2. Deviating from the collusive outcome Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.40 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work together. PRICE (Dollars per can) 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0 0 Demand 20 40 MR 60 80 100 120 140 QUANTITY (Cans of beer) MC = ATC 160 180 200 Monopoly Outcome When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce information, each firm earns a daily profit of $ cans and charge so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $ ? per can. Given this Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to while McCovey's profit is now Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity. to $ Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit per can. Mays's profit is now when
2. Deviating from the collusive outcome Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.40 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work together. PRICE (Dollars per can) 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0 0 Demand 20 40 MR 60 80 100 120 140 QUANTITY (Cans of beer) MC = ATC 160 180 200 Monopoly Outcome When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce information, each firm earns a daily profit of $ cans and charge so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $ ? per can. Given this Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to while McCovey's profit is now Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity. to $ Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit per can. Mays's profit is now when
Principles of Economics 2e
2nd Edition
ISBN:9781947172364
Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 3SCQ: Consider the curve in the figure below, which shows the market demand. marginal cost, and marginal...
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Transcribed Image Text:2. Deviating from the collusive outcome
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of
beer is constant and equals $0.40 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each
firm.
Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model
requires that the two companies must equally share the output.)
Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and
McCovey choose to work together.
PRICE (Dollars per can)
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0
+
0
Demand
20
40
MR
MC = ATC
60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
QUANTITY (Cans of beer)
When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce
information, each firm earns a daily profit of $
Monopoly Outcome
cans and charge $
, so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $
per can. Given this
Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the
two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit.
Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set under the
collusive agreement.
Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to
while McCovey's profit is now $
Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity.
to $
Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit
per can. Mays's profit is now
when
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