Andrew runs a gym. It is the only gym in the region, giving Andrew's business a monopoly position in the market. Eachcustomer's demand curve for working out in the gym per month is given by the following: P = 80 - 5q, where q is thenumber of visits to the gym. The total cost is: TC= 25q. Andrew is considering new pricing for his business: a membershipfee that allows people to join the gym and a unit fee charged for each entry to the gym.If Andrew wants to maximize profits, the optimal membership fee is $_ Andrew runs a nightclub called “Fun1040". Given the popularity and cache of the club, he has a monopoly position in themarket. Males nightclub goers have an individual demand curve of P =16 - q, whereas female customers each have anindividual demand curve of P = 22 - q. Andrew has a marginal cost per drink of MC = $2 per unit and no fixed cost. By law,Andrew is unable to charge an entrance fee. He can, however, charge different prices for men and women for their drinks(by serving men blue glasses and women customers their drinks in green glasses). If Andrew tries to maximise profit, whichstatement is true?O Andrew charges both men and women $12 per drink; this is fırst-degree price discrimination.O Andrew charges men $9 per drink and women $12 per drink; this is an example of third-degree price discrimination.O Andrew charges men $12 per drink and women $9 per drink; this is an example of third-degree price discrimination.O Andrew charges men $10 per drink and women $7 per drink; this is an example of third-degree price discrimination.O Andrew will use second-price discrimination in order to maximise the profit.

Answered: gion, giving An S bus 1oPoly positiON…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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You are the manager of a monopoly. Your analytics department estimates that a typical consumer’s inverse demand function for your firm’s product is P = 200 − 20Q, and your cost function is C(Q) = 80Q.a. Determine the optimal two-part pricing strategy. Per-unit fee: $ Fixed fee: $ b. How much additional profit do you earn using a two-part pricing strategy compared with charging this consumer a per-unit price?
Question 5: Jimmy has a room that overlooks, from some distance, a major league baseball stadium. He decides to rent a telescope for $50 a week and charge his friends and classmates to use it to peep at the game for 30 seconds. He can act as a monopolist for renting out "peeps". For each person who takes a 30 second peep, it costs Jimmy $.20 to clean the eyepiece. Jimmy believes he has the following demand for his service: Price of a Peep $1.20 Quantity of peeps demanded 1.00 90 100 150 200 250 300 70 60 50 350 40 30 400 450 20 10 500 550 a) For each price, calculate the total revenue from selling peeps and themarginal revenue per peep. Price Quantity TR MR $1.20 100 90 100 150 200 70 250 60 300 350 50 40 30 400 450 20 500 10 550 b) At what quantity will Jimmy's profit be maximized? What price will he charge? What will his total profit be? c) Jimmy's landlady complains about all the visitors coming into the building and tells Jimmy to stop selling peeps. Jimmy discovers, though, if he…
You are the manager of a monopoly. Your analytics department estimates that a typical consumer's inverse demand function for your firm's product is P = 300-20 Q, and your cost function is C(Q) = 60Q. a. Determine the optimal two - part pricing strategy. Per - unit fee: $ Fixed fee: $b. How much additional profit do you earn using a two - part pricing strategy compared with charging this consumer a per- unit price?
You are the manager of a monopoly. Your analytics department estimates that a typical consumer's inverse demand function for your firm's product is P = 350-20Q, and your cost function is C(Q) = 70Q. a. Determine the optimal two - part pricing strategy. Per-unit fee: $ Fixed fee: $ b. How much additional profit do you earn using a two-part pricing strategy compared with charging this consumer a per- unit price? $
You are the manager of a pizzeria that produces at a marginal cost of $6 per pizza. The pizzeria is a local monopoly near campus (there are no other restaurants or food stores within 500 miles). During the day, only students eat at your restaurant. In the evening, while students are studying, faculty members eat there. If students have an elasticity of demand for pizzas of −4 and the faculty has an elasticity of demand of −2, what should your pricing policy be to maximize profits?
