the manager exerts high effort (=e) then the probability of e probability of success is 0.2 (and hence the probability of failure is 0.8). The manager's utility function is w-D(e), where w denotes the wage paid by the owner to the manager, and D(e) is the disutility of the me wage paid by the owner to the manager is the owner's only cost. The owner is risk neutral. o exert high effort, what contract would he offer to the manager? What is the owner's expected profit. the owner still wants to ensure that the manager accepts the proposed contract and exerts high effort. Write down the inequality constraints that the contract must satisfy in order for uality. Given this fact, compute the contract that the owner should offer to the manager. What is the owner's expected profit? How can we explain the difference with respect to the expected profit computed in point FEE m
The owner of a firm must hire a manager to launch a new product. The new product can be successful and generate a revenue of 5000 or fail and generate a revenue of 1000. The probability of succ
success is 0.7 (and hence the probability of failure is 0.3). If the manager exerts low effort (e=e,) then the probability of success is 0.2 (and hence the probability of failure is 0.8). The manager's utility
effort chosen by the manager, with D(e) = 10 and D(e)-o. The manager's reservation utility is -40 The wage paid by the owner to the manager is the owner's only cost. The owner is risk neutral.
If the owner could observe the manager's effort and would want the manager to exert high effort, what contract would he offer to the manager? What is the own
Assume from now on that the manager's effort is unobservable. Suppose that the owner still wants to ensure that the manager accepts the proposed contract an
this to happen.
c)
a)?
a)
b)
It can be shown that the constraints in point b) must be binding, i.e. they must hold with equality. Given this fact, compute the contract that the owner should offer to the manager. What is
Transcribed Image Text:The owner of a firm must hire a manager to launch a new product. The new product can be successful and generate a revenue of 5000 or fail and generate a revenue of 1000. The probability of succ success is 0.7 (and hence the probability of failure is 0.3). If the manager exerts low effort (e=e,) then the probability of success is 0.2 (and hence the probability of failure is 0.8). The manager's utility effort chosen by the manager, with D(e) = 10 and D(e)-o. The manager's reservation utility is -40 The wage paid by the owner to the manager is the owner's only cost. The owner is risk neutral. If the owner could observe the manager's effort and would want the manager to exert high effort, what contract would he offer to the manager? What is the own Assume from now on that the manager's effort is unobservable. Suppose that the owner still wants to ensure that the manager accepts the proposed contract an this to happen. c) a)? a) b) It can be shown that the constraints in point b) must be binding, i.e. they must hold with equality. Given this fact, compute the contract that the owner should offer to the manager. What is
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