4. 19.Recall the following public goods game from the class, where two roommates are trying to figure outhow much effort to exert to clean the apartment. They could either choose to exert low level ofefforts, elow or they could exert higher level of effort, ehigh. Their payoffs are given in the followingmatrix:elowehighherder 2elow3,35,2herder 1ehigh2,54,4The Nash equilibrium of this game (is or is not) Pareto efficientIn the Nash Equilibrium, there is (over-supply or under-supply) of effort by the tworoommates de to (positive or negative) externality problem.20.Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are a[ Select ]solution to externality problemwhile Coase's theorem is ; v[ Select ]solution to the same problem.government-backedprivate marketPlease fill in both bank using government- backed or private market

Given information 2 players 2 strategy set for each

19. Recall the following public goods game from the class, where two roommates are trying to figure out how much effort to exert to clean the apartment. They could either choose to exert low level of efforts, elow or they could exert higher level of effort, ehigh_ Their payoffs are given in the following matrix: elow ehigh herder 2 elow 3,3 5,2 herder 1 ehigh 2,5 4,4 The Nash equilibrium of this game (is or is not) Pareto efficient

19. Recall the following public goods game from the class, where two roommates are trying to figure out how much effort to exert to clean the apartment. They could either choose to exert low level of efforts, elow or they could exert higher level of effort, ehigh_ Their payoffs are given in the following matrix: elow ehigh herder 2 elow 3,3 5,2 herder 1 ehigh 2,5 4,4 The Nash equilibrium of this game (is or is not) Pareto efficient

