Suppose that there are two lemonade stands competing with one another via Bertrand (price) competition. There are 100 potential customers who walk by the two stands each day. Each of these customers will buy lemonade from whichever stand is cheapest as long as the price is less than $1. If they charge the same price then the customer chooses randomly between the two. The marginal cost of lemonade is the $0.25 for both stands. Fixed Costs are equal to $5 for each stand. What is the Nash equilibrium price of lemonade? a. $0.25 b. $1.00 c. $0.30 d. $0.35
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- There are two firms in the market (duopoly). These two firms are competingsimultaneously. The first firm chooses its output level (x) by predicting the second firm’soutput (y). Let c denote the total cost function c(x) = x and c(y) = y. Also, let’s assumethat the inverse demand function is p(Y) = 7 - Y where Y = x + y. (1) Obtain the reactionfunction of the first firm. (2) Find the equilibrium (output and profit of each firm) whentwo firms simultaneously competeKate and Alice are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolints. The market demand tunction is o- 20,000 - 200Pwhere Pis the price of a cubic yard of concrete and Ois the number of cubic yards demanded per year. Marginal cost is sa0 per cubic yard. Suppose Kate onters the market first and chooses her output belore Alice. What is the difference in Alice's profit when Kata enters the market tirst, compared to when they simultanecusly select ther outputa? When Kate entors the markat first, Alice's profit is $3,888.a0 lower. O When Kate enters the market fest, Alice's profit is 513,333.33 lower. O When Kate enters the market first, Alice's profit is $5,000 lower. O When Kate onters the market first, Alice's proft is $1.111.11 higher,Economics Bidding for Bookstore Licenses. Paige initially has the only license to operate a bookstore in Bookville. She charges a price of $13 per book, has an average cost of $3 per book, and sells 1,501 books per year. When Paige's license expires, the city decides to auction two bookstore licenses to the highest bidders. Suppose the relevant variables (price, average cost, and output per firm) take on only integer valueslong dash—no fraction or decimals. a. Suppose Paige is optimistic and imagines the best possible outcome with a two-firm market. What is the maximum amount she is willing to pay for one of the two licenses? $ nothing (Hint: How will the relevant variables change? What is the smallest possible change in their values?) b. Suppose Paige is pessimistic and imagines the worst possible outcome with a two-firm market. What is the maximum amount she is willing to pay for one of the two licenses? $ nothing (Enter your response as an integer.)
- It takes 3,000 households having average annual income of $50,000 within a 3-mile radius to support a grocerystore. There are actually 6,000 households within 3-miles of the Shop-Rite Grocery that have $50,000 per yearaverage incomes. Today, Shop-Rite is the only grocery store in this area. Using the concept of Nash Equilibrium inlocation, explain what the likely outcome will be for this area, given those conditionsA producer of manure is located next to a bakery. The producer of manure produces M pounds of manure daily and earns profits of 156M - M². The bakery sells C' cakes daily, and it earns profits of 312C-C²-MC (the strong smell of manure drives away the appetite of many would-be customers of the bakery). In a competitive equilibrium solution, where each business seeks to maximize profits, a total of if be sold daily. From a social point of view, the producer of manure should not produce at all. Choose one: A. true B. false pounds of manure willSuppose we have two identical fırms A and B, selling identical products. They are the only firms in the market and compete by choosing quantities at the same time. The Market demand curve is given by P=390-Q. The only cost is a constant marginal cost of $14. Suppose Firm A produces a quantity of 57 and Firm B produces a quantity of 44. If Firm A decides to increase its quantity by 1 unit while Firm B continues to produce the same 44 units, what is the Marginal Revenue for Firm A from this extra unit? Enter a number only, no $ sign. Don't forget to include the negative sign if revenue decreases. 231
- Two firms produce identical products at zero cost, and theycompete by setting prices. If each firm charges a low price,then both firms earn profits of zero. If each firm charges ahigh price, then each firm earns profits of £30. If one firmcharges a high price and the other firm charges a low price,the firm that charges the lower price earns profits of £50, andthe firm charging the higher price earns profits of zero. (a) Which oligopoly model best describes this situation?(b) Write this game in normal form.(c) Suppose the game is infinitely repeated. Can theplayers sustain the "collusive outcome" as a Nashequilibrium if the interest rate is 50 percent? Explain. Please answer the a, b and c parts.Ugly Dolls Inc. (UD) is a firm in Mytown that sells its products on a market under monopolistic competition. The cost function of UD is represented by TC = 100+10Q. Lately, because of the UD is making a big amount of profit, some firms enter the market to compete. If the number of firms entering the dolls market increase, we know that, (a) The price of dolls will drop. (b) The average cost of UD will increase. (c) The quantity sold by UD will drop. (d) All the above answers are correct.Save Answer Consider two cigarette companies, PM Inc. and Brown Inc. If neither company advertises, the two companies spit the market and earn $60 million each. If they both advertise, they again split the market, but profits are lower by $20 million since each company must bear the cost of advertisirlg. Yet if one company advertises while the other does not, the one that advertises attracts customers from the other. In this case, the company that advertises earns $70 million while the company that does not advertise earns only $30 million. What will these two companies do if they behave as individual profit maximizers? Neither company will advertise, and PM Inc. earns $60. One company will advertise, the other will not. Brown Inc. earns $70. Both companies will advertise, and PM Inc. earns $40. Both companies will advertise, and PM Inc. earns $60.
- fnan421 - Word Teri Gozden Geçir Görünum Yardım Ne yapmak istediğinizi soyleyin 2) Two firms, X and Y, are planning to market their new products. Each firm can develop TV, Laptop. Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrixi FIRM Y TV LAPTOP PHONE FIRM X TV 30, 30 50, 35 20, 50 LAPTOP 40,70 20, 20 50,80 PHONE 50,20 80,50 10,10 A) What will be the equilibrium if Firm X makes its selection first? If Firm Y goes first? ; (Ctrl) -1. Two firms (A and B) play a competition game (i.e. Cournot) in which they can choose any Qi from 0 to ¥. The firms have the same cost functions C(Qi) = 10Qi + 0.5Qi2, and thus MCi = 10 + Qi. They face a market demand curve of P = 220 – (QA + QB). a. Assume firm A chooses quantity first. Frim B observes this choice and then chooses its own quantity. What is Frim B's profit as a function of QA and QB? b. Firm B has MRB = 220 – 2QB – QA. What is firm B’s best response to an arbitrary QA selected by firm A? c. Given that firm A expects firm B’s best response, what is firm A’s profit as a function of QA? (Hint: the only unknown variable in the profit function should be QA) d. Firm A has MRA = 150 – 4QA/3. What are the equilibrium QA and QB selected in this game? e. What is the equilibrium price, and how much profit does each firm collect?In a market there are five firms, all have a total cost curve equal to CT = 2q. The market demand is Q = 500 - 5P. How much profit would each firm get if they collude and share the market equitably? What is the profit to each firm if they agree to collude, but one firm misleads the others charging a slightly lower price? What is the profit if all firms do not collude and compete via price?