Gary's Gas and Frank's Fuel are the only two providers of gasoline in their town. Below is the demand schedule for the market of gasoline. Assume that the cost of producing gasoline is zero per gallon (AC=D0, FC=D0). Suppose that the two producers collude (split production and profits evenly. If Gary's Gas decides to cheat and increase production by 1 Gallon, and Frank' Fuel keeps its original output level, what will be Gray's Gas's new profit? Q demanded (in 1 3 4 9 10 gallons) Market price (in dollar) $22 $20 $18 $16 $14 $12 $10 $8 $6 $0 O $60 O None of these options is correct. O $50 O$30 O $40 6 2)
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- Gary's Gas and Frank's Fuel are the only two providers of gasoline in their town. Below is the demand schedule for the market of gasoline. Assume that the cost of producing gasoline is 3 per gallon (AC=3, FC-D0). Suppose that the two producers collude (split production and profits evenly), what are the joint profits of these two firms? Q demanded (in gallons) 10 12 4 Market price (in dollar) $22 $20 $18 $16 $14 $12 $10 $8 $6 $0 O $27 O None of these options is correct. $55 O $72 O $36 50 00 3)Two firms produce identical products at zero cost, and theycompete by setting prices. If each firm charges a low price,then both firms earn profits of zero. If each firm charges ahigh price, then each firm earns profits of £30. If one firmcharges a high price and the other firm charges a low price,the firm that charges the lower price earns profits of £50, andthe firm charging the higher price earns profits of zero. (a) Which oligopoly model best describes this situation?(b) Write this game in normal form.(c) Suppose the game is infinitely repeated. Can theplayers sustain the "collusive outcome" as a Nashequilibrium if the interest rate is 50 percent? Explain. Please answer the a, b and c parts.Two firms produce the samecommodity, both with zero cost. The demand for this commodity is D(P) = 100−P.The two firms can each produce at most 50 units. They compete on price andrationing is efficient: if pi < pj then the demand that j faces is Dj(p) = D(pj) − qi,where qi is the quantity supplied by firm i. That is, the lower price firm gets to sellfirst. Is the price list p = (p1, p2) = (0, 0) a Nash equilibrium? Prove your assertion.
- There are only two driveway paving companies in a small town, Asphalt, Inc. and Blacktop Bros. The inverse demand curve for paving services is ?= 2040 ―20? where quantity is measured in pave jobs per month and price is measured in dollars per job. Assume Asphalt, Inc. has a marginal cost of $100 per driveway and Blacktop Bros. has a marginal cost of $150. Answer the following questions: Determine each firm’s reaction curve and graph it. How many paving jobs will each firm produce in Cournot equilibrium? What will the market price of a pave job be? How much profit does each firm earn?(5) For each situation, solve for the Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium (differentiated Product). 5a) Suppose Sarah's constant marginal cost is $5 but Joe's is $8 Recall that in a Bertrand model with differentiated product, each supplier faces his/her own demand: Qjoe = 100 – 10 Pjoe + 5 Psarah Qsarah = 100 – 10 Psarah + 5 Pjoe 5b) Suppose Joe and Sarah have the same cost functions as earlier (constant MC of $5) but asymmetric demand functions Qjoe = 100 – 10 Pjoe + 5 Psarah Qsarah = 160 - 10 Psarah + 5 PjoeThere are only two driveway paving companies in a small town, Asphalt, Inc. and Blacktop Bros. The inverse demand curve for the services is ? = 2040 − 20?where quantity is measured in pave jobs per month and price, in dollars per job. The firms have an identical marginal cost of $200 per driveway. If the two firms collude, splitting the work and profits evenly, how many driveways will each firm pave, and at what price? How much profit will each firm make? Does Asphalt have an incentive to cheat by paving one more driveway each month? Show it numerically.
