prove that the following strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium: For any 0 < x ≤1, player 1 offers x to player 2, player 2 accepts any offer greater than or equal to x and rejects any offer smaller than x. Is this strategy profile a subgame perfect equilibrium as well? Briefly explain why.

Microeconomics: Principles & Policy
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ISBN:9781337794992
Author:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow
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Chapter13: Between Competition And Monopoly
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prove that the following strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium:
For any 0 < x ≤1, player 1 offers x to player 2, player 2 accepts any offer greater than or
equal to x and rejects any offer smaller than x.
Is this strategy profile a subgame perfect equilibrium as well? Briefly explain why. 

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