A firm faces two types of consumers. Consumer A has an inverse demand of P = 120-10 Q and consumer B has an inverse demand of P = 60-2Q. The firm has a constant marginal cost of $20. Assume the firm does not know which type a given consumer is. She offers to sell the good at a price of 70$ per unit. However, if the customer buys 10 or more units, she will offer a quantity discount and charge only 40$ per unit (including the first 10). Which consumer will use the price discount? Question 7 options: Neither costumer will purchase from this firm at all. Customer A will choose the quantity discount and customer B will not choose the quantity discount. Both consumers will chose the quantity discount. Neither of the two consumers will opt for the quantity discount. Instead, both will purchase at the higher price of 70 and buy less than 10 units each. Customer B will choose the quantity…
A firm faces two types of consumers. Consumer A has an inverse demand of P = 120- 10 Q and consumer B has an inverse demand of P = 60-2Q. The firm has a constant marginal cost of $20. Assume the firm does not know which type a given consumer is. She offers to sell the good at a price of 70$ per unit. However, if the customer buys 10 or more units, she will offer a quantity discount and charge only 40$ per unit (including the first 10). Which consumer will use the price discount? Both consumers will chose the quantity discount. Neither of the two consumers will opt for the quantity discount. Instead, both will purchase at the higher price of 70 and buy less than 10 units each. Customer A will choose the quantity discount and customer B will not choose the quantity discount. Customer B will choose the quantity discount and customer A will not choose the quantity discount. Neither costumer will purchase from this firm at all.
A manager of a nightclub realizes that demand for drinks is more elastic among students and is trying to determine the optimal pricing schedule. Specifically, he estimates the following average demand for his customer types: Under 25: qr =18-5p Over 25: q=10-2p The two age groups visit the nightclub in equal numbers on average. Assume that drinks cost the club $2 to make. If the manager can charge a separate entry fee and a price per drink for each group, what two-part price will the manager set for reach group. Now suppose that once again it is impossible to identify which group the customers belong. Suppose the manager lowers the price of drinks to equal to marginal cost and still wanted to attract both customers, what entry fee would the manager set? Compare the profits earned in parts a) to d). Which scheme would you choose if you could not identify customer type and which would you choose if you could identify customer type.
Ivan runs a small independent movie theatre in Scarborough, which presently attracts 1,100 customers per week at a ticket price of $7. His customer base comprises 750 adult customers and 350 seniors. He would like to increase his total revenue by practising price discrimination. He knows that the demand by adults is fairly inelastic and that a change in the admission price of $1 would change the quantity by 60 customers. He also recognizes that the demand by seniors is fairly elastic and a $1 change in the price would result in a change of 40 customers. Adults Seniors Price Quantity Total Revenue Quantity Total Revenue $2 $ $ 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a. From this information, complete the table above. b. What is Ivan’s present total revenue? Total revenue: $ c. Should he increase or decrease the price for adults? Should he increase or decrease the price for seniors?…
Please prove that, in a monopoistic market, P=(MC)/(1+(1//E_(d)))
Consider any market that has a demand curve given by: Qd = 240 - 2P. Where Qd is the total quantity demanded in the market, given in millions of units and P is the market price, calculated in monetary units. Imagine that there are 2 Cournot oligopolists operating in this market with Cmg = CVme = 15 and fixed monthly costs equal to 1,400. About this market, ask yourself: a) What is the profit of each of the oligopolists? b) Imagine that one of the companies managed to implement a process innovation capable of halving its Cmg and CVme, so that they would go from 15 to 7.5. This investment implies an additional monthly expense of $1,800. Discuss the statement: "If this situation occurs, the innovative company will not implement variable cost reduction, as the quantity supplied in the market will increase very little; prices will remain very close to what they are today and its profits will not increase"
Exercise 4.2 "With respect to the monopoly equilibrium without price discrimination, first-degree price discrimination increases the profit of the enterprise at the expense of reducing social welfare." Do you agree with this statement? Reason your answer and represent graphically.

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