- 6. Two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2 and are competing in quantities. The demand they are facing is given by p=1-91-92, with p being the price of the good, and 9₁ and 92 the quantities produced by firm 1 and 2 respectively. The total cost of firm 1 is TC1 (91) = 9₁ and the one of firm 2 is TC₂ (92) = 292. (a) Find the Cournot equilibrium. (b) The government decides that it wants to make the market more competitive. As such it decides to offer to Firm 1 a license to become the leader in the market. The licence costs F, and if Firm 1 buys it, it will be allowed to choose its quantity before Firm 2. What is the maximum Firm 1 would be willing to pay for this license?Suppose that Market demand for golf balls is described by Q= 90-3p,Where Q is measured in kilos of balls. There are two firms that supply the market. Firm 1 can produce a kilo of balls at a constant unit cost of $15 whereas firm 2 has a constant unit cost equal to $10.a. suppose firms compete in quantities. How much does each firm sell in a Cournot equilibrium? What is the market price and what are firms' profit?b. suppose firms compete in price. How much does each firm sell in a Bertrand equilibrium. What is market price and what are firms' profits?Imagine a small town in a remote area where only two residents, Maria and Miguel, own dairies that produce milk that is safe to drink. Each week Maria and Miguel work together to decide how many gallons of milk to produce. They bring milk to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Maria and Miguel can produce as much milk as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for milk is shown in the table below: Quantity (in gallons) 10 |1 O b. $12 O c. $10 d. S8 2 113 14 לן 16 17 18 19 10 11 12 Price $24 $22 $20 $18 $16 $14 $12 $10 $8 $6 $4 $2 $0 Total Revenue (and Total Profit) $0 $22 $40 $54 $64 $70 $72 $70 $64 $54 $40 $22 $0 Refer to Table 17-3. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Maria and Miguel from operating as a monopoly. What will be the price of milk once Maria and Miguel reach a Nash equilibrium? a. $14
- 1. The market (inverse) demand function for a homogeneous good is P(Q) = 10 - Q. There are two firms: firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 2 for producing each unit of the good, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 1. The two firms compete by setting their quantities of production, and the price of the good is determined by the market demand function given the total quantity. a. Calculate the Nash equilibrium in this game and the corresponding market price when firms simultaneously choose quantities. b. Now suppose firml moves earlier than firm 2 and firm 2 observes firm 1 quantity choice before choosing its quantity find optimal choices of firm 1 and firm 2.9: Suppose there are two restaurants on an island, Ace's (A) and Betty's (B). They both have to decide how many meals, qa and qB, to sell per day. For Q = qA + ¶B, the market demand function for meals is p = 120 – Q || Both restaurants face a marginal cost per meal of $30. (1) Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and prices. (2) What if the restaurants decide to form a cartel and split the production and profits evenly. How much will each firm produce and what price do they charge? (3) Suppose they competed with prices instead of quantities. Find the Bertrand equilibrium quantities and prices. (4) Find the deadweight loss of Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, and of the cartel outcome. Then rank each of these from least deadweight loss to most deadweight loss. For the rest of the problem, assume firms compete in quantities (Cournot) and there is no cartel. (5) Suppose Betty's marginal cost per meal increases to $60. Ace's marginal cost remains at $30. What are the new…Suppose Tasty Cakes is deciding its pricing strategy: it is debating whether to offer a single linear price for its sheet cakes or to offer non-linear pricing. Suppose on any day, it gets 2 customers–who are of Type A and TypeB with the following maximum willingness-to-pay for the cakes: Units Type A Type B 1 $100 $90 2 $75 $40 Suppose it costs $10 to bake each of the cakes. (a) If Tasty Cakes decides to pick a linear pricing strategy, what will be the profit-maximizing price it should choose? How many cakes will it end up selling and what will be its total profit? (b) If Tasty Cakes decides to pick a non-linear pricing strategy where it may offer a different price depending on the number of cakes purchased, what should be the profit-maximizing set of prices? How many cakes will it sell and what will be its total profit? (c)Comparing Tasty Cakes’profits in (a) and (b), explain IN WORDS why we see this difference in profits