. for two firms that share a market if demand p=300-q where q is the total quantity sold and fixed cost is 300 and MC is 20 and suppose if the firms are in collusion and the first firm decides to cheat ,how much will the first firm produce ,what will its "p " be and profit be and how much will it exceed the second firm.Also then if both firms collude but both cheat then what will each firm make profit?

. for two firms that share a market if demand p=300-q where q is the total quantity sold and fixed cost is 300 and MC is 20 and suppose if the firms are in collusion and the first firm decides to cheat ,how much will the first firm produce ,what will its "p " be and profit be and how much will it exceed the second firm.Also then if both firms collude but both cheat then what will each firm make profit?

Survey Of Economics

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337111522

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 11SQP

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