Suppose a monopolist operates in a market with two types of consumers (“high” and “low” types) and offers two types of goods (“high quality” and “low quality”). In general, if the monopolist wants to implement second-degree price discrimination (i.e. to sell the “high quality” good to the “high” type consumer and the “low quality” good to the “low” type consumer), they may have to set the price of the “high quality” good lower than the willingness-to-pay of the “high” type.(a) True. (b) False.

Suppose a monopolist operates in a market with two types of consumers (“high” and “low” types) and offers two types of goods (“high quality” and “low quality”). In general, if the monopolist wants to implement second-degree price discrimination (i.e. to sell the “high quality” good to the “high” type consumer and the “low quality” good to the “low” type consumer), they may have to set the price of the “high quality” good lower than the willingness-to-pay of the “high” type.(a) True. (b) False.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter14: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 14.9P

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