Russian Oligarch System

Robert Michels believed that any political system eventually evolves into an oligarchy. He called this the iron law of oligarchy. According to this school of thought, modern democracies should be considered as oligarchies. Unfortunately, Oligarchy Governments really hide under the name of democratic. As an example, a number of former Soviet states, including Ukraine. Officially, we live in a democratic state, but we all know who is at the helm of state power. Ukraine is called a democratic state, which governed by a few oligarchic clans.

* Oligarchies, or a small group of wealthy elites, hired strongmen, or despots, known as podesta to maintain law and order

“There are no morals in politics; there is only expedience. A scoundrel may be of use to us just because he is a scoundrel.” -Vladimir Lenin. Because of the changes in Russia’s government and economy over the years, authoritarianism has changed drastically, but the common theme of strong government and limited freedom for citizens has stayed the same.

Over the past decade (from 2004 to 2014), political corruption in Russia government is gradually uncovered by some global medias and organizations. Such tendency not only repainted the entire landscape of Russia government, but also raised public awareness on the significance of preventing a greater deterioration of this political phenomenon worldwide. This report aims to prove such political phenomenon is unethical through the comparison with code of conduct, and to provide tangible measures and solutions. The result suggests that high-level of corruption in the Russian government is one of the factors of inflation. It is also found that corruption will lead to social issues. Most importantly, such political behavior is unethical regarding the code of conduct. In order to achieve a revolutionary change in the Russia government, therefore, a redefinition of legislation and a recreation of domestic press are indispensible.

The beginning of the 20th century brought radical changes to the social and political structure of autocratic Russia. It was a period of regression, reform, revolution and eradication. Eradication of a blood line that had remained in rule for over 300 years; the Romanov Dynasty. The central figure of this eradication was Tsar Nicholas II, often described as an incompetent leader, absent of the “commanding personality nor the strong character and prompt decision which are so essential to an autocratic ruler...” (Sir G. Buchman, British ambassador to Russia from 1910 in H. Seton-Watson, The

The oligarchs came to be known as the concentrated centralized economic class of corrupt men who took advantage of Yeltsins privatization movement. These economic elite ascended to power during Yeltsin's terms. Yeltsin's economic plans lead to corruption, economic stagnation and increased power of the oligarchs. The oligarchs were adroit at finding loopholes and ways around any attempt Yeltsin had at privatization. They did not follow any market rules because there were really none in place in the infant Russian market. The oligarchs took money out of Russia by setting up offshore accounts from their enterprises; defeating the purpose of the economic reforms by not investing money back into the

Oligarchy, in another word, “economic elite domination”, is a form of government controlled by a small ruling class, who dominates the political system to the exclusion of all others. Oligarchy typically has neither constitution nor charter, and the controllers mostly make the majority of decisions. As Thom Hartmann wrote in “The Crash of 2016” (Hartmann, 2016, p. xviii), “The spectacle of national

Similar to the Italian Mafia, Russian organized crime is comprised of several groups. These groups have managed to survive the test of time by thriving and coexisting with one another. These accomplishments can be attributed to their complex leadership structure which has evolved throughout the several centuries that Russian organized crime has existed. This paper will focus on explaining two of the three structures and the individual positions within those structures that are mentioned in the textbook for the Organized Crime class at Clemson University, Organized Crime: A World Wide Perspective (Grennan & Britz, 2006).

The class discussion developed as one student pointed out that the distinct gap between rich and poor in Russia possibly accounts for why Raskolnikov wanted to kill the pawnbroker and get rid of the rich. I further added to that point that the lack of connection between the government and the people most likely urged Raskolnikov to take the action. During the 1800s Tzars were ruling the country, and of course none of the authorities’ actions were in favor of the citizens.

In Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?, Karen Dawisha relates Russian President Vladmir Putin’s rise to power. She overarchingly claims that Putin is an authoritarian leader who has obstructed and even reverted Russia’s path of democratization, citing, amongst many factors that enabled his ascension, his “interlocking web of personal connections in which he was the linchpin” (100), money-laundering to tax havens and personal projects, and the complicity of the West. With copious research, journalistic interviews, legal documents, and even sporadic informational diagrams, it is evident why her book is so popular amongst scholars and history enthusiasts. Unfortunately however, in spite of the grand yet oftentimes substantiated claims she generates, a more subtle yet noteworthy assumption is made: that the state is a protector, as Olson proffered. She employs this theoretical underpinning from the beginning, though is not representative of Putin’s actual authoritarian regime.

The thesis of Nigar Ibrahimova shows how Machiavelli and Vladimir Putin are compared , how Putin exercised virtú in the light of Machiavelli’s doctrines and how he took advantage of this virtú in his politics. An example of how Putin exploits virtú, as stated in the thesis of Ibrahimova is his employment of cruelty to deal with the oligarchs. During the Putin’s terms in presidency, he witnessed how corrupt the corrupt the oligarchs were, causing chaos in Russia. So what he did, while employing cruelty, he charged them with taxes, strip them off their power in media and political parties and finally arrested them, thus eliminating them in the process. In that way, his exercise of virtú was

The global Swedish furniture chain Ikea threatened to call it quits after years of trying to run a clean business in Russia. When the head of Ikea in Russia, Lennart Dahlgren, left the company in 2006, he revealed that the company had been subjected to years of legal traps that it sought to solve by meeting personally with Putin. But a high-ranking official told them that a meeting with Putin would cost $5 million to $10 million. Not knowing whether the officials were serious or joking, Dahlgren told reporters, “I sensed that it would be better not to get into that discussion any deeper (Dawisha 1).

The book is an unusual view to post-soviet Russian economy and politics, tracking on the origins and consequences of informal practices.

The present day Russian Federation involves a democratic system, given the presence of elections, an independent judiciary, and the supremacy of law. Yet, in democracy, the crux of it involves an inevitable paradox: law limits state power, but the state must have the power to enforce the law. However, finding the balance of the ability to enforce laws, and therefore maintaining order, while not infringing on civil liberties, requires a mutual understanding, a social contract, between the rulers and the ruled. This requirement has not found its place in the Russian political arena, especially since “creating a rule-of-law-based sate out of dictatorship is not easy” (Bressler 2009). In addition, the Russian psyche views authority as a source of force and violence (Yakovlev 1996), an etymological result of a continuity beginning from imperial Russia. Although the Russian Federation, the Union Soviet Socialist Republics, the Russian Empire, and the Tsardom of Russia differ significantly, a strong state remains prevalent in the core of Russian history and politics. In short, the nature of political rule in Russia involves a never ending tug of war between the seemingly undying authoritative soulless entity known as the state and the equally undying Russian people’s hunger for liberty.

Russia’s Return as a Superpower. There are concerns that Russia may once again “reassert itself militarily” (Wood 7). After the original fall of communism in 1991, Russia seemed to be on a path to democracy. Currently the notion of a democratic Russia seems to be fading as Russia “has been centralizing more and more power in the Kremlin” (Putin 2). Regional governors, who were once elected by the people, are now being appointed by Moscow.