Please no written by hand solutions 1. Assume the cost function for a monopolist is given by TC(q) = 30Q; the inverse demand function for the firms' output is p = 120 - Q, where Q is the total output. a. Find the profit-maximizing combination of price and quantity b. Estimate consumer surplus, producer surplus and the deadweight loss associated with this monopolist C. If this industry became perfectly competitive, explain and estimate the consumer surplus, producer surplus and deadweight loss of the industry d. Graph your answers for a, b, and c 2. Now assume that the monopolist above splits into two. Each of two firms has the cost function TC(q) = 30q. a. What are the firms' outputs in a Nash equilibrium of Cournot's model? b. Estimate the economic profits for each firm c. If firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 the follower, find the equilibrium outputs for the Stackelberg solution.
Please no written by hand solutions
1. Assume the cost function for a monopolist is given by TC(q) = 30Q; the inverse demand function for the firms' output is p = 120 - Q, where Q is the total output.
a. Find the profit-maximizing combination of price and quantity
b. Estimate
C. If this industry became
d. Graph your answers for a, b, and c
2. Now assume that the monopolist above splits into two. Each of two firms has the cost function TC(q) = 30q.
a. What are the firms' outputs in a Nash equilibrium of Cournot's model?
b. Estimate the economic profits for each firm
c. If firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 the follower, find the equilibrium outputs for the Stackelberg solution.
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