Kate and Alice are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolints. The market demand tunction is o- 20,000 - 200Pwhere Pis the price of a cubic yard ofconcrete and Ois the number of cubic yards demanded per year. Marginal cost is sa0 per cubic yard. Suppose Kate onters the market first and chooses heroutput belore Alice. What is the difference in Alice's profit when Kata enters the market tirst, compared to when they simultanecusly select ther outputa?When Kate entors the markat first, Alice's profit is $3,888.a0 lower.O When Kate enters the market fest, Alice's profit is 513,333.33 lower.O When Kate enters the market first, Alice's profit is $5,000 lower.O When Kate onters the market first, Alice's proft is $1.111.11 higher,

When both firms choose output simultaneously, they are Cournot duopoly and when one firm enters…

Kate and Alice are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolints. The market demand function is o- 20,000 - 200Pwhere Pis the price of a cubic yard of concrete and Ois the number of cubic yards demanded per year. Marginal cost is sa0 per cubic yard. Suppose Kate onters the market first and chooses her output belore Alice. What is the difference in Alce's profit when Kate enters the market tirst, compared to when they simultaneously select ther outputs? When Kate enters the markat first, Alice's profit is $3,888.a0 lower. O When Kate enters the market fest, Alice's profit is $13,333 33 lower. O When Kate enters the market first, Alice's profit is $5.000 lower O When Kate onters the market first, Alice's proft is $1.111.11 higher,

Kate and Alice are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolints. The market demand function is o- 20,000 - 200Pwhere Pis the price of a cubic yard of concrete and Ois the number of cubic yards demanded per year. Marginal cost is sa0 per cubic yard. Suppose Kate onters the market first and chooses her output belore Alice. What is the difference in Alce's profit when Kate enters the market tirst, compared to when they simultaneously select ther outputs? When Kate enters the markat first, Alice's profit is $3,888.a0 lower. O When Kate enters the market fest, Alice's profit is $13,333 33 lower. O When Kate enters the market first, Alice's profit is $5.000 lower O When Kate onters the market first, Alice's proft is $1.111.11 higher,

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16CTQ: Would you rather have efficiency or variety? That is, one opportunity cost of the variety of...

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