Suppose that a worker value jobs by both the wage rate and the workplace collegiality. The woker's utility is strictly increasing in the wage rate but strictly decreasing in the chance of being bullied in the workplace. The utility function of the worker is U = wª (1-), where a = 0.5, w is the wage rate and b is the probability that a worker is bullied in a workplace. Suppose for a typical job A, the chance of getting bullied is 0.01, and the wage rate is 100. Which of the following statements is correct? %3D If job B offer w = 121 and b = 0.04, the worker would prefer job B to job а. А If job B offer w = 144 and b = 0.09, the worker would prefer job B to job b. А If job B offer w = 80 and b = 0, the worker would prefer job B to job A С. If job B has bullying probablity b = 0.04, the worker is indifferent between job A and job B. Then, the compensating wage differential of job B is at least 25. d. If job B offer w = 80 and b = 0, the worker would be indifferent between job A and job B. e.

Suppose that a worker value jobs by both the wage rate and the workplace collegiality. The woker's utility is strictly increasing in the wage rate but strictly decreasing in the chance of being bullied in the workplace. The utility function of the worker is U = wª (1-), where a = 0.5, w is the wage rate and b is the probability that a worker is bullied in a workplace. Suppose for a typical job A, the chance of getting bullied is 0.01, and the wage rate is 100. Which of the following statements is correct? %3D If job B offer w = 121 and b = 0.04, the worker would prefer job B to job а. А If job B offer w = 144 and b = 0.09, the worker would prefer job B to job b. А If job B offer w = 80 and b = 0, the worker would prefer job B to job A С. If job B has bullying probablity b = 0.04, the worker is indifferent between job A and job B. Then, the compensating wage differential of job B is at least 25. d. If job B offer w = 80 and b = 0, the worker would be indifferent between job A and job B. e.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter16: Labor Markets

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16.9P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Suppose that the University of Alabama and Clemson are making spending decisions for theupcoming year. Assume that Alabama is currently spending $15 million on their recruiting andfacilities, and Clemson is spending $10 million. Each team has an additional $5 million to spendor keep as profits. If they both choose to not spend the additional $5 million then Alabama hasa 60% chance of getting the highest quality quarterback recruit to commit to them (getting thecommitment of the player is the goal). However, if they both choose to spend the additional $5million then there is a 57% chance that Alabama gets the high quality quarterback to commit. IfAlabama spends the additional $5 million but Clemson doesn’t then there is a 67% chanceAlabama gets the recruit. However, if Alabama does NOT spend the additional $5million butClemson does then there is a 50% change either team gets the recruit’s commitment. Setup thepayoff matrix and label the players, their strategies, and their payoffs, and…
Suppose that there are two ice cream vendors on a beach which isrepresented by the 0-1 interval. Customers are uniformly distributedalong that interval. The vendors simultaneously select a position. Cus-tomers go to the closest vendor and split themselves evenly if the ven-dors choose an identical position. Each vendors want to maximize itsnumber of customers. Which location should the vendors choose in the0-1 interval, why?
Charles is participating in an experiment. His payoff in the experiment is tied to his effort e doing a mundane task. There is also some risk involved by design-there is a chance p that Charles is going to get a fixed payment L regardless of his effort. Charles' payoff is thus: with probability p w.e with probability 1- p Charles has to pay a cost C, which increases with his effort. First, let us assume that Charles' utility is the expected payoff net of this cost: U(e) = pL + (1 – p)we – c(e) Derive the first order condition with respect to e. b. How doesp affect Charles' effort e? c. How does L affect e?
