Q1)d) Country Road Two drivers round the corer of a country road from opposite directios, and find they are about to enab head-on. Each can either veer left or right: so long as they make the same decision, they are unscathed. Car 2 Left Right <-100, -100 0, 0 Car 1 Left 0,0 Right-100,-100 B(Left)= Dominant Strategies for Car 1: B (Right) Dominant Strategies for Car 2: Ba(Left) = Social Welfare Maximum Strategies:
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- Two politicians from the same party decide whether to support or oppose the gov- ernment's environmental policy. Politician A prefers that they both support, but Politician B prefers that they both oppose. Both politicians agree that the party should have a coherent position and the worst outcome is that one supports and the other opposes the policy. (a) Formulate this situation as a strategic game - specify the players, actions, and payoffs (you can set-up a table of the actions and payoffs). (b) What are the Nash equilibria of this game? Explain your answer.Consider a small town with two competing restaurants: Doug’s Diner and Betty’s Bistro. There is 1000profit to be made in the market. Each period, the restaurants simultaneously decide whether to offer high orlow quality food. In order to offer high quality food, each restaurant must hire an expert chef, which incursan additional cost of 100. The restaurants split the profit equally if they offer the same quality of food. Ifone restaurant offers high quality food while the other offers low quality food, the high quality restauranttakes four fifths of the profit and the low quality restaurant takes one fifth of the profit.(a) Draw up the normal form game matrix, showing the players, strategies, and payoffs.(b) Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game.(c) Explain how the restaurant owners could both be better off than in the Nash equilibrium if they wereable to cooperate. Is the town as a whole better off or worse off when the firms cooperate? Why or whynot?You are playing a game with a friend. It’s yourmove but you don’t have a dominant strategy.Your payoff depends on what your friend doesafter your move. You consider flipping a coin todecide what to do. You are about to reach for acoin, but then you realize that your friend has adominant strategy. Explain how using backwardinduction (rather than a coin toss) will now determine your next move
- There are a kicker and a goalie who confront each other in a penalty kick that willdetermine the outcome of the game. The kicker can kick the ball left or right, while the goaliecan choose to jump left or right. Because of the speed of the kick, the decisions need to bemade simultaneously. If the goalie jumps in the same direction as the kick, then the goalie winsand the kicker loses. If the goalie jumps in the opposite direction of the kick then the kickerwins and the goalie loses. Model this as a strategic form game and write down the matrix thatrepresents the game you modeled. Find the Nash equilibrium.Question 1 Saue Answe Consider a 2-player game with strategy sets S1-(a,b}for player 1 and Sz =(c,d) for player 2. Which statement is true if player 1 has no dominant strategy? O Strategy b guaranteos playor 1 the best possible payaff, no matter what strategy player 2 choosos. O Depending on what strategy player 2 chooses, sometimes strategy a leads to a (weakly) higher payoff for player 1 than strategy b, and sometimes strategy b leads to a (weakiy) higher payoff for player 1 than strategy a. O We cannot say whether any of the other 3 alternatives is true. O Strategy a guarantees player 1 the best possible payoff, no matter whhat strategy player 2 chooses.Exercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 R O player pay 000 2 1 M 3 b 010 O player 3's payoff 1 2 221 2 000 0 0 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.
- In game theory, a dominant strategy is the best strategy to pick, no matter which moves are chosen by the other player. O to make the exact same move that was made by the other player. the choice that causes the payoff for the other player to be minimized, regardless of the payoff it earns the best strategy to pick, assuming the other player makes his or her best possible choice. to allocate all personnel resources towards defensive talent in order to dominate opposing offenses. 46°Frock paper scissors гock 0. -3 1 рарer 1. -1 scissors -1 3 0. (a) Show that xT= ( ) and yT= (3) together are not a Nash equilibrium 3 3 313 for this modified game. (b) Formulate a linear program that can be used to calculate a mixed strategy x € A(R) that maximises Rosemary's security level for this modified game. (c) Solve your linear program using the 2-phase simplex algorithm. You should use the format given in lectures. Give a mixed strategy x E A(R) that has an optimal security level for Rosemary and a mixed strategy y E A(C) that has an optimal security level for Colin.Consider the following game: Player 2 In Out Player 1 In -2,-2 2, 0 Out 0, 2 0, 0 (a) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game, or what are the Nash equilibriaof this game? (b) Does either firm have a dominate strategy (a strategy that is always abest response)? Which? (c) Suppose Player 1 could move before Player 2 and Player 2 could observe Player 1’s move. What do you think would happen?
- you and a friend decide to run a three mile race. If you agree to run together, you keep up with himfor the first mile, but you overexert yourself and run the last two miles at slower paces on your own. Tomake up for lost time, your friend runs the last two miles at a faster pace. Your mile times are 6:30, 7:00,and 7:30. Your friend’s times are 6:30, 6:00, and 6:00. If you both agree to run on your own, you run aconstant pace of 7:05 while your friend runs at a constant pace of 6:05. If you want to run together butyour friend wants to run solo, he runs his constant pace of 6:05. You, on the other hand, want to showhim that you can run faster, but you end up overexerting yourself after the first mile. You run times of6:20, 7:05, and 7:30. If he wants to run together but you do not, you both run at your pace of 7:05. Thissituation can be turned into an economic game, with the payoffs the overall race times. You each wantto run the fastest time you possibly can.(a) Who are the players in…2. Consider the following Bayesian game with two players. Both players move simultaneously and player 1 can choose either H or L, while player 2's options are G, M, and D. With probability 1/2 the payoffs are given by "Game 1" : GMD H 1,2 1,0 1,3 L 2,4 0,0 0,5 and with probability 1/2 the payoffs are according to "Game 2" : G |M|D H 1,2 1,3 1,0 L 2,4 0,5 0,0 (a) Find the Nash Equilibria when neither player knows which game is actually played. (b) Assume now that player 2 knows which one among the two games is actually being played. Check that the game has a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.Two workers are on a production line. They each have two actions: exert effort, E, or shirk, S. Effort costs a worker e > 0 and shirking costs them nothing. If two workers do action E a lot of output is produced and the workers earn £3 each. If only one worker chooses action E less output is produced and they both earn £1. The workers earn nothing if they both shirk. (i) Describe this situation as a strategic form game (assuming the workers do not observe each other's effort choice when making their own decision). (ii) For what values of e does this game have strictly dominant strategies? (iii) Describe the Nash equilibria of this game for e = 0,1, 2, 3. (iv) The workers now are re-arranged into a production line. First worker 1 moves and then worker 2 moves. Worker 2 can now see worker l's effort level before they choose their effort. Draw this extensive form game. (v) Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the production-line game for c = 1/2 and c = 3/2.