Stackelberg duopolists, Firm A and Firm B, face inverse market demand P = 250 – 2Q, where Q is the sum of the firms's production Q = Q A + QB. Both have marginal cost MC = $10. Find the equilibrium market price for this Stackelberg scenario. $70 b. $100 $80 d. $90 а. с.
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- Consider any market that has a demand curve given by: Qd = 240 - 2P. Where Qd is the total quantity demanded in the market, given in millions of units and P is the market price, calculated in monetary units. Imagine that there are 2 Cournot oligopolists operating in this market with Cmg = CVme = 15 and fixed monthly costs equal to 1,400. About this market, ask yourself: a) What is the profit of each of the oligopolists? b) Imagine that one of the companies managed to implement a process innovation capable of halving its Cmg and CVme, so that they would go from 15 to 7.5. This investment implies an additional monthly expense of $1,800. Discuss the statement: "If this situation occurs, the innovative company will not implement variable cost reduction, as the quantity supplied in the market will increase very little; prices will remain very close to what they are today and its profits will not increase"The market for dark chocolate us characterized by Cournot duopolists - Honeydukes and Wonka industries. The market demand for dark chocolate is: P = 8 - 0.005Qd where P is the price per bar in dollars and Qd is dark chocolate's daily quantity demanded in bars (use qh to represent the quantity of dark chocolate sold by Honeydukes and qw to represent the quantity of dark chocolate sold by Wonka Industries). Honeydukes has a constant marginal cost of $2.50 per bar, while Wonka Industries has a constant marginal cost of $3.00 per bar. The firms move simultaneously in choosing their profit-maximizing quantity of output. a. Given the firms move simultaneously, what is the equation for Honeydukes' reaction function with qh expressed as a function of qw? b. Given the firms move simultaneously, what is the equation for Wonka's reaction function with qw expressed as a function of qh? c. What quantity of dark chocolate will each firm produce in equilibrium and what price will be established for a…Suppose two firms compete as Bertrand duopolists for an identical product, where demand is given by Q = 5000 – 50P and both firms have marginal cost of 10 per unit of output. If firm 1 has capacity of 1500 and firm 2 has capacity of 2000, what will the equilibrium price be in this market?
- In the mobile phone market, Samsung and Apple constitute a duopoly in the production of devices.The American firm has the following demand q_a = 10 - p_a + 0.25p_s, and the Korean firm, q_s = 20 -p_s+ 0.5p_a. Because both firms assembly their devices in China, their cost structure is the same andequal to ?(q) = 10q, answer the following questions.a) What would be the equilibrium (quantity, price, and profit) in this market, and interpret youranswer.b) If they decide to form a cartel, what are the new quantities, prices, and profits?Suppose a duopoly in a market for a differentiated good. The demands and costs of the two companies, A and B, are given by: Qa = 200 - 2Pa + Pb Qb 2002Pb + Pa CTa = 550 + 46 Qa CTb = 550 + 46 Qb Assuming that the two companies choose their price (Bertrand model), what quantity will be produced by firm A?Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The demand they face is P = 100-2Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q)= 40. In equilibrium, the deadweight loss is Multiple Choice $256. $512 $128 5394
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