Since, therefore, neither the foreknowledge of God nor the liberty of man can, without a plain contradiction, be denied, it follows unavoidably that the foreknowledge of God must be of such a nature as is not inconsistent with the liberty of man.
Neither the divine determinations, persuasions or inflections of the understanding or will of rational creatures doth deceive the understanding, pervert the will, or necessitate either to any moral evil.
This predetermination of Gods own will is so far from being the determining of ours, that it is distinctly the contrary; for supposing God to predetermine that I shall act freely, tis certain from thence that my will is free in respect of God, and not predetermined.
The question is not, whether a man be a free agent, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his will; but whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, come upon him according to his will, or according to anything else in his own power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will; but to say, I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd speech.
This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings in their steady prosecution of true felicity, that they can suspend this prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them.
Albeit the will is not capable of being compelled to any of its actings, yet it is capable of being made to act with more or less difficulty, according to the different impressions it receives from motives or objects.