Burger King has introduced new strategy by reducing the price of its Whopper by 75 percent if customers also purchased french fries and a soft drink. Nevertheless, the sales dropped within two weeks. Based on your knowledge on game theory, what do you think had happened? The Edge magazine columnist, Jack Sparrow reported the recent findings of two academic political scientists. These scholars found out that voters are not happy with “negative campaigns” of politicians. However, the political scientists suggested it is pointless for candidates to stay positive. The damage from staying positive is heaviest when the opponent is attacking. Explain the dilemma. Airlines practice price discrimination by charging leisure travelers and business travelers different prices. Why do you think by charging different prices; the airline companies will maximize their profits? Discuss briefly.

Burger King has introduced new strategy by reducing the price of its Whopper by 75 percent if customers also purchased french fries and a soft drink. Nevertheless, the sales dropped within two weeks. Based on your knowledge on game theory, what do you think had happened? The Edge magazine columnist, Jack Sparrow reported the recent findings of two academic political scientists. These scholars found out that voters are not happy with “negative campaigns” of politicians. However, the political scientists suggested it is pointless for candidates to stay positive. The damage from staying positive is heaviest when the opponent is attacking. Explain the dilemma. Airlines practice price discrimination by charging leisure travelers and business travelers different prices. Why do you think by charging different prices; the airline companies will maximize their profits? Discuss briefly.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.5P

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In 'the dictator' game, one player (the dictator) chooses how to divide a pot of $10 between herself and another player (the recipient). The recipient does not have an opportunity to reject the proposed distribution. As such, if the dictator only cares about how much money she makes, she should keep all $10 for herself and give the recipient nothing. However, when economists conduct experiments with the dictator game, they find that dictators often offer strictly positive amounts to the recipients. Are dictators behaving irrationally in these experiments? Whether you think they are or not, your response should try to provide an explanation for the behavior.
4.2. Game theory (Prisoner's dilemma). Often, many sectors in an economy have two main rivals, battling it out in the marketplace. There can be rivalry such as between Apple and Samsung in Phones and Laptops. Suppose Apple plans to cut its price. Samsung will likely follow suit to retain its market share. This may end up with low profits for both companies. A price drop by either company may thus be construed as defecting since it breaks an implicit agreement to keep prices high and maximize profits. Thus, if Apple drops its price but Samsung continues to keep prices high, Apple is defecting, while Samsung is cooperating (by sticking to the spirit of the implicit agreement). In this scenario, Apple may win market share and earn incremental profits by selling more. Assume that the incremental profits that accrue to Apple and Samsung are as follows: If both keep prices high (Cooperate), profits for each company increase by AED200 million (because of normal growth in demand). If one drops…
Burger King has introduced new strategy by reducing the price of its Whopper by 75 percent if customers also purchased french fries and a soft drink. Nevertheless, the sales dropped within two weeks. Based on your knowledge on game theory, what do you think had happened?
Consider a variation of the television station broadcast game of Exercise 4 in Chapter 7. Suppose the stations interact sequentially. First, MBC chooses between 6:00 and 7:00. Then, after observing MBC’s choice, RBC decides between 6:00 and 7:00. Finally, after observing the behavior of both MBC and RBC, CBC chooses either 6:00 or 7:00. Payoffs are as given before. Draw the extensive form of this sequential game and compute the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Determine the optimal strategy for the situation by representing it as a game and finding the saddle point. State your final answer in the terms of the original question.A Republican and a Democratic candidate are running for office in a heavily Republican county. A recent newspaper poll comparing their views on taxes and welfare reform showed that when compared on taxes or on welfare reform, the Republican leads by 20%. When comparing the Democrat on welfare reform to the Republican on taxes, the Republican leads by 35%. But when comparing the Democrat on taxes to the Republican on welfare reform, the Republican leads by only 15%. Use this information to decide what each candidate should discuss at their next debate. (Let T represent taxes and W represent welfare reform.) Democrat T W Republican T W % % % % =
Question 5 Consider an ultimatum game in which a Proposer offers a two-way split of $100 to two respondents. If either of the Responders accepts but not the other, that Responder and the Proposer get the split and the other Responder gets nothing. If no one accepts, no one gets anything, including the Proposer. If both Responders accept, one is chosen at random to receive the split. The following figure shows some laboratory evidence of this ultimatum game, with the proportion offered to the Responder on the horizontal axis. Based on this information, which of the following statements is correct? 100% One Responder 70% Two Responders 50% 10% 20% 10% ON ON SN 10% ASN 20% as 40 45s sos Fraction of offers rejected
We consider a game between two players, Alice and Bob. Alice chooses a number x and Bob chooses a number y. Alice's payoff is given by the following function:50 x + 79 x y - 89 x 2 . (the last entry is "x squared".)Suppose that Bob plays y = 23. Calculate Alice's best response (round your answer to 2 decimals).
A case study in the chapter describes a phoneconversation between the presidents of AmericanAirlines and Braniff Airways. Let’s analyze thegame between the two companies. Suppose thateach company can charge either a high price fortickets or a low price. If one company charges $300,it earns low profit if the other company also charges$300 and high profit if the other company charges$600. On the other hand, if the company charges $600,it earns very low profit if the other company charges$300 and medium profit if the other company alsocharges $600.a. Draw the payoff matrix for this game.b. What is the Nash equilibrium in this game?Explain.c. Is there an outcome that would be better than theNash equilibrium for both airlines? How could itbe achieved? Who would lose if it were achieved?
So imagine you are playing this game as the second player and you are both given a 10 dollars and the dictator decides to offer you 25 cents and that she/he will keep $9.25. Your only choice is to accept the 25 cents or reject the offer and get no money at all. What would you do? What would be considered ‘rational’ from the perspective of utility maximization? What would you do if this is a continued game and the same scenario will happen multiple times not just once? Do you think others will react the same way you would?
Discrete All-Pay Auction: In Section 6.1.4 we introduced a version of an all- pay auction that worked as follows: Each bidder submits a bid. The highest bidder gets the good, but all bidders pay their bids. Consider an auction in which player 1 values the item at 3 while player 2 values the item at 5. Each player can bid either 0, 1, or 2. If player i bids more than player j then i wins the good and both pay. If both players bid the same amount then a coin is tossed to determine who gets the good, but again both pay. a. Write down the game in matrix form. Which strategies survive IESDS? b. Find the Nash equilibria for this game.
This question is from game theory
Exercise 1.12. Consider the following game. There is a club with three members: Ann, Bob and Carla. They have to choose which of the three is going to be president next year. Currently Ann is the president. Each member is both a candidate and a voter. Voting is as follows: each member votes for one candidate (voting for oneself is allowed); if two or more people vote for the same candidate then that person is chosen as the next president; if there is complete disagreement, in the sense that there is exactly one vote for each candidate, then the person from whom Ann voted is selected as the next president. (a) Represent this voting procedure as a game frame, indicating inside each cell of each table which candidate is elected. (b) Assume that the players' preferences are as follows: AnnAm Carla Ann Bob, Carla Bob Ann, Bob Carla Ann Caria Carla. Using utility values 0, 1 and 2, convert the game frame into a game. (c) Apply the IDWDS to the game of part (b). Is there a weak iterated…