3. Assume a city of 1,000,000 people, 60% of whom are willing to pay $1 maximum (each) to clean up pollution. The rest of the population is wealthier and is willing to pay $100 each to clean up pollution. Pollution clean-up costs $2,000,000. It has been proposed that each person be taxed equally to pay for the pollution clean-up. Will that pass a majority-rule vote? Is it desirable from the point of view of the Pareto criterion? Is it a good idea, using the compensation principle? Which social choice mechanism do you think is best on intuitive grounds, and why?

3. Assume a city of 1,000,000 people, 60% of whom are willing to pay $1 maximum (each) to clean up pollution. The rest of the population is wealthier and is willing to pay $100 each to clean up pollution. Pollution clean-up costs $2,000,000. It has been proposed that each person be taxed equally to pay for the pollution clean-up. Will that pass a majority-rule vote? Is it desirable from the point of view of the Pareto criterion? Is it a good idea, using the compensation principle? Which social choice mechanism do you think is best on intuitive grounds, and why?

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter10: Externalities

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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