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

4. Consider a two player game with Fred and Barney, who tal turns removing matchsticks from a pile. They start with 33 matchsticks, and Fred goes first. On each turn, ecach player may remove either one, two, three, four, or five matchsticks. The player to remove the last matchstick wins the game. What are the optimal strategies for each player? Who will win? b. Suppose now that they can remove up to six matchsticks, how will the optimal strategies change for- each player? a.
3. Suppose that the various Balls of basketball or internet fame Lavar, Lamelo, Liangelo, Lonzo,and Spalding are considering playing in a 1-on-1 tournament. They get a payoff of 0 if theydecide not to participate. The following table illustrates their payoffs across the variousscenarios. 1 Player 2 Players 3 Players 4 Players 5 Players Lavar 10 4 2 -2 -5 Lamelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Liangelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Lonzo 10 8 7 6 5 Spalding 10 9 8 7 6 a. Find and describe all pure strategy Nash Equilibria.b. Suppose now Spalding, since it is in fact a literal basketball, gets a payoff of 0 in anycircumstance, being an inanimate object. The table is now as follows: 1 Player 2 Players 3 Players 4Players 5 Players Lavar 10 4 2 -2 -5 Lamelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Liangelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Lonzo 10 8 7 6 5 Spalding 0 0 0 0 0 Find and describe all pure strategy Nash Equilibria.
12. Consider a game where each player picks a number from 0 to 60. The guess that is closest to half ofthe average of the chosen numbers wins a prize. If several peopleare equally close, then they share theprize. The game theory implies that (A) all players have dominant strategies to choose 0 (B) all players have dominant strategies to choose 30 (C) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick 0 (D) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick positive numbers 13. Behavioral data in such games suggests that (A) most subjects choose 0; (B) most subjects choose 30; (C) common answers include 30, 15, 7.5, and 0; (D) most subjects use randomization. Can you help me answer number 13 please?
learn.canterbury.ac.nz Clasarsom Nov 15-ICO EUC LEARN | AKO See the game below and answer the questions 8 to 11: Player-1 C Player-2 X, Y Y Player-1 9 14 8. Player-2 16 17 16 Nash Equilibrium in this game: Select one: O a. Playert: C; Player2: X O b. Playert: C; Player2: Y Oc. Playert: L; Player2: X Od. Playert: L; Player2: Y e. None
Consider the following price game: Firm 1 Firm 2 High Low High 20, 20 12, 24 Low 24, 12 14, 14 Remark: In simultaneous move games (games with rows and columns) theconvention is to write the row player’s payoff first and the column player’spayoff second. (a) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? Recall that for each playeryou should find the best response to each of the opponents’ strategies andunderline the associated payoff. Then look for a cell where both strategiesare best responses to each other. This is a Nash equilibrium. (b) Does either firm have a dominate strategy (a strategy that is always abest response)?
3 0: she makes a pront of $9 An is ISK AVCise and aunty she makes. Let P be the probability that it rains the day of the concert. Find the number P tha makes Ann indifferent between organizing the concert in the Club or at the Park. 8. Compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game below: Bungle F2 # Zippy E Left Right DOD F4 Up 2,-1 R I 20 F3 $ BAG 3 4 -2,0 HOT % 5 F5 Down 3,1 T 4,-2 VO MacBook Air 6 F6 Y & 7 F7 * U 8
Hi this is from a textbook. Thank you. Consider the following game in which Sally can play T or B and John chooses between L or R. Each player makes their choice simultaneously. If Sally chooses T and John chooses L, Sally gets a payoff of 5 and John has a payoff of 4. If Sally plays T and John R, Sally’s payoff is 8 and John gets 3. If Sally Chooses B and John L, the payoffs are 3 to Sally and 2 to John. Finally, if Sally chooses B and John R, the payoffs are 7 to Sally and 0 to John. Which statement is true? a) The Nash equilibrium is (B,R); this is a prisoners’ dilemma b) The Nash equilibrium is (T,R); this is a prisoners’ dilemma c) The Nash equilibrium is (T,R); this is not dominant strategy equilibrium d) The Nash equilibrium is (T,L); this is a dominant strategy equilibrium e) None of the above
20.38 C 1 Search il 4G O Microeconom... 1. In the sequential games such as the sequential Battle of the Sexes, why does the Nash equilibrium allow for outcomes with noncredible threats? 2. Left Right Up 1, 3 3, 1 Down 2, 2 4, 4 a. Find the Nash equilibrium or equilibria b. Which player, if any, has a dominant strategy? c. Does A benefit from changing the game by reducing his or her payoff in this way? 3. Noah and Xaviera love to play "Hide and Seek." It is a simple game, but it continues to amuse. It goes like this. Xaviera hides upstairs or downstairs. Noah can look upstairs or downstairs but not in both places. If he finds Xaviera, Noah gets one scoop of ice cream and Xaviera gets none. If he does not find Xaviera, Xaviera gets one scoop of ice cream and Noah gets none. a. Fill in the payoffs in the matrix below! Is this a zero-sum game? What are the Nash equilibria in pure strategies? Hide and Seek Xaviera Upstairs Downstairs Upstairs Noah Downstairs b. Find a Nash equilibrium in…
rock paper scissors гock 0. -3 1 рарer 1. -1 scissors -1 3 0. (a) Show that xT= ( ) and yT= (3) together are not a Nash equilibrium 3 3 313 for this modified game. (b) Formulate a linear program that can be used to calculate a mixed strategy x € A(R) that maximises Rosemary's security level for this modified game. (c) Solve your linear program using the 2-phase simplex algorithm. You should use the format given in lectures. Give a mixed strategy x E A(R) that has an optimal security level for Rosemary and a mixed strategy y E A(C) that has an optimal security level for Colin.
Consider the following game: Player 2 In Out Player 1 In -2,-2 2, 0 Out 0, 2 0, 0 (a) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game, or what are the Nash equilibriaof this game? (b) Does either firm have a dominate strategy (a strategy that is always abest response)? Which? (c) Suppose Player 1 could move before Player 2 and Player 2 could observe Player 1’s move. What do you think would happen?
Во ein g C. 190 d. 210 Inv est Do n't Diagram 1 Air bus Air bus Inv est Do n't Inv est Do n't (-25,-25) (170,0) (0,190) (0,0) Suppose that both Boeing and Airbus receive a subsidy of 20 units to invest. What is Boeing's equilibrium payoff in this game? a. -5 b. 0
2. Consider a game that game theory people refer to as the “ultimatum game.”We will refer to our two players as the “offerer” and the “decider”. How the gameworks is that the offerer proposes a way to split $1000 between the two players.While this could be done in a variety of ways, we will assume that the offerersonly has two possible proposals: Either a 50-50 split, or she offers the decider$50 and keeps the rest. The decider can either accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the money is split as proposed. If the offer is rejected, themoney spontaneously combusts and nobody gets anything. a) List the strategies for each player and write an extensive form version of thegame with payouts. b) List all the Nash equilibria of this game. c) Explain which, if any of the Nash equilibrium are not sub-game perfect. d) Write the game out in normal form and find the pure strategy Nashequilibrium. Explain how this matches with your answers to (b) and (c) . Alsoexplain why there…