You and a coworker are assigned a team project on which your likelihood or a promotion will be decidedon. It is now the night before the project is due and neither has yet to start it. You both want toreceive a promotion next year, but you both also want to go to your company’s holiday party that night.Each of you wants to maximize his or her own happiness (likelihood of a promotion and mingling withyour colleagues “on the company’s dime”). If you both work, you deliver an outstanding presentation.If you both go to the party, your presentation is mediocre. If one parties and the other works, yourpresentation is above average. Partying increases happiness by 25 units. Working on the project addszero units to happiness. Happiness is also affected by your chance of a promotion, which is depends on howgood your project is. An outstanding presentation gives 40 units of happiness to each of you; an aboveaverage presentation gives 30 units of happiness; a mediocre presentation gives 10 units…
In the final round of a TV game show, contestantshave a chance to increase their current winnings of$1 million to $2 million. If they are wrong, theirprize is decreased to $500,000. A contestant thinkshis guess will be right 50% of the time. Should heplay? What is the lowest probability of a correctguess that would make playing profitable?
he person who requires high return regardles bf nsk s called (a There 1s no difference between return d riok preference. Drish averse O risk neutral (indifferent) (ay risk seeking
Suppose there is a 50–50 chance that a risk-averse individual with a current wealth of $20,000 will contract a debilitating disease and suffer a loss of $10,000. a. Calculate the cost of actuarially fair insurance in this situation and use a utility-of-wealth graph (such as shown in Figure 7.1) to show that the individual will prefer fair insurance against this loss to accepting the gamble uninsured. b. Suppose two types of insurance policies were available: (1) a fair policy covering the complete loss; and (2) a fair policy covering only half of any loss incurred. Calculate the cost of the second type of policy and show that the individual will generally regard it as inferior to the first. Reference: Figure 7.1
According to the Intern al Revenue Service, the mean tax refund for the year 2014 was $2800 Assu me the stan dard devlation I6 $450 an d that the amounts 1etunded follow a normal probability distribution. a. What percont of the refunde aro more th an $3,100? (Round the Intermediate velues to 2 decimal places. Round your answer to 2 decimal places) Percert 0.25 % b. What percent of the refun ds are more th an $3,100 but less th an $3.500? (Round the intermediete values to 2 dec imal places Round your ans wer to 2 decimal places) Peroert c. What percent of the retun ds are more th an $2,250 but less than $3.500? (Round the inter mediate val ues to 2 decimal places Round your answer to 2 decimal places) Peroart
Someone at a party pulls out a $100 bill and announces that he is going to auction it off. There are n=10 people at the partywho are potential bidders. The owner of the $100 bill puts forth the following procedure: All bidders simultaneously submit a written bid. Only the highest bidders pay their bid (assuming that the highest bid is positive). If m people submit the highest bid, then each receives 1/m of the $100. Each person’s strategy set is {0,1,2,...,1000}{0,1,2,...,1000} so bidding can go as high as $1,000. The payoff of a player bidding bi is:0 if bi < max{b1,b2,…,bn},and 100/m − bi if bi = max {b1,b2,…,bn}where,m is the number of bidders whose bid equals max{b1,...,bn}. How many pure-strategy Nash equilibria does this game have? 1) 0 2) 1 3) 4 4) More than 4.
1. A woman with current wealth X has the opportunity to bet an amount on the o ccurrence of an event that she knows will occur with probability P. If she wager s W, she will received 2W, if the event occur and if it does not. Assume that t he Bernoulli utility function takes the form u(x) = -e-TX with r> 0. How much should she wager? Does her utility function exhibit CARA, DARA, IARA?
Suppose that the buyers do not know the quality of any particular bicycle for sale, but the sellers do knowthe quality of the bike they sell. The price at which a bike is traded is determined by demand and supply.Each buyer wants at most one bicycle.(ii) Assuming that each buyer purchases a bike only if its expected quality is higher than the price,and each seller is willing to sell their bike only if the price exceeds their valuation, what is theequilibrium outcome in this market?
LIVING IN SPAINJackie moved to Spain to work for a public relations firm. She had health insurance from herprevious employer, but she was surprised to learn that her new employer in Spain did notoffer healthcare coverage. When she asked about this, she was told that more than 90percent of Spaniards use the public healthcare system, which was mostly free. However,her new employer did provide supplementary private health insurance that would allow herto receive quicker care from a private hospital if she desired.Jackie learned that she would be paying 4.7 percent of her salary and her employerwould pay 23.6 percent of her salary to the government for health insurance. She was given a Tarjeta Sanitaria Individual health card to prove that she had health insurance. With this,she could get free care at public hospitals and doctors’ offices. However, before seeing adoctor, she would need to register with a local primary care physician and decide whethershe would use public or private…