Can I get someone to answer these questions for me? 1. Consider a two player, simultaneous move game. The strategies available to each player andpayoffs are shown in the following matrix form:Player 2CLR6,45,2 8,54,4 9,3 5,9B 7,5 4,4 5,2Game 5TPlayer 1 Ma) Find and write down the Nash equilibria in pure strategies, if any exist.b) Say that instead of being a simultaneous move game this game had been sequential. Firstplayer 1 will choose a strategy and then player 2 will observe the choice made by player1 and choose a strategy. The full structure of the game, including all payoffs, is commonknowledge to both players. Sketch a game tree to represent the extensive form of thisgame. Find and write down the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.2. In this question we will combine a very simplified model of an externality that has long-lastingimpacts with the model of discounted utility that we learned in our game theory topic. Considera hypothetical environmental externality: produced as the byproduct of industrial activity, eachunit of emission of a pollutant that is emitted once, today, causes $10 of external harm to societyeach and every year, starting immediately, forever. Let's say that policymakers apply a discountfactor of 8 € (0, 1) to future gains and losses, in an analog of the discounted utility model exceptfor cash payoffs rather than utilities.What would the socially efficient Pigouvian tax on the emission of this pollutant be if we applieda discount factor of (i) 8 = 0.5, (ii) 8 = 0.9, and (iii) 8 = 0.99? Give an intuitive explanationof how to interpret the parameter d in this context, and explain precisely but in simple termswhat the goal and effect of the Pigouvian tax would be.3. Consider a model of Cournot duopoly. Two firms produce an identical product. The inversedemand function for the product is given by p = 60-y, where y = y₁ + y2 is the sum of thequantity produced by the two firms. Production costs are zero for both firms.a) Find the quantity produced by each firm in the Nash equilibrium of this game. Find theprice of the product and the profit of each firm.b) Now say that marketing guru Jim has a proposal for firm 1. He would be able to convincepeople that the two firms' products were in fact slightly different from each other, so thatthe amount produced by each firm would not impact the price of the other's productas much as it did before. The inverse demand function for each product would becomeP₁ = 60-y₁ - y2 and p2 = 60 - 92 -2₁. What is the most that firm 1 would be willingto pay Jim to do this? Show your work and explain in a few sentences what you did tofindyour answer. 4. A profit-maximizing monopolist produces a good and sells it to three consumers, A, B and C.It has zero costs. The consumers have inverse demand curves given byPA = 10 - 9A,PB = 12 - 29B,1Pc = 4-29c.(2)(3)a) If consumer B had been the only consumer and the monopolist had to set a single, uniformprice for its product, what price would it choose and how many units would it sell? Whatwould be the socially efficient price and quantity?The monopolist has decided to price its good using a two part tariff. It knows that it has threeconsumers, and it knows exactly what the demand curve is for each one.b) Say that the monopolist could tell the consumers apart and set a personalized two parttariff for each of them. What two part tariff would it set for each consumer?c) Say that the monopolist cannot tell the three consumers apart and has to set just a singletwo part tariff that all three consumers can then decide whether or not to pay. What twopart tariff would it set? Explain your answer.

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Pure strategy Nash Equilibrium: Nash equilibrium with 2 players is the strategy profile where both…