Consider two firms 1 and 2. The cost function of each firm is TC(9) - function is given by P(Q) = 40 - Q. where Q = 9, + 9z. Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium and compare it to the monopoly outcome and competitive outcome. 9(q) The inverse demand No upload is required for this question.
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- The market price of laptops in a certain city is determined by P = 1,400 – Q where Q represents the total number of laptops produced. The total cost of producing q laptops is TC = 200q +50,000 for any firm in this market. (e) Suppose both firms are able to collude and equally split monopoly production. What is the profit for each firm?1) A monopoly faces a demand curve P(Q) = 120 – 2Q, and has a marginal cost of 60. a. What is profit-maximizing level of output? What is the profit-maximizing price? How much profit the firm will make? b. Assume that a second firm enters the market. The new firm has an identical cost function. If the two firms enter in a Cournot competition, what will be the price in equilibrium? How much will each firm produce in equilibrium? How much profit will each firm make? c. If, instead, the two firms compete in a Stackelberg game (assume the incumbent firm is the leader), what will be the price in equilibrium? How much each firm will produce in equilibrium? How much profit will each firm make? d. Now assume the follower has to pay a fixed cost, f =100 if q>0. Does it change the follower's decision? Assume again they are playing a Stackelberg game.? e. The leader knows that the follower has to pay the fixed cost and decides produce one third more than the quantity found in part c). Does it…Two Cournot competitors face inverse demand p = 50-Q, where Q = 9₁ +92 is the total output of firms 1 and 2. Both firms have marginal cost of 2. What are the equilibrium output levels q₁ and 92? 16 and 16 25 and 25 20 and 9 36 and 3
- Help me please1. The market (inverse) demand function for a homogeneous good is P(Q) = 10 - Q. There are two firms: firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 2 for producing each unit of the good, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 1. The two firms compete by setting their quantities of production, and the price of the good is determined by the market demand function given the total quantity. a. Calculate the Nash equilibrium in this game and the corresponding market price when firms simultaneously choose quantities. b. Now suppose firml moves earlier than firm 2 and firm 2 observes firm 1 quantity choice before choosing its quantity find optimal choices of firm 1 and firm 2.Consider the daily market for hot dogs in a small city. Suppose that this market is in long-run competitive equilibrium with many hot dog stands in the city, each one selling the same kind of hot dogs. Therefore, each vendor is a price taker and possesses no market power. The following graph shows the demand (D) and supply (S = MC) curves in the market for hot dogs. Place the black point (plus symbol) on the graph to indicate the market price and quantity that will result from competition. Competitive Market 5.0 4.5 PC Outcome 4.0 3.5 3.0 o 2.5 2.0 S=MC 1.5 1.0 0.5 D 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 QUANTITY (Hot dogs) PRICE (Dollars per hot dog)
- 5. Monopoly outcome versus competition outcome Consider the daily market for hot dogs in a small city. Suppose that this market is in long-run competitive equilibrium with many hot dog stands in the city, each one selling the same kind of hot dogs. Therefore, each vendor is a price taker and possesses no market power. The following graph shows the demand (D) and supply (S = MC) curves in the market for hot dogs. Place the black point (plus symbol) on the graph to indicate the market price and quantity that will result from competition. Competitive Market 5.0 4.5 PC Outcome 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 PRICE (Dollars per hot dog) 0 30 60 S=MC 90 120 150 180 210 QUANTITY (Hot dogs) D 240 270 300Assume that one of the hot dog vendors successfully lobbies the city council to obtain the exclusive right to sell hot dogs within the city limits. This firm buys up all the rest of the hot dog vendors in the city and operates as a monopoly. Assume that this change doesn't affect demand and that the new monopoly's marginal cost curve corresponds exactly to the supply curve on the previous graph. Under this assumption, the following graph shows the demand (D), marginal revenue (MR), and marginal cost (MC) curves for the monopoly firm. Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and quantity of a monopolist. Use the green points (triangle symbol) to shade the area that represents consumer surplus, and use the purple points (diamond symbol) to shade the area that represents producer surplus. PRICE (Dollars per hot dog) 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 0 30 Monopoly MC D MR 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 QUANTITY (Hot dogs)…Assume that one of the hot dog vendors successfully lobbies the city council to obtain the exclusive right to sell hot dogs within the city limits. This firm buys up all the rest of the hot dog vendors in the city and operates as a monopoly. Assume that this change doesn't affect demand and that the new monopoly's marginal cost curve corresponds exactly to the supply curve on the previous graph. Under this assumption, the following graph shows the demand (D), marginal revenue (MR), and marginal cost (Mc) curves for the monopoly firm. Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and quantity of a monopolist. Monopoly 5.0 4.5 Monopoly Outcome 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 MC 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 D MR 35 70 105 140 175 210 245 280 315 350 QUANTITY (Hot dogs) In the following table, enter the price and quantity that would arise in a perfectly competitive market; then enter the profit-maximizing price and quantity that would be chosen if a monopolist…
- 10Two firms produce differentiated products. The demand for each firm’s product is as follows: Demand for Firm 1: q1 = 20 – 2p1 + p2 Demand for Firm 2: q2 = 20 – 2p2 + p1 Both firms have the same cost function: c(q) = 5q. Firms compete by simultaneously and independently choosing their prices and then supplying enough to meet the demand they receive. Please compute the Nash equilibrium prices for these firms.Question 2Bob and Alice are duopoly competitors for ice cream in Venice Beach,CA. Market demand for ice cream is p = 1000 − 2Q and both Alice’sand Bob’s costs of production are identical and given by C(q) = 4q.Calculate market price and quantity ifc) Alice and Bob decide to coordinate their decisions in a cartel (i.e.to build a monopoly) and to equally share profits.Two firms are engaged in Cournot (simultaneous quantity) competition. Market-level inverse demand is given by P = 160 − 4Q Firm 1 has constant marginal costs of MC1 = 8, while Firm 2 has constant marginal costs of MC2 = 24. 1) Does there exist a low enough positive marginal cost for firm 1 such that firm 1 acts like a monopoly in this market, if so what is the MC if not why?
