Consider the following games which are commonly used in laboratory exper- iments on social preferences. For each: describe the game, explain how the game would be played by selfish players and summarise the main findings from the experimental evidence. i. Dictator game ii. Ultimatum bargaining game iii. Trust game Carefully comment on the figure below, which shows the percentage of third parties who punish in the dictator game and is taken from Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), "Third party punishment and social norms", Evolution and Human Behavior 25(2).. Percentage of punishers E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher/Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004) 63-87 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 A D percentage of third parties who punish -percentage of recipients who belief that third parties punish 0 10 20 30 Dictator's transfer to recipient Fig. 1. Percentage of third parties who punished in the dictator game. 40 50 Explain why anonymity of the subjects is an important feature of public good game experiments.

Consider the following games which are commonly used in laboratory exper- iments on social preferences. For each: describe the game, explain how the game would be played by selfish players and summarise the main findings from the experimental evidence. i. Dictator game ii. Ultimatum bargaining game iii. Trust game Carefully comment on the figure below, which shows the percentage of third parties who punish in the dictator game and is taken from Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), "Third party punishment and social norms", Evolution and Human Behavior 25(2).. Percentage of punishers E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher/Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004) 63-87 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 A D percentage of third parties who punish -percentage of recipients who belief that third parties punish 0 10 20 30 Dictator's transfer to recipient Fig. 1. Percentage of third parties who punished in the dictator game. 40 50 Explain why anonymity of the subjects is an important feature of public good game experiments.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.6P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

(a) Consider the following games which are commonly used in laboratory exper- iments on social preferences. For each: describe the game, explain how the game would be played by selfish players and summarise the main findings from the experimental evidence. i. Dictator game ii. Ultimatum bargaining game iii. Trust game (b) Carefully comment on the figure below, which shows the percentage of third parties who punish in the dictator game and is taken from Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), "Third party punishment and social norms", Evolution and Human Behavior 25(2). [10 marks] Percentage of punishers E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher/ Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004) 63-87 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 A percentage of third parties who punish --percentage of recipients who belief that third parties punish 0 10 20 30 Dictator's transfer to recipient Fig. 1. Percentage of third parties who punished in the dictator game. 40 50 (c) Explain why anonymity of the subjects is an important feature of…
In game theory, a dominant strategy is the best strategy to pick, no matter which moves are chosen by the other player. O to make the exact same move that was made by the other player. the choice that causes the payoff for the other player to be minimized, regardless of the payoff it earns the best strategy to pick, assuming the other player makes his or her best possible choice. to allocate all personnel resources towards defensive talent in order to dominate opposing offenses. 46°F
1) Consider the following variant of the prisoner's dilemma with altruistic preferences. For simplicity, I'm adding 15 to the payoffs of the baseline normal form representation of the game we describe in class which results in the following: Player I\ Player 2 Cooperate Non-Cooperate Cooperate 8.8 0,15 Non Cooperate 15,0 14,14 Assume now that the players are not “selfish”; rather the preference of each player i are represented by the payoff (utility) function m; (a) + ßm; (a) where mi(a) is the payoff received by player i when the strategy profile is a, j is the other player, and ß is a given non-negative number. Player 1's payoff to the strategy profile (Cooperate, Cooperate), for example, is 8+8ß. A) Assume ß = 1. Write the normal form of the game. Is this game a prisoner's dilemma? What is the Nash equilibria of the game? B) Find the range of values of ß for which the resulting game is the prisoner's dilemma.
Consider the game below with a worker (W) and a firm (F). The worker initially can choose to acquire skills or not acquire skills. If the worker does acquire skills, the firm then gets to decide whether to compensate the worker or not. The extensive form of the game and the payoffs are below. Which of the following is true? W Acquirre Not Acquire There is no Nash equilibrium. C Compensate Not Compensate This game has a single Nash equilibrium. There are two Nash equilibria. None of the above. (0,0) Both players have a strictly dominant strategy. (10,10) (-5,20)
Finu all ue purt"3truto5J a fair mechanism for allocating cookies? Explain why or why not. U13. (Optional) Construct the payoff matrix for your own two-player game that satisfies the following requirements. First, each player should have three strategies. Second, the game should not have any dominant strat- egies. Third, the game should not be solvable using minimax. Fourth. should have exactly two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Provide your game matrix, and then demonstrate that all of the above conditions the game are true.
a. Consider the following sequential game. Player 1 A B Player 2 Player 1 a a B Player 2 (4) () y i. Determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibria and their outcomes. ii. Determine the Nash equilibria of the game. For each of the Nash equilibria, argue why no player has a profitable deviation. ii. Determine which parts of the Nash equilibrium strategies involve uncredible threats.
A principal can choose to make the allocation of tasks broad (B) or narrrow (N). At the same time an agent can choose to work put in high effort (H) or low effort (L). The payoffs are 20 to the principal and 30 to the agent is the actions chosen are B and L. For all other combinations of actions the payoffs are 0 to both players. Which of the following statements are true? DA Nash equilibrium of the game is (B, H) A Nash equilibrium is (N, L) There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in this game. A Nash equilibrium is (N, H) A Nash equilibrium is (B, L)
For the friend-foe game, recall that there were 3 Nash equilibria possible, but the equilibria set didn't include the cooperative outcome, for which both players would win. Friend Foe Friend 500,500 0,1000 Foe 1000,0 0.0 a) If the game is played répeatedly. propose a play strategy that will enforce cooperation. For what valucs of o (discount factor) the equilibrium will be (Friend. Friend)?
please discuss the separation eqilibrium in details 1. Assume that two players play the Tinder game. There are two types of potential boyfriends: the gentleman (25% of the population) and the douchebag (75% of the population), and they can decide on the different level of effort: low, medium, and high. For the first type, the respective costs are 30, 50, and 80. For the second type, the respective costs are 50, 75, and 120. For the potential boyfriend, the payoff from being in relationship is 130, and the payoff associated with being dumped is 70. The girl can get 60 if she stays single, 100 if she is in relationship with the gentleman, and 25 if she dates the douchebag (credits to Owen Sims) a) Present the game in the extensive form b) Calculate the expected pay-off for the girl. Should she date at all? c) Discuss whether the game has a separating equilibrium
Let us see the example of Juan and María given but modify their preferences. It is still the case that they are competitive and are deciding whether to show up at their mom’s house at 8:00 A.M., 9:00 A.M., 10:00 A.M., or 11:00 A.M. But now they don’t mind waking up early. Assume that the payoff is 1 if he or she shows up before the other sibling, it is 0 if he or she shows up after the other sibling, and it is 1 if they show up at the same time. The time of the morning does not matter. Find all Nash equilibria.
The ultimatum game is a game in economic experiments. The first player (the proposer) receives a sum of money and proposes a fair proposal (F - 5;5) or unfair proposal (U - 8;2). The second player (the responder) chooses to either accept (A) or reject (R) this proposal. If the second player accepts, the money is split according to the proposal. If the second player rejects, neither player receives any money. 1 A 5:5 2 F R 0:0 U A 8:2 2 1. Find the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium using backward induction. R 0;0
Exercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 R O player pay 000 2 1 M 3 b 010 O player 3's payoff 1 2 221 2 000 0 